4. British Views of the Far East Situation
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Some of the dark shadows of approaching war were lifted by a report of the Japanese Ambassador to London that a recent conciliatory speech of Australian Premier Menzies had been given as a gesture of friendship from Great Britain to Japan. [327] Furthermore, Admiral Nomura in Washington conversed with the British Ambassador, who told him that neither
[321] I, 382, 383.
[322] I, 381.
[323] I, 384, 385.
[324] I, 386.
[325] I, 387.
[326] I, 388.
[327] I, 389.
Page 52
the United States or England desired war in the Pacific, but that in case of difficulty the United States would back up England. According to the British Ambassador's interpretation of recent newspaper stories, the situation in the Far East was somewhat better than it had been, although it was still dangerous. [328]
65. British Counter Intelligence Against the Japanese [329]
The British were exercising censorship of foreign messages at various points in their worldwide communication net. Code messages passing from Havana to Bombay were seized by the British censor in India; [330] a Japanese steamship was stopped by an armed British vessel in the Gulf of Persia, and all mail was removed for inspection; [331] all mail carried on vessels touching at Hongkong was examined by the British authorities, which caused the Japanese to route vessels carrying important mail away from this port. [332]
JAPANESE-DUTCH RELATIONS
66. Japanese Threats Against the Netherlands East Indies
Rumors of approaching war between America and Japan were affecting all Japanese relations in the South Pacific, especially in the Netherlands East Indies where strenuous efforts were being made to keep out Japanese fishermen. [333] A conversation between a Japanese diplomat and an official of the Netherlands East Indies demonstrated some interesting views on both sides regarding the relative strength of the Japanese and the United States navies.
HOFSTRAATEN: "No, you are badly mistaken there. I am satisfied from what I have heard from American naval officers that they could sink the Japanese navy within six weeks."
ISIZAWA: "On the contrary, I have been told by Japanese navy men that in the event of an attack our ships could sink the entire American fleet within two weeks." [334]
Japan seemed to be ready to take severe measures against the Netherlands East Indies, if the occasion arose. [335] Unfortunately, the Japanese had succeeded in getting access to secret documents and messages sent from the Netherlands Ministry in Bangkok to Dutch authorities. A request was sent to Tokyo for a Dutch language translator who could take advantage of this situation, [336] but very shortly thereafter, a secret investigation by the Netherlands government disclosed that a native employee, who possessed keys for all the safes, had been in contact with the Japanese Military Attaché. Since the Japanese had learned of this investigation from a telegram of the British Attaché in Bangkok, it may be presumed that Japan was able to decipher some of the British codes. [337]
Though documentary evidence is not available at the present writing, it is possible that the contents of the original message disclosing this leak in the Netherlands Indies government was revealed to proper authorities at Bangkok by United States officials so that proper measures could be taken to prevent damaging revelations.
[328] I, 390.
[329] I, 391.
[330] I, 392.
[331] I, 393.
[332] I, 394.
[333] I, 398.
[334] I, 395.
[335] Ibid.
[336] I, 396.
[337] I, 397.
Page 53
67. Dutch Counter Intelligence Against the Japanese
As early as January 10, 1941, the Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies were complaining to Tokyo that the Dutch authorities were intensifying their surveillance of Japanese nationals. For this reason, secret documents concerning Japanese plans for arousing the natives and Chinese residents against Dutch authorities were burned to avert their discovery. [338]
The Dutch authorities were exercising very close censorship over the mail of all foreign residents, and Tokyo was warned to send all secret correspondence by official couriers. [339] Since Japanese diplomats in the Netherlands East Indies were engaged in intelligence work, [340] they urged that only civilian couriers be used instead of military men, so as to avoid all misunderstandings with Dutch Authorities. This plea was occasioned by the fact that many Japanese entering Netherlands East Indies as diplomatic couriers were military men in disguise, who were easily spotted by Dutch counter espionage authorities. [341]
68. Japanese-Dutch East Indies Negotiations
Repercussions from Mr. Matsuoka's visit to Berlin and Rome were felt even in the Netherlands East Indies, where Japanese representatives claimed that the refusal of the Dutch to grant them trade advantages was influenced by the British and American governments. The Netherlands government insisted, however, that its decision was based on its own policy of not sending anything to Japan which could then be forwarded to Germany. All Japanese efforts to persuade the Dutch that their goods would not be reshipped to Europe seemed to be unavailing. This was especially true after the visit of Mr. Matsuoka to the Axis capitol. [342]
Japanese diplomatic dispatches from Batavia were quite frank in their appraisal of this situation. Not disguising the fact that all verbal arguments had been of little avail and that, therefore, a new approach would have to be made if their proposal was to be realized, Japanese agents reported that Mr. Matsuoka's trip to Berlin had blocked their negotiations to buy more essential products from the Netherlands East Indies. [343]
Agreeing that the Dutch had no intention of blockading Japan, but were determined to see to it that no supplies of military value would reach Germany from the Netherlands East Indies, Japanese negotiators informed Tokyo that the situation was approaching a crisis. There seemed to be little doubt that the Japanese were planning to seize the Indies eventually, but negotiations were being carried on to ensure a constant stream of supplies until a favorable opportunity arose for military conquest of this area. [344]
JAPANESE-THAI RELATIONS
The Japanese were exerting constant pressure on Thailand to assure themselves of closer economic relations with this country. According to the Japanese, the British were ready to invade Thailand at any time that Japanese-Thaiese cooperation became too great. [345] Japan was somewhat disturbed when Thailand resumed diplomatic relations with Russia, and
[338] I, 399.
[339] I, 400-402.
[340] I, 403, 404.
[341] I, 405, 406.
[342] I, 407-410.
[343] Ibid.
[344] I, 411, 412.
[345] I, 413.
Page 54
Tokyo did not hesitate to inform its diplomats that Japanese-Thailand relations should tend toward promoting Thailand's reliance on Japan. [346] Propaganda broadcasts were transmitted to this area from Tokyo, [347] and though Japan desired a radio beacon for military purposes, Japanese diplomats explained to the Thaiese that it was needed for the safety of the Thailand-Japan Air Service. [348]
In mid-April Japan's pressure on Thailand became intensified. The Thaiese were informed that Japan expected them to accept her offers of assistance; there could be no mistaking Japanese intentions for this area. [349]
The remaining chapters of this study, with their appendices, will appear in subsequent volumes which will be published in the near future for the information of higher authorities who need to know.
[346] I, 414.
[347] I, 415.
[348] I, 416.
[349] I, 417.
Page A-1
APPENDIX I
Preliminary Phase
(February 14, 1941- May 12, 1941)
PART A—THE HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS
No. 1
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
February 15, 1941
# 85.
On the 14th at noon I presented President Roosevelt with my credentials and at the same time with Former Ambassador HORINOUCHI's release from office. In my separate numbers 86 [a] and 87 [b] I describe my own formal statements at the presentation ceremony together with the President's formal responses.
Secretary HULL sat with us during the ceremony and the President assumed a very attentive attitude. We talked of a number of things, in the course of which he referred to the situation in the United States, speaking as follows:
"At present Japanese-American relations are following a gradually worsening path. Incidents in China have mounted to over a hundred and troubles between Japan and the United States are inciting American public opinion. Furthermore, the newspapers of both countries are printing at random inciting articles. This is a matter to be worried about. Secretary HULL and I are endeavoring to quiet public opinion but you will remember the case of the sinking of the Maine long ago and only four years ago happened the Panay incident. I am awfully worried because I fear that through some untoward incident the worst may happen. Japan is gradually penetrating further and further south toward the Hainan Island, the Spratley Islands, French Indo-China and Thai. Now you know that in consideration of the 3-power pact Japan is not free to act independently. I fear that Germany and Italy are going to bring force to bear on you."
In response I said: "Well, it is my intention to do my utmost to prevent a rupture in Japanese-American relations. My personal opinion is that Japan and the United States ought not quarrel with each other but rather when the time comes let both countries have the grave mission of bringing about world peace."
The President replied: "I strongly agree with you and will do my best to improve relations between Japan and the United States, and whenever necessary at any time I will be glad to have interviews with you."
[a] Plain text.
[b] Not available.
Trans. 2-19-41
Page A-2
No. 2
FROM: Washington (Morishima)
TO: Tokyo
January 13, 1941
# 21. (Your special message # 2.) [a]
I see by the papers that WAKASUGI, formerly Consul General in New York, is to accompany Ambassador NOMURA as an adviser and is coming to Washington. No doubt you have been considering what official status he is to be given in his capacity as an adviser. I might say, however, that if he is to be called merely a special official, it would be impossible for him to ask for diplomatic privileges in the United States and, furthermore, he would experience inconvenience in his more important activity and in contacting members of the Congress and the press, to say nothing of the State Department officials. Consequently, he would not be able to accomplish the mission for which he is to be especially sent. I wonder how it would be if the precedent set by Minister NISHI, when he was made a Special Ambassador to Soviet Russia, is followed and WAKASUGI, by special consideration, could be given the combined status of Minister and Counselor. I might also mention, for your reference in this connection, that among the diplomats here, especially in the case of those from Italy, -----, Mexico, Brazil, and Great Britain, there are in each office two Commercial Attaches, in addition to the Ambassador, and one of these two Attaches is given the status of Minister.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 1-15-41
No. 3
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
17 February 1941
# 93.
(We are unable to decipher your message # 67a from the 18th letter on. Please retransmit.)
Regarding Wakasugi's rating, besides the situation explained in my message # 216, Great Britain has given one of her Counselors a Minister's ranking, and also shortly she will add one more Minister. (Minister to Canada is to be transferred to Canberra as High Commissioner.)
It has also been reported that U.S. will promote her Counselor at London to a Minister, and the Legal Adviser to the newly appointed Ambassador, KOHEN (Cohen?) will also be given the Minister's ranking.
In view of the above and in consideration of the performance of his duties in relation to the State Department and the diplomatic corps in general, please decide on Wakasugi's diplomatic rank and reply as soon as possible.
[a] Re appointment of Col. Iwakuro as Aide to Military Attaché at Washington.http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG
[b] Re status of Wakasugi.
Trans. 3-5-41
Page A-3
No. 4
FROM: Washington (Japanese Ambassador)
TO: London
February 14, 1941
# 6. Message from Tokyo # 68. (Part 1 of 3)
In my recent discussions in the Diet this Foreign Minister in order to persuade the United States to reflect have frankly expressed our attitude and determination and endeavor to make it clear that our national strength is not exhausted. Now when you take office, will you please begin with the President and inform both the officials and people of the United States of the following points. Please endeavor to impress them upon your listeners:
1. It is my mission to rescue our civilization from chaos and to bring peace and prosperity to the Pacific in which both Japan and America are interested. In the accomplishment of this task our two countries ought to cooperate and pull together. Since the new year, compromises between our two countries have been less in evidence. Unfortunately the American officials and people refuse to understand our real intention; or else they mistakenly deem that our aims are at odds with their own welfare. This is a very grave and dangerous hallucination. We have an uncheckable determination to oppose any country whose design it is to thwart us. Now, I hear that the Americans think that among our people there are those who secretly despise the Tri-Partite Treaty. (Of course, all countries have their dissenters.) The Americans hope that, through the prolongation of the China trouble, we will be shorn of our national strength and that if they take a strong attitude toward us they can break the solidarity of our people and bring us to our knees. At least, I hear there are such Americans, and if it is true, this sort of mistake may bring about most regrettable results.
2. It is true that our national strength is to be a certain extent exhausted; however, it is not as much so as American propaganda would indicate. Further, it is the character of our people to resent pressure from the outside and to combat it savagely. By adding to our troubles, losses and our setbacks in war, the Americans should know that they are only consolidating the morale of our folk. Now, I have seen many Americans who have traveled among us Japanese and, judging from them, if the United States was in the same predicament, the same thing would result. The Americans ought to know what result will come from following this sort of policy. On the other hand, our people must not forget that by departing from reason and acting emotionally, making compromises with people who meet them half way with sympathy and kindness, they often get further than in any other way. Now, perhaps those who are the leaders in the United States may be this sort of people.
Trans. 2-17-41
No. 4A
FROM: Washington (Japanese Ambassador)
TO: London
February 14, 1941
# 6. Message from Tokyo # 68. (Part 2 of 3) [a]
3. Do you know that in all Japan there is not one man who actually wants to fight the United States? Unfortunately, however, if trouble of any sort arises between Japan and the United States, the Soviet is sure to work directly upon the American people and try to instigate them to war. America has never started a war willfully on her own.
Page A-4
4. What does the United States have to gain by fighting Japan? In all the United States, I will wager there is not one who desires to defeat Japan and see the race of Yamato shattered but, on the other hand, if there be a man who thinks of that even in his wildest dreams, let him know once and for all that this cannot be done. Now let's suppose for a moment that they did defeat us and forced upon us another Versailles Treaty. It would not take us any thirty years to throw off that yoke. No, our deliverance would come swiftly. Behold the resurgence of the German Reich! Japan has a government such as no country on this earth possesses. By the eternal glory of our emperor, the King of Heaven, we have overcome every vicissitude through which we have passed in years gone by. If we were to go down now, swifter than that of Germany would be our restoration and like lightening would come our vengeance and in this there is no element of doubt. The imperial family is the fountainhead from whence issues the uniform stream of our national existence. We have a peerless nation, totally and completely incomprehensible to all outsiders. In sum, if Japan and the United States, who have always been friends, now break, it will be a tragedy for both and the civilization of the world will be cast into chaos. Under these circumstances I can tell you one thing; the United States ought to ------ absolutely must ----- think this matter through.
[a] DoD comment: Part 2, above, of Mr. Matsuoka's message was not available to the original historian. Through recent research, the message has been located. Such instances will occur throughout this history from time to time; suffix "A" will so indicate.
Trans. 2-17-41
No. 5
FROM: Washington (Japanese Ambassador)
TO: London
February 14, 1941
# 6. Message from Tokyo # 68. (Part 3 of 3).
5. If Japan and the United States fight, Soviet Russia is sure to move; and suppose that Japan is completely defeated as the United States hopes that she will be, then Soviet Russia will grab the whole of China and Bolshevize her, and on the wave of her success, she will Bolshevize the greater part of Asia. I wonder if the United States presages such an eventuality? If, in one chance out of a million, Japan should go under, a fearful situation would prevail in the Far East.
6. The foreign policy of Imperial Japan is based on a logic unique in the world. Its utmost concern is the security of world peace and prosperity. She had not, in the least, any intention of attacking the United States. Therefore, that the United States is intensely working towards the building up of her defenses is a phenomenon beyond our comprehension. Japan and the United States should never oppose each other, but cooperate. Recent words and actions of political leaders in the United States have been extremely provocative, and it would seem that their object is to build a defense sufficiently powerful to enable the United States to act as a police official for the whole world. Such a thing is indeed not only regrettable for the sake of peace in the Pacific, but also unbecoming of the United States. Instead of interfering often with the right to livelihood enjoyed by the other powers, the United States, I believe, should awaken to the responsibilities that are hers by right and that she has towards world peace, and in the spirit of mutual concession, should devote all her energy to the solution of the impending crisis and to the promotion of the well-being of humanity.
Relay to London.
Trans. 2-17-41
Page A-5
No. 6
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State.
(Paraphrase)
3
TOKYO, Jan 27, 1941—6 p.m.
(Received January 27—6:38 a.m.)
(125)
A member of the Embassy was told by my ----- colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of "trouble" between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use of all the Japanese military facilities. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic.
Grew
711.94/1935: Telegram
(S.D. II, P. 133)
No. 7
FROM: Honolulu (Okuda)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) [a]
February 15, 1941
# 027.
Chief of Office Routing.
To Chief of Fifth Branch, Section 3 of the General Staff and Captain Ogawa:
WOTUTO requested on the 14th that the information noted below be forwarded to you. I find it difficult to relay the information contained in paragraph 1, but I do so anyway.
1. Indications seem to be that the U.S. has decided to declare war on Japan within the next three weeks.
2. Definite advice will be available twenty-four hours in advance of such a declaration by the U.S.
3. The U.S. plans to cut Japanese trade lanes to South America.
[a] To foreign ministry.
Trans. 2-18-41
Page A-6
No. 8
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
February 19, 1941
# 095
At the time of my assuming my post the newspapers of this country manifested a spirit of welcoming me personally as one who has a large number of friends in this country and as being well acquainted with conditions here, but they are all agreed in saying that as far as the future of Japanese-American relations is concerned there is nothing to do but wait for future developments. The newspapers have also reported the President's press conference of the 11th (see my special intelligence report) and activities of the Japanese Navy in the French Indo China area; taking the attitude that Japanese-American relations still permit of no optimism.
To cite some of the more noteworthy newspapers articles, the New York Herald Tribune of the 12th pointed out the great significance of the statement by President Roosevelt on the day of Ambassador Nomura's assumption of his post, to the effect that there will be no change in the established policy of assistance to Britain, even though the U.S. should become involved in war in the Far East; and asserted that even though Ambassador Nomura will likely begin conversations with the U.S. government officials looking to Japanese-American negotiations, unless the Japanese are prepared to make greater concessions than they are generally anticipated now, there is very little hope of any success. It also set forth that the Ambassador personally is friendly to the U.S., that during his office as Foreign Minister he had worked for the renewal of the trade treaty, and that he will likely renew his efforts for the conclusion of a treaty.
The Evening Star on the 12th related how the German and Italian diplomatic representatives in Washington turned out to welcome the Ambassador at the station on his arrival, suggesting that Germany and Italy expect the new Ambassador to bring about some joint diplomatic moves with the German-Italian Axis in Washington. It was asserted that local diplomatic circles will be watching with interest to see what conciliatory moves will be made by Ambassador Nomura in trying to enlist American good-will for the improvement of Japanese-American relations. It was further stated that when it comes to the actual problems, expressions of intentions and personal relationships, mean nothing, but that friendship of the U.S. for Japan will depend upon Japan's actions in the Far East and South Pacific, and that the new Ambassador knows well what the conditions are for bringing about closer relations between Japan and America.
Trans. 2-26-41
No. 9
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
February 19, 1941
# 96.
Although it has been but a few days since I assumed my post, I wish to report my general observations.
(1) There are definite indications of American-British solidarity and identity of feelings Germany in the present war. Although no tangible proof can be given, the general sentiment in America against Germany appears to be as strong as, if not stronger, than it was during the world war.
Page A-7
(2) Since the Tripartite Treaty, there is a definite feeling among the people here that Japan is their real enemy, and also that, coinciding with the German spring offensive, Japan will embark on her southward advance and that Japan is using the Thailand-French Indo-China situation as an excuse to prepare herself for an attack on Singapore.
(3) There is much talk of America's backing England, Australia, New Zealand, and Dutch Indies against Japan's southward advance.
(4) In the event of American-British joint naval action, many capital ships will be needed in the Pacific and many smaller ships in the Atlantic. Therefore, if the situation demands it, British capital ships will take over the Pacific area and American destroyers will take over the Atlantic area. On the basis of this argument, there are some who believe that in exchange for the aid of latest type British capital ships, America will furnish destroyers to assist England. This is a very important question, deserving our utmost consideration.
(5) Some are bold enough to say that, in a year or two, the American fleet at Hawaii will make a westward advance, claiming that Japan's southward advance is part of her national plan and for that reason America cannot maintain a neutral attitude. Should Britain fall, the Americans will add whatever remains of the British fleet to her own fleet to attack Japan.
Please communicate the contents of this message to the War Minister and the Navy Minister.
Trans. 2-21-41
No. 10
February 20, 1941
Japan Must Expand Nomura Says
Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, new Japanese Ambassador, said yesterday that his country must expand southward, that he hopes the expansion can be by peaceful economic means but that he cannot promise Japan will not use force to carry out the program.
Describing Japan as a nation bent only on preserving the peace, the Ambassador declared that war can be avoided between the United States and Japan unless the initiative comes from the American side.
"Japan will expand to the south peacefully and economically," he said in Japanese to an interpreter at his first press conference since arriving in Washington February 11.
Doesn't Expect War With U.S.
Under the present economic bloc system Japan can no longer get goods from far places. Naturally she has to get them nearby.
"I cannot say with absolute definiteness whether Japan will have to resort to force to secure these necessities," he added.
He did not expect war with the United States, he said, unless this country makes the first move.
Six feet in height and a veteran of more than three decades in his country's navy, the Ambassador took great delight in his rejoinders to questions fired by a group of forty reporters.
Though he has a good command of the English language, Nomura spoke through an interpreter, yesterday, apparently to give himself more time to prepare careful answers to all questions.
Page A-8
The picture he painted of Japan's activities and of her "new order" for Asia was one of a peaceful nation intent on removing trade barriers.
Atmosphere Not so Good
Persistently reporters attempted to get him to express some of Japan's objections to recent American and British military movements in the Far East, to admit a danger of war with the United States, to voice Japan's objections to fortification of the far Pacific Island of Guam and to disclose the degree of cooperation existing between Japan and Germany.
None of these attempts was successful.
Whenever a barbed question was asked the Ambassador and his interpreter would laugh uproariously, slap thighs and prepare an answer.
The closest that Nomura came to saying that Japanese-American relations were something less than rosy was a statement at the start, that he found the "atmosphere in Washington not quite so good as I expected when I was in Japan. I thought it would not be so bad".
"Do you believe there is danger of war between the United States and Japan," Nomura was asked.
"Personally I believe that there should not be war, and there will not be war," he replied. "But of course that is my personal opinion."
"Can there be any commercial equality in Asia in view of Japan's program?" was the next question.
"I believe that eventually, when peace and normal conditions are restored in China, it will be quite possible to restore normal policies and guarantees to United States commerce," Nomura said.
"Of course at present there are military controls. Without these controls it would be impossible to carry out our operations. It is inevitable that there will be certain cases of impairing third-power interests. But this is merely temporary."
Queried on Guam
Asked if Japan objected to strengthening by the United States of Guam and Samoa, voted yesterday by the house, Nomura replied:
"Of course from the Japanese side we don't like to see an air or naval base so near our territory, especially a base of a great power like the United States."
"But we cannot interfere."
Asking if he had any objection to British reinforcements arriving at Singapore, the Japanese envoy replied similarly: "Singapore doesn't concern us. It is a British base."
Asked whether he had brought with him any concrete suggestions for improving relations, Nomura replied that "I can not answer that."
"Do you think Japan will have to expand her territory some more in order to establish this new order?" the Ambassador was asked.
"No," he replied—in English.
Regarding current activities in Indo-China and Thailand he said,
"Indo-China and Thailand have special reference to the China war. The main object of Japan there is the economic, or exchange of goods." He explained that his country is interested chiefly in making sure that no war supplies get into China from Indo-China or Thailand."
Nomura was asked, "Will Japan extend her relations with the Axis?"
"There is a treaty and Japan will stick to it," he said.
If the United States goes to war against Germany would Japan declare war on the United States?" was the next stickler.
Page A-9 http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG
"I don't think the United States will declare war against Germany, so the situation you refer to will not arise." Nomura answered.
"Does the treaty obligate Japan to go to war against the United States if the United States goes to war against Germany?" the envoy was asked.
"That is a question of treaty interpretation; I will refrain from going into it," he said cautiously.
Then he volunteered the following:
"When Japan entered upon the Axis treaty it was her intention to preserve the peace. Her motives were entirely peaceful. We wanted to avoid war with the United States."
Asked for a comment on a statement by Undersecretary of State Welles, Tuesday, that Japan should express her intention in deeds not words the Japanese Ambassador said:
"That remark by Mr. Welles may mean some criticism against Japanese or some other country. Japan sincerely tries to carry out her words."
The press conference broke up when a reporter asked whether he believed "the Roosevelt Administration is trying to get the United States into a war."
"I'll ask you," said Admiral Nomura, laughing heartily.
Nomura was characterized recently by President Roosevelt as an old friend.
(Washington Post)—(20 February 1941: Columns 1 & 2)
No. 11
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington
February 27, 1941
# 100.
On the 27th the German Ambassador called on me and said that according to a telegram from the German Ambassador in Washington, you said, in response to a question put to you at the press conference regarding Japan's stand in the event of German-American war, that "it involved the question of the application of the Tripartite Agreement."
As the German Ambassador wishes to verify the above phrase let me know the facts relative to it.
Trans. 3-3-41
No. 12
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
February 28, 1941
# 122. Re your # 100. [a]
At a press interview on February 19th, they cornered me with queries as to whether Japan would join the war in case the United States does. I explained, "That is a matter of the Tripartite Pact, and I do not wish to discuss it. Originally this Pact was concluded with peaceful intentions toward the United States."
Page A-10
For your information I am sending you the clipping (Washington Post) by separate wire (# 123). [b]
[a] The German Amb. in Tokyo desires verification of your statement in Washington re the question of application of the Tripartite Agreement being involved in the event of a U.S.-German war.)
[b] See No. 13.
Trans. 3-4-41
No. 13
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
March 2, 1941
# 123.
"If the United States goes to war against Germany, would Japan declare war on the United States," was the next stickler. "I don't think the United States will declare war against Germany, so the situation you refer to will not arise," NOMURA answered. "Does the treaty obligate Japan to go to war against the United States if the United States goes to war against Germany," the Envoy was asked. "That is a question—I will refrain from going into it," he said cautiously. Then he volunteered the following: "When Japan entered upon the Axis Treaty it was her intention to preserve the peace. Her motives were entirely peaceful. We wanted to avoid war with the United States."
Note: This is request message. It was referred to in No. 14 (Tokyo to Washington # 107) in which Matsuoka warns Nomura to be extremely careful in his replies to such questions and to keep pace with the Foreign Office.
Trans. 3-11-41
No. 14
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington
March 4, 1941
# 107.
Re your # 123 [a].
Though Your Excellency is sufficiently aware of the necessity of being extremely cautious in your replies to questions as to whether Japan will enter the conflict in the event the United States attacks Germany, I am gradually clarifying this in the affirmative at the Plenary Budget Sessions of the Lower House. As far as your manner of answering questions is concerned, henceforth, when questions are put to you on successive occasions, please keep pace with me. Please transmit your wire and this one to Germany.
[a] No. 13.
Trans. 3-8-41
Page A-11
No. 15
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
March 8, 1941
# 136.
(Part 1 of 2) Strictly Secret.
To be handled in Government Code.
Today, the 8th, at HULL's residence, we had a secret conversation all by ourselves lasting for more than two hours.
The Secretary explained to me his economic policy and said that the economics of extreme nationalism was bound to invite war and that he had at one time concluded a treaty especially with Canada even against preferentialism practiced within the British Empire. From this point on we entered into the main stream of our discussion. I said:
"The President had once pointed out that Japanese-American relations were in a state of deterioration. Suppose that the worse came to worst; this worst state of affairs would recur every ten or twenty years and nothing would be so unfortunate as that to both countries."
The Secretary agreed with me in this view, and so I proceeded, saying:
"We need, at this time, to maintain in a cool-headed manner our promises to each other and reduce to the minimum anything that is provocative." He again concurred in this.
I then warned him by emphatically pointing out how the embargo arouses antagonism. However, he did not make any satisfactory reply.
Then the Secretary stated:
"The great aspiration on the part of HITLER for military conquest is as insatiable as were those of NAPOLEON and ALEXANDER. It appears that Japan approves of such conquest and that what she professes as the New Order in the Far East is in fact merely the conquest of the Great Far East by force of arms."
Then our conversation shifted to the subject of China, French Indo-China and Thailand. I said, "What Japan is seeking in China are three things, namely; as may be clearly seen from Japan's treaty with that government, a good neighbor (of course if a third power attempts to establish military bases in China, Japan would object to it as a threat to her); economic cooperation (Japan places great importance on such products as iron and coal. She has no intention of interfering with any third power in the matter of ordinary commerce); and an anti-Communist agreement (the Communist Party is succeeding in the northwestern part of China), and Japan is trying to get these on the basis of equality. So long as the army is in China, it has for its object victory. War, as it is fought today, is an economic war as well; and so it is inevitable that the economic state in the occupied territories assumes the form of economic planning and control."
The Secretary did not very strongly object to this view, and merely stated "The question of the 250 protests could well be settled without touching upon this question."
Trans. 3-13-41
Page A-12
No. 16
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
March 8, 1941
# 136.
(Part 2 of 2)
Strictly secret. To be handled in Government code.
I said to him: "Heretofore French Indo-China has followed the policy of seclusion too closely. It is necessary for Japan to get her to open her doors in order that Japan may cope with the present tendency of dividing the world into economic spheres. As to Thailand, we would like to have her also become a good neighbor of ours. I suppose you already know that we have a treaty of friendship with her. I don't know personally whether naval forces were used or not in the recent mediation. They may have been used in demonstrating our power so as to hasten a successful conclusion of the mediation."
To this, he did not say a word in reply.
Then the Secretary said: "How about the advance towards Singapore and into the Dutch East Indies?", which he thought was the most important point of our conversation and, quoting the arguments presented by politicians, he seemed to express fear over the possibility of Japan's planning a more aggressive military conquest in the Greater Far East.
I explained, "There was no danger of Japan advancing towards Singapore and the Dutch East Indies by means of force unless circumstances make it unavoidable. What Japan wants from the Dutch East Indies is of an economic nature."
As regards 'unless circumstances make it unavoidable,' since it was previously stated that if the United States stiffens the embargo, those who advocate that we should acquire oil wells would get the upper hand regardless of the question of whether we must acquire oil from some other place, I asked him what he thought of this. The Secretary seemed to think that Japan would be forced rather by the Tripartite Alliance than by the embargo. (Regarding this point, the President also expressed a similar view at the time of our first meeting).
Furthermore, the Secretary appeared to be greatly concerned over the alleged visit which you are to make to the European countries.
At any rate, today's conversation was only a beginning. He said that he would discuss such questions only with an Ambassador and "off the record" whether the discussion is official or private; and added that although the President is in complete agreement with his views, he would be glad to arrange for my interview with the President. He went so far as to show me the back-door entrance to the White House so that I could avoid the newspaper men.
We agreed to consider today's conversation as having taken place with neither party taking the initiative. Since I expect to have similar conversations in the future, will you please be especially careful not to let this matter leak out to the officials on the outside.
Trans. 3-13-41
No. 17
FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo
March 9, 1941
# 134.
On the 5th, Wakasugi met and talked with Roy Howard. The outline of what Howard had to say is given below, for whatever interest it may have:
1. Howard said that his travel schedule had made it impossible for him to have accepted the kind invitation of the Foreign Minister. He also said that he felt the necessity of rushing
Page A-13
home to the U.S. to aid his friend Wilkie in his campaign for the Presidency which at that time seemed to be going against him.
However, Howard said, he is considering making another visit to the Far East as soon as the British Aid Bill, which is at present being discussed in Congress, is decided upon.
2. Howard, on his last trip, flew from Rangoon to Chungking and thence to Hongkong. While in Chungking he called on Chiang Kai-Shek and other key men. Chiang's spirits were so high that he appeared even younger than he did when Howard saw him on the previous trip. His, as well as the others', spirit to fight on against Japan is as ever on the increase.
Howard said that he asked Chiang Kai-Shek if he had any intention of accepting Japanese demands of setting up a patrol area between North China and the Soviet Union to guard against Communism; to suppress anti-Japanese sentiment in China; to cooperate in the economic development of China, and through these acts to settle Sino-Japanese differences.
Chiang's reply, Howard said, could not be quoted here but the gist of it was that now that Japan had set up the Nanking government and installed Wang Ching-wei therein, there was no hope of any amicable settlement.
3. With regard to the query as to the possibility of settling the Sino-Japanese incident through the mediation of the President of the United States, Howard said that if Japan guaranteed non-aggression against China, there was, in his opinion, a possibility. (The same opinion was expressed by President Stewart of Yenching University in Peking when Wakasugi saw him there recently.)
4. Howard said that he knew the Foreign Minister well. "Matsuoka", he said, "has a realistic view of politics. He knows that win or lose the battle, an American-Japanese war would end in nothing but losses for both countries and absolutely no gains. This conviction on the part of Matsuoka is one guarantee of peace between the two countries."
He added confidentially that he has described the man Matsuoka as a realist to the President.
5. Howard said that the most difficult problem in the relations between the U.S. and Japan is America's ignorance of the truth behind Japan's avowed goal of establishing a New Order in East Asia.
Americans, as a rule, are under the impression that-----(garbled). Through this, Japan, disregarding all foreign interests and intentions in the Far East, will attempt to do what she pleases to suit herself through force of arms.
Since the signing of the Tripartite Pact, this impression is growing stronger all the time, for Germany has used this very same system in Europe.
It is true that the U.S. has used force against her neighbors in the past, Howard said, giving as instances Nicaragua, Mexico, and Cuba. However, since then, the U.S. has been trying to right these wrongs and to offer cooperative assistance.
At present, the U.S. policy is to settle all differences with foreign countries by treaty terms and through international law. In this way, she is hoping to bring about order throughout the world.
In view of this, the U.S. cannot tolerate the setting up of a new order program fashioned to suit Japan and Japan only, for, if allowed, it would break down the U.S.'s policy from its very foundation.
The country is unified in the belief that two policies cannot exist in this world.
To ease this fundamental difference between the two countries, Howard suggests that the fact that Japan's real intentions are peaceful and involve only economic factors, be explained by someone like the Foreign Minister. He adds that in his opinion, it would be well to repeat at every opportunity that Japan does not have any political or militaristic ambitions; that Japan is not embarked upon any domination program.
Page A-14
6. Japan is not grasping the most important points to publicize in her propaganda work. It is useless for Japan to spend so much time trying to explain the China Incident.
Americans are very ignorant of foreign affairs, he said. This can be seen by the fact that they are under the impression that a totalitarian state like China is a Democracy. Americans with Communistic leanings even claimed the Soviet Union to be a democracy until the German-Soviet Union anti-aggression pact was signed.
Japan should publicize the fact that in actuality, Japan is similar to a democracy and that there is no reason for the U.S. to look upon her as an enemy.
Mailed to all consuls general in U.S. and Canada, (plus Honolulu).
Trans. 3-11-41
No. 18
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
March 8, 1941
# 135.
To be handled in Government Code.
(Secret outside the Department).
I had an opportunity to talk with many well-known persons and newspaper men in New York. Viewing the developments taking place in the two countries, giving aid to Britain has virtually become a national policy with nationwide support. The influence of the Isolationists is steadily declining and although no one advocates the sending of troops to Europe, pending the passage of the bill to aid Great Britain, preparations are progressing for shipment of arms and materials to Britain in increasing numbers. Eventually, many say, that American warships will be used to convoy these shipments. Although at present there is no likelihood of Congress declaring war, it is certain that the President as a Commander-in-Chief has the power to dispatch warships to any part of the world.
The United States believes that if Great Britain succeeds in withstanding the German spring offensive, the war would become a drawn out affair in view of the fact that submarine warfare is not intended to be decisive but one of gradual exhaustion, and, therefore, the prospect of a victory would increase. Although the United States realizes that in comparison with the position Germany held during the first World War, it is at present much stronger, the people do not discuss this subject. As to Japanese-American relations, they believe they have reached a stalemate and since the United States does not wish inwardly to face crises on two fronts simultaneously, the China question has somewhat receded from the focus of interest. Due to the fact that peaceful settlement has been reached recently in French Indo-China, the people of the United States did not make a great ado over this question; however, as regards the question of French Indo-China versus Thai, they regard this question as a policy on the part of Japan to acquire bases for further southward advance, and so, if troops are moved further in the direction of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, they will begin to consider the situation as very serious for both the United States and Great Britain. Consequently, in such an event the United States would launch a thorough-going embargo against Japan and then, although the United States would not move her principal naval forces westward, she might cut off our sea routes and thus institute what may be called a long distance blockade. They see that there is a chance of such a strategy developing into a long-drawn-out and extensive guerrilla war on the sea.
As to the Axis Powers, they regard Italy as having already fallen under German pressure and for this reason they do not consider her an important factor. In other words, Germany comes
Page A-15
first; Japan, second. For this reason, Japan should face the situation in a cool-headed manner and avoid, as far as possible, expressing views that may be provocative. Inasmuch as there is the possibility of the present war becoming a long-drawn-out affair, Japan should make ready for any unforeseen eventuality ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- I believe that there is little prospect of improvements being achieved by means of temporary makeshifts and that there is no other way but for Japan to adopt a bold counter-policy.
Please transmit this message to the Premier and to the Navy and War Ministers.
Trans. 3-11-41
No. 19
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
February 25, 1941
# 112.
The following are the impressions I got as the result of meeting with various foreign representatives. I forward it to you for whatever value it may be.
1. With Japanese-U. S. relations in a critical condition, it is natural that the newspapers are full of speculations as to the possibility of war between the two countries. Inquiries of me on this point are frequent, as may be imagined. I have replied to all questions concerning the "southward expansion" program along the lines contained in your instructions.
2. I met the British Ambassador on this the 25th. He spoke very softly and his general attitude was very calm and collected.
He said that even though Japan had decided to sit at the same table as Germany and Italy, England had no actual differences with Japan. He brought up the subject of our so-called "southward expansion", but when I explained the matter to him, indicated satisfaction and comprehension. He continued by saying that England's war spirit was high and that with the aid of the United States, victory was a certainty. Today, Italy as a threat to Egypt is a thing of the past.
He added that he hoped that Japan would not misjudge the general outlook.
I said that it seemed inevitable that a war which involved both naval and continental warfare would be a long drawn out affair. "Was England making preparations for a long drawn out War?" I asked.
He replied that it may be said today that the air force holds the key to victory or defeat. England is gradually strengthening her air power. Great Britain once said that the war would last for three years. It is just at the half way mark at present, he said.
3. The representative of the Soviet Union told me that the U.S.S.R. would probably remain neutral for an indefinite period.
4. The Italian representative said that Germany and Italy would not welcome a long term war. The United States, on the other hand, has the ability to withstand a war lasting several years, if they are determined to do so. Moreover, the U.S. is gradually moving in the direction of entering the war, he said.
Trans. 2-26-41
Page A-16
http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG
No. 20
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
14 March 1941
# 145.
As it had been reported that the President would soon be taking a vacation trip, I had arrangements made by the Secretary of State and had a secret interview with him for an hour and a half this afternoon. (The Secretary of State was present taking notes.) The conversation ranged over a number of topics, and I told him that if further positive assistance is given China, and the "embargo" against Japan is made more rigid, this would cause uneasiness among our people, and that there ought to be some way of doing something to improve relations between the two countries. To this the President replied that the most serious obstacle is the Tripartite Alliance, that this had been a surprise to the American people; who feel that likely there will be greater developments than are to be seen in the wording of the published text of the same, and that in view of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's visit to Europe it is feared that there might be a further drive southward in concerted action with Germany's offensive. I replied that this would not necessarily follow, that our foreign policy is determined not by the Foreign Minister alone, but by all the Cabinet members. Being a person who is reluctant to give assent ----- I did not expect that he would say anything ----- .
The Secretary was pleased over the day's interview and urged that Japan take the "initiative" in bringing about a better situation. (Just before this the President did say that there would likely be some way out.). Inasmuch as they had again inquired regarding the matter of a southward push, I replied that I thought there was no danger of this. The President also added that one great problem after the war will be the regulation armaments. He said that personally he is very fond of the Navy, (his private room is decorated with nothing but pictures of battleships), but that as we well know there are many difficulties involved in carrying on a war with the Pacific Ocean intervening, and that it would not be a wise thing to burden the people with the heavy costs of an armament race between Japan and the U.S.; also that the appearance of motion pictures of Matsuoka and Hitler would have a disquieting effect upon the people. I agreed that this is quite possible ----- (last 3 lines garbled).
(On request of Tokyo's # 122, the last three lines were retransmitted in # 149 (See I, 21) from Washington.)
Trans. 3-19-41
No. 21
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
17 March 1941
# 149.
Regarding your # 122 [a], the portion of the message requested retransmission is as follows: "I agreed that the was quite possible and we finished our talk in good spirits. Details will be sent later. Please keep this matter secret for future occasion."
[a] "Send last part of your # 145," (Nomura's talk with Roosevelt, 14 March.)
Trans. 8-11-41
Page A-17
No. 22
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
15 March 1941
# 146.
(In 4 parts, complete).
The particulars of my interview with the President on the 14th were as follows:
I began by saying that I would address him with the frankness of a seaman, and that he would please pardon if I appeared impolite. He remarked laughingly that my English would do. Further prefacing my remarks with the statement that while Japan does not wish to fight America, if the present attitudes of the two countries are persisted in, a crisis in the Pacific must be reached, I came to the question of the difficulties involved in carrying on a frontal war with America, and told him that in the event of a Japan-American war, a war in the Pacific would not be an easy thing for the United States either, that even if the U.S. should win, the result of such a war would be the loss of peace and order in the Far East, that Soviet influence would become prevalent in the Far East, bringing about a recurrence of the difficulties of the monarchial days. Manchukuo would likely come under this influence, with the danger of China and even the entire Far East becoming Sovietized. The U.S. would have nothing to gain thereby. On the other hand in meeting Great Britain's continental blockade in the Atlantic, Germany's use of submarines and airplanes to attack Great Britain's shipping in a counter-blockade would become increasingly violent, with bombings even of non-military establishments, and also greater activity in the way of British counter-attacks. This war cannot be terminated by (such means) but will become a long drawn out war of exhaustion. The former great war affords proof that a long drawn out war brings serious reactions socially to both the victors and the vanquished alike, if not indeed social revolution. (The President gave assent to this point.) At such a time as this both the governments of Japan and the U.S. bear a grave responsibility for cooperating in maintaining the peace of the Pacific, and for preventing the spread of hostilities.
Coming next to the question of Japan's policy on the continent, I stated that it was Japan's policy to reach a local settlement of the dispute between Japan and China and to prevent its spread, but that one reason for its having become as extensive and long drawn out as it has, is the absolute anti-Japanese attitude of the Nationalist Government. Inasmuch as I had explained to the Secretary of State, the other day, what it is that Japan asks of China, I would omit a repetition of this, only to say that the treaty made with the Wang government gives evidence of the spirit of good neighborliness, friendship, and equality with which we are cooperating in economic matters and in an effort to resist Communism.
(Part 2)
There seem to be various misunderstandings in regard to the new order in East Asia, and I myself do not know of any clear definition as to what it is, however, it does mean that Japan is to be able to secure the commodities essential to her existence while preserving friendly relations with the adjacent neighbor nations, and the "bloc" economics and the economic pressure of the powers have given impetus to this program. To go more into detail, we desire to have the economic and trade doors open to our nearby neighboring nations, and we are planning for cooperative prosperity, but we are making no demands for territory. It is the same thing as the Pan Americanism or good neighbor policy of your country, but due to the fact that we are not as clever as your country in carrying it out we frequently invite misunderstandings.
The President and the Secretary looked at each other and laughed; I told them that I believed that even these matters were not such as could not be settled without recourse to
Page A-18
war, but that if at this time further positive assistance is given China and if the "embargo" is made more rigid, the relations between the two nations would be still further aggravated, however I still believed that some way can be found for an amicable solution.
To this the President replied as follows:
(1) My grandfather traveled and traded in all parts of China ----- entered a certain harbor of Haiti (?) on a Japanese merchant ship ----- sold a lot of goods at 10¢ and 15¢ apiece to the Negroes, also entered Santiago, Cuba, and sold all the stock that had accumulated. ----- saw that Japan was well able to compete with other countries on a basis of equality.
(Part 3)
----- in regard to Mexico, for example, we would be able to overcome her by force, but this would result in more harm than good. Some senators have advocated the acquisition of the islands in the Caribbean, (this, he said, is no national secret), but he said that Great Britain paid out $20,000,000 for two million Negroes, and that there is no need of taking these over. He said that he could not believe that Japan could continue long to govern China with her civilization of several millenniums, even though she might do so for a time.
Hitler's success -—--- (the Secretary ----- agreed ----- repeating "world conquest -----. Iraq ----- make Africa a colonial territory -----. After Germany's victory in the war, and the new order in East Asia, the U.S. will stand ----- and there she can never consent to this. Furthermore when Mussolini with Hitler's ----- Germany victory, a friend of which Japan must beware.
(2) China has an old civilization and by means of the radio her language is becoming unified, and she is about to emerge from the period of ruling military cliques into national unity. Until rather recently Russia was made up of nomadic peoples, a large part of them illiterate. Her civilization is behind the times and she is ruled by one man, Stalin, and is not in a position to profit -----. According to the report of an attaché who was with the 8th Route Army, the program of the 8th Route Army is not Communistic but "educational", but he may be somewhat mistaken.
I then told him something of the way the Communist influence has permeated the northwestern areas of China, and that the Japan-China emergency must not be allowed to continue on indefinitely. -----.
(Part 4)
(3) The Tripartite Alliance stirred up the American people tremendously. As long as such a treaty exists there is danger that ----- developments ----- result in southern advance in concert with Germany.
I therefore explained to him that this treaty has been forced upon us by the oppressive acts of the U.S. and that its object was "preventative" and not "offensive" and that it is therefore to be called a peaceful treaty, but he said it remains to be seen what the results of the Foreign Minister's visit to Europe will be. However, there may still be some way of bringing about a change for better in the situation.
(4) The policy of the government is to break Germany and to help Britain to win, and therefore exports even to the Soviet, of cotton, and machine tools, for instance, if they enter Germany from Russia will increase Germany's power to continue the war. This has given rise to embarrassing problems between us and Russia. Further explanation was then made regarding the "embargo" against Japan.
(5) Now and then persons calling themselves representatives of the Japanese government come over, but the U.S. government cannot deal with them. However, if it is necessary, it is always ready to talk freely with the Ambassador, as we have today, through the President, or the Secretary of State.
Page A-19
At any rate the conversation was pleasant throughout and they were concerned over the situation in the Far East. The Secretary finally thanked me, and made the statement reported in the latter part of my previous message.
Please be careful that this, as well as the former (previous) message [a] by no means be allowed to leak out.
[a] (See I, 20 & 21).
Trans. 3-18-41
No. 23
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
20 March 1941
# 157.
My observations concerning the present activities of the United States are as follows:
On the 19th the Lower House approved the $7,000,000,000 "Aid for Britain" Budget by a vote of 337 to 55 and without amendments. In addition to this they had previously approved a $3,500,000,000 Defense Budget. The President recently made a stirring address. Now the belligerent spirit of the people is being stirred up so that they are beginning more and more to support the dictatorial powers of the President. Well, when it comes to actually assisting Great Britain, ships are what is most needed and at present Great Britain's month losses, through sinking, amount to 500,000 tons. The argument has been put forward that in the United States' ship building program, it is better to construct more small craft than warships. In any case it is very difficult to speedily increase ship building capacity. Nevertheless, it is being said that by next year twice as many craft will be produced as this year. When it comes to delivering ships to Great Britain, there is a growing feeling here that, if necessary, they should be convoyed by American warships. By and large, it appears that the officials are making a great many military preparations. I do not think that the Congress will ever declare war, but for that matter the United States is actually already in the war. Influential American officials say that Germany may have a temporary success, and even though she succeeds in landing troops in Great Britain, long term occupation of those islands will be impossible. They hold that even though Great Britain is invaded, the war will not end but rather that, in that case, it will be a long, long struggle, ending no one knows when.
Relayed to London and Berlin.
Trans. 3-22-41
No. 24
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
20 March 1941
# 160.
The activities of the United States in connection with the convoy system exercised by the American Navy are as follows:
1. Now that the "Aid to Britain" Law has passed, America finds that she cannot immediately transfer the craft which constitute the most urgent need. The United States knows that she cannot exercise her aid to Britain unless the threat on the high seas is eliminated. Therefore, some sort of convoy system carried on by the Navy is deemed essential. It has been reported recently that German submarines are in the waters near this country and consequently popular opinion is gradually coming to recognize this necessity. The Committee to Defend
Page A-20
America by Aiding the Allies, which seems to reflect the opinions of the Government and which was formed last year before destroyers were transferred to Britain, recently passed a resolution to the effect that if convoys are needed, they shall be afforded. The Navy, too, recognized this necessity, and the President, himself, is said to have ordered the Navy to draw up a definite plan.
2. Since it is feared that through convoying ships the United States may precipitate its entry into the war, substitute proposals have been advanced; namely—
a. That American warships to transferred to England and that they do the convoying.
b. That the cruising limits under the Neutrality law be extended and that the convoy limits of British craft be curtailed.
3. Concerning convoys, there is a prohibition stipulation in the "Aid to Britain" Law. However, constitutionally speaking, this has no effect in limiting the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief. From a constitutional point of view, therefore, it is very doubtful if this clause has any meaning. Furthermore, the President is said to be considering abolishing from the Neutrality Law the provision (the cash and carry principle) prohibiting American merchantmen from stopping in belligerent zones.
Relayed to London, Berlin, and New York.
Trans. 3-22-41
No. 25
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
21 March 1941
# 162.
Relayed to London and Berlin.
It is estimated that not only the Democratic Representatives but also two thirds of the Republicans will vote approval of the policy of the administration, when the vote is taken in the House on the 7 billion dollar budget for carrying out the so-called Aid-to-Britain bill.
Some of the leaders of the Republican party who formerly were opposed to aiding Britain are now among those who will vote for the appropriation. Public opinion in the U.S. is rallying to the support of the President's aid for Britain.
Trans. 3-25-41
No. 26
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Berlin
24 March 1941
# 5.
Strictly Secret.
To be handled in Government code.
Please transmit the following message concerning the present state of affairs in the United States to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA:
By virtue of the expansion of her own national defense and her assistance to Great Britain, the United States had de facto already entered the war. It will take a considerable length of time before the United States' full power is behind her program of assistance to Britain and the big question of the moment is sea shipping. The number of ships recently sunk has mounted to a high figure and it is impossible to fully make up for them. Consequently, the officials of the United States are most anxious about this situation. The Congress is not likely,
Page A-21
at least at this stage, to declare war, but I would say that there is a possibility that American warships may presently begin to convoy. I am, however, following every detail of this situation because I know that convoying materials to England is going to have a tremendous effect upon the American people. The trend now is to concentrate the main strength of the American Navy in the Atlantic and, in coordination with Great Britain, to protect British territory in the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, the minds of the officials of the United States appear also to be made up to protect the Netherlands Indies. The United States is in addition following the policy of assisting China as much as possible so long as she restrains Japan and of preventing Japan's advance to the south. Notwithstanding all this, at least while the Atlantic is the primary focus of interest, the United States certainly desires at least a temporary peace in the Pacific. There can be no mistake on this point. For all the cheering and crying that American assistance will bring victory to England, those responsible are beyond any question trembling within themselves. Apparently there are also officials, who might be said to have the power of life and death, who on the surface loudly proclaim that a land invasion of Great Britain is next to impossible, and that the chances of its success are remote, and that Great Britain is sure to win, but who underneath the surface are pessimistic. Now, things have come to the point where people who speak of peace are anathematized by the title of defeatist and they are dwindling in numbers. It will take two years for assistance to England to reach its peak; that is to say, in June, year after next, and thereafter the plans are to have it continue at that rate for three years.
Trans. 3-27-41
No. 27
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Berlin and London
25 March 1941
# 047.
(Circular).
Action Tokyo as # 171.
Re my # 170 [a] and # 168 [a].
Even though this appropriation is passed, it is recognized that it will take time for it to get into operation so that the U.S. will be able to do anything toward replenishing the shipping lost by Great Britain. Of the merchant ships (5,000,000 tons) to be built with the shipbuilding funds provided in this appropriation ($629,000,000) together with those to be completed that are now under construction (3,500,000 tons), at the most only about 1,000,000 tons could be completed during the current year, and this would not be easy for the U.S. -----. It is thought that this is the reason why it is not advisable for the U.S. Navy to engage in convoy duty.
[a] See I, 27A.
Trans. 3-27-41
Page A-22
No. 27A
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
March 22, 1941
# 168.
1. Because of the shortage of bottoms, the President, the Secretary of the Navy and Naval Affairs Committee of Congress have on successive occasions stated that American commercial ships will be transferred to England. I have news which seems to indicate that the Naval Affairs Committee of Congress on the 21st made a statement supporting the transfer of some ships (five is said to be the number). This matter is being held over until the arrival of the British Envoy SALTE and until the people see how critical the situation is. This is to forewarn you.
2. On the occasion of a discussion for an additional naval budget in Congress on the 21st, a proposal prohibiting the use of already existing funds in the conveying of goods sent in the Aid to British Program was overwhelmingly voted down. The above is for your information.
Relayed to London and Berlin. Have relayed information to New York.
Trans. 3-26-41
No. 28
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
22 March 1941
# 167.
At the present time there are two bills before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House which call for strong economic restrictions against Japan. These two plans are as I give them below. This is but another example of the sort of bills they have been passing against us all along. Though I do not believe that they are of immediate concern, I give them for your information.
1. One bill (already presented in the House in Washington) calls for an embargo against the export of military goods to Japan, against transportation of such equipment on American ships, restrictions against American products being shipped on Japanese ships, and the prevention of activities by American people of companies that would aid Japan.
2. I am sending the details, by mail, of a resolution requesting the President to institute strong economic restrictions against Japan because of the occupation of Chinese territory by Japanese forces.
Have relayed information to New York.
Trans. 3-26-41
No. 29
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: London, Berlin and Rome
2 April 1941
# 66.
(Circular). Message to Tokyo # 207.
I. To the protests of Berlin and Rome over the confiscation of their ships, the American government will take a bristlingly hostile attitude, and returning them is the last thing that the United States would consider. I cannot consider otherwise than that. Washington's relations with those two governments will follow an ever-narrowing route.
II. The German and Italian ships will be handled in a manner more or less different from those of Denmark. (The charge of sabotage is a mere fabrication.) To the extent that general
Page A-23
principles and United States law will permit, these vessels will in all probability be somehow used to assist Great Britain, nor is there likely to be any objection.
III. It appears that the authorities of this country are conferring with the several American states on the question of the confiscation of vessels.
Relayed to London, Berlin and Rome. Have relayed information to New York.
Trans. 4-4-41
No. 30
FROM: Washington (Jap. Amb.)
TO: London, Berlin and Rome
2 April 1941
# 65.
(Circular). Message to Tokyo as # 206. Secret.
Aroused more and more by the course of the military situation, the Government of the United States is taking advantage of the National Defense legislation (and of course the Aid-to-Britain law) in order to strengthen her attitude of suppressing the Axis powers. An example of this can be found in the confiscation of ships, and in all probability Washington is going to take successive vigorous measures along the line of convoying, etc. But when it comes to the question of economics, although I regard it as inevitable that they will take the same course and extend the export quota system, nevertheless that is a matter they are considering very deeply. Gradually by degrees they are whipping up the spirit of the people upon whose approval they wish to base their actions. I do not think they can easily be deterred, and their talk of "short of war" is gradually turning to "economic warfare". We must be ever on the alert because of this trend.
Relayed to England, Germany, and Italy.
Trans. 4-4-41
No. 31
FROM: Rome
TO: Washington
10 April 1941
No number.
Message to Tokyo # 205.
In connection with the question of American seizures of Italian ships, Director PRUNAS [a] told ANDO [b] confidentially: "At the present time the Italian Government is protesting this act as being contrary to International Law but it seems that the American Government is again disregarding International Law and scheming to confiscate them. We are making a very profound study of retaliatory steps to be taken in such an event. Rest assured that should we put these into operation they will be blanket retaliatory measures. Furthermore, in the case that they do confiscate them, it will take at least six months of repair to put them in usable shape because the interiors of these Italian ships were severely damaged by their crews.
"Though Mexico, Venezuela and Costa Rica in Central and South America have already taken steps similar to the United States; Brazil, Argentina and Chile will not take such measures.
Page A-24
On this last point he is understood to have been very optimistic.
Relayed to Washington, London and Berlin. Relay to London.
[a] Director General of the Transoceania Bureau of the Italian Foreign Office.
[b] Secretary in the Japanese Embassy in Rome.
Trans. 4-12-41
No. 32
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Rome
4 April 1941
# 2.
(Message to Tokyo as # 218, April 4th).
Re my # 207 [a].
On the 4th the Italian Commercial Attaché told IGUCHI [b] confidentially that in all probability the Italian Government would demand the recall of the American Naval Attaché in Rome because of the American demand for the recall of the Italian Naval Attaché in Washington. Furthermore, if the American authorities decide to confiscate Italian ships in the United States, (at the present time the American flag has been taken down and again they are flying the Italian flag), in revenge the Italian Government is considering the confiscation of a part of American owned property in Italy (this is said to be something more than $150,000,000).
Relayed to Rome. Have relayed information to New York.
[a] See I, 29 in which Washington reports on the confiscation of German and Italian ships.
[b] Japanese Embassy Counselor in Washington.
Trans. Not dated
No. 33
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
11 April 1941
# 225.
(Abstract)
The passage of the lend-lease bill has made America optimistic about the war in Europe and Africa. However, the situation in the Balkans and the English failure in Africa, threatening as it does Alexandria and the Suez and Dakaar, have stirred up feeling in America. The sinking in one day of 400,000 tons of shipping as was done on March 23rd, has alarmed public opinion, for England and America together cannot turn out more than 2,000,000 tons a year.
Trans. 4-18-41
No. 34
FROM: New York (Morishima)
TO: Tokyo
12 April 1941
# 147.
President ROOSEVELT has been issuing orders one after another with special bearing on the sanctioning of the navigation of American ships on the high seas arranging preparations for the defense of Greenland; and generally everyone throughout the country has welcomed this
Page A-25
as an approved measure of assistance toward England, even such persons as Colonel Lindbergh himself. They are endorsing the leasing of Greenland as an appropriate step in America's National Defense program. On the other hand, in view of Germany's preeminent success in the Balkans, and the ever present threat to British maritime communications, further effective measures are being demanded, particularly in both the Christian Science Monitor and the Tribune editorials of the 12th.
1. Greenland will become a base for naval convoys.
2. It is a fact that munitions will be transported to the Suez in American ships.
3. The United States is considering going so far as to transfer to England the recently stolen German and Italian ships.
4. Colonel Donovan at a Foreign Policy discussion meeting held in Chicago on the 11th, in supporting the convoy question, proposed the occupation of Dakar [a], or the acquisition of usable harbors in Ireland as a result of British-American pressure and he went on to say that if necessary the United States should unhesitatingly enter the war. These comments are creating quite a stir.
This is for your information. Please transmit this to all competent ambassadors in Europe.
[a] French West Africa.
Trans. 4-18-41
No. 35
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
4 April 1941
# 214.
Re my # 212 [a] and # 213 [a].
In connection with the export quota system, as you know, in response to our numerous strong protests, for a year now the United States has taken the unwarranted attitude that it is unreasonable for foreign countries to keep prating about things which are necessary to the United States' defense program. (See my # 1679 [b] of last year.) Well, the United States does not attempt to conceal the fact that her objective is to bring pressure to bear and to restrain Japan. This is specifically why they are carrying out the measures which trouble us. So long as they take this attitude, it is futile for me to negotiate with the State Department on the question of obtaining the present licenses. No matter how much I negotiate on both of these matters, I will get nowhere. An official in charge at the Export Control Office very cynically remarked to Lawyer SIEBOLD; "Why, for us to use our good offices to get licenses for Japan would, after all, be giving a big boost to a technical enemy, wouldn't it?" From that, I think you can see how just about every one of the American officials feels.
[a] Available in code under study.
[b] MORISHIMA reports on the reasons for the limitations placed on exports.
Trans. 4-8-41
Page A-26
No. 36
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
15 April 1941
# 228.
(In 2 parts, complete).
Received from New York as # 048 to me.
Relayed to Tokyo as New York # 148 of 15 April.
New York—Tokyo # 065 [a]
Re my Washington—Tokyo # 164 [b]
I. The president of the YU Company [c] is confined to his home by sickness. According to my telegram # 65 [a] Yamaoka and the lawyer for "YU" have been holding conversations. Inasmuch as he has not yet applied for a permit, in order to expedite matters, I went with Yamaoka, on the 12th to call on the vice president. (The chief engineer and the lawyer were also present at this interview.)
The "YU" Company's opinions relative to the four points presented to them by Yamaoka are as follows:
(a) Concerning the "non-selective polymerization process, including catalytic hydrogen and tri-potassium phosphate process," the "tri-potassium phosphate process" cannot yet be manufactured by them, since it does not belong to them. It is a patent of the Shell Development Corporation and therefore the "YU" Company cannot apply for a permit.
(b) As to the "catalytic cracking process, including hydrogen transfer as a part thereof", there is no objection to applying for a permit for it, however, the "hydrogen transfer" ----- there is danger that the State Department may consider that it comes within the export embargo on aviation gasoline.
(c) As to the "catalytic desulpharization process":
(1) The "YU" Company is still studying it in the laboratory and it is not yet a "commercial process" and hence the problem of an export permit belongs to the future and need not be considered at this time.
(2) Inasmuch as the scope is rather broad and there is danger that it might be dealt with as aviation gasoline and thus come under the embargo, it would be better to deal with "crude, or other charging stock". (The original draft was presented as it was. After the attitude of the State Department has been ascertained it is to be considered again).
(3) The transfer of the "Phillips Desulpharization Process" to a third party is also forbidden.
(d) Materials such as a catalyst, etc., as requested in the 1938 and 1928 contracts, including the foregoing process". Even if a request for a comprehensive permit for the "materials" mentioned in the above were made by the "YU" Company it would be impossible to have it granted. Therefore there is no objection to requesting a permit for the "catalysts" only mentioned above ----- in case of ----- it will become an actual problem.
II. The "YU" Company's opinion is as (1) and is a reasonable one I think. Now, then there is a possibility of obtaining an export permit, we should immediately put in a request for a permit for only those things for which there is a reasonable expectation of having a request granted. And therefore in harmony with their opinion we have made application for a permit -----. Please convey the "YU" Company's views to Saneyoshi [d] and if he has any opinions, the talk may continue ----- having informed Saneyoshi please have another conference.
III. Further in regard to "materials" the Ambassador's telegram # 214 (?) [e] to Your Excellency ----- is necessary to get in touch with the State Department ----- other than "catalysts" ----- to delay needlessly the negotiations regarding materials ----- there is no other way than to request negotiations through the Embassy..
Page A-27
IV. For any further negotiations with the "YU" Company it will be necessary to have Saneyoshi (of the Japan Gasoline Company) come to America.
[a] See I.
[b] See I, 199.
[c] Universal Oil Products Co. of Chicago (?).
[d] Masao Saneyoshi, an official of the Japanese Gasoline Co.
[e] See I, 35. Ambassador Nomura reports that it is useless for him to continue negotiations with the U.S. in matters pertaining to licenses and protests over the export quota system, as the U.S. is not attempting to conceal the fact that her objective is to bring pressure to bear and restrain Japan.
Trans. 4-22-41
No. 37
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Nanking
16 April 1941
# 111.
(Part 1 of 2).
Message to Tokyo as # 617.
Re my # 616 [a].
On the 15th I sent a member of my staff to the American Consulate General and he said to Chief Consul STANTON: "Our Army, through its espionage agencies, has procured an unimpeachable report that the gasoline in question was purchased by the Chungking Commercial Section. After loading, the responsibility for the shipment rests on Chungking. Furthermore, we know that Chungking has not even got any war insurance. For over a year now we have suspected such shipments as being destined for the enemy and have been on the lookout. Naturally we feel strongly impelled to seize them." STANTON retorted: "Well, I will not even pretend to deny that this gasoline was about to be shipped to Chungking. I will not quibble. The customs have produced the necessary documents and this is a bona fide export. Any interference on the part of you Japanese is illegal." My staff member pointed out: "The Military does not raise the point as to whether or not this is to be included in the embargo which has recently been brought into force. The whole thing is this: the gasoline is for the use of our enemy, the Chungking Government, and we are going to confiscate it." STANTON retorted: "As to whether or not this is enemy produce, the burden of proof is on the Japanese. Furthermore, suppose it is destined for Chungking. Until it is turned over to them, it belongs to Texas. You say it is 'tekisan' (enemy produce): I say it is 'Texan' (evidently having heard the Japanese use the word 'tekisan', STANTON makes a pun using the word 'tekisan' for 'Texan'.) Now, say that you Japanese set aside the regulations of the customs and seize this gasoline on the mere charge that it is bound for the Central Army, the American concerns have not heard of any regulations permitting such deeds being publicly announced. If you start to seize American goods on the basis of unannounced regulations, it will be just too bad for you. By what logic could you possibly call such an act proper and reasonable?" My staff member answered: "Well, we got it straight from our espionage agencies and they will furnish definite proof. Pretty soon you'll understand why this proof cannot be denied."
[a] See I, 39.
Trans. 4-18-41
No. 38
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Nanking
16 April 1941
# 111.
Message to Tokyo as # 617.
Part 2 of 2.
"Don't think that just by calling our plans to seize this gasoline improper and unreasonable you can move us in our determination to confiscate it." STANTON replied "Well, Texas, through this incident, is going to incur a great loss. I will immediately protest to Japan by note and will demand reparations. What is more, I will wire the facts to both Washington and Tokyo." My man countered by saying "The diplomatic officials know that there is a good basis for our argument. They also know that Texas will incur no loss. A mere protest from the United States won't do any good. If you simply report the details of this to Tokyo, all that will ensue is a big argument and you will wind up where you are right now. I mean the United States will have no recourse in settling this matter but to withdraw its complaint immediately." My man started to walk out, but STANTON sat down and said "You may say if you will that Texas will incur no damage, but until this gasoline is bought up, Texas will suffer a sizeable loss." He was rather nasty, and in conclusion my man stated "Well I wasn't thinking about it being bought up. You know I am not authorized to go deeply into these things. However, I may safely say that Japanese officials are of the unanimous opinion that the American concerns shall not undergo any losses. Since this gasoline is for the enemy, we can't compromise. But, if it is true that Texas actually will suffer, it might be possible to get in touch with Hongkong and have them consider this point. In any case, I will communicate this to the Consul General in Shanghai."
Trans. 4-18-41
No. 39
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Nanking
16 April 1941
# 110.
Message to Tokyo as # 616.
Re your # 294 [a].
1. In connection with our schemes to procure petroleum mentioned in 2 of your telegram, I sought the advice of the purchasing agents and the Chief of the Constabulary. They replied that this gasoline must, at any cost, be prevented from reaching the hands of the Chungking officials, and that the thing to do is to seize it immediately.
2. As to whether or not this gasoline seems under the export embargo regulation of the customs, upon investigation I find that the export permit was obtained before this regulation went into effect on April 7th, and that the transaction is foolproof.
3. After finding out these things, on the 14th I called the military and naval officials to my residence and announced the contents of your telegram. As a result of our conversation, we agreed as follows:
If we follow the plan suggested in 3 of your message in handling this matter, from the very beginning it will smell of corruption, and if we merely say that we suspect that it is for the aid of CHIANG KAI-SHEK, we would make ourselves vulnerable to a come-back on the part of the United States. No.! We must have an air-tight case. Therefore, as we all agreed, the besthttp://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG
Page A-29
thing to do is to negotiate by insinuations, claiming that we have a witness (some imaginary person) whom we will not name.
Relayed to Nanking.
[a] Tokyo wires Nanking and Shanghai concerning a report that the U.S. is about to exercise a comprehensive Petroleum embargo against Japan.
Trans. (Not dated)
No. 40
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking
12 April 1941
# 118.
Message to Shanghai as # 294.
Re your # 575 [a].
1. We have received a report that the United States is about to exercise a comprehensive petroleum embargo against Japan in the near future. Soon we are going to have Ambassador NOMURA inform the American Government that if they carry out this measure, our Empire cannot but act with determination. We are going to have Ambassador NOMURA advise them not to embargo petroleum. Therefore, although we do not like to hold up the gasoline in question, if you get any definite proof that the Chungking Commerce Section has purchased it, go ahead and seize it.
2. So far I have received no report from you on the schemes mentioned in my # 153 [b] for purchasing petroleum. (Please report on this immediately.) These negotiations are going on and if it is seen that success is imminent and that this seizure will damage the negotiations, you may release the gasoline. I will leave this up to your judgment, which should be guided by developments in your city.
3. If you cannot find the actual proof mentioned in the preceding paragraph 1, take suitable steps to prevent the exports mentioned in your # 539a. If we cannot get the results we desire, we will come forth with an out and out charge that the goods are suspected of being sent to assist CHIANG KAI-SHEK and summarily seize them.
[a] Not available.
[b] Available; Not translated.
Tans. 4-14-41
No. 41
Proposal Presented to the Department of State Through the Medium of Private American and Japanese Individuals on April 9, 1941. [a]
The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.
Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.
Page A-30
It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of an entente cordiale, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.
For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. We, therefore, suggest that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both governments in honor and in act.
It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a Conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective Governments.
We presume to anticipate that our Governments could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:
1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.
3. The relations of both nations toward the China affair.
4. Naval, aerial and mercantile marine relations in the Pacific.
5. Commerce between both nations and their financial cooperation.
6. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
7. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.
Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual understanding subject, of course, to modifications by the United States Government and subject to the official and final decision of the Government of Japan.
I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
The Governments of the United States and of Japan might jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.
Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.
Both Governments might declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others.
Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.
II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.
The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of its Axis Alliance was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the extension of military grouping among nations not directly affected by the European War.
The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined by no aggressive alliance aimed to assist any one nation against another. The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.
Page A-31
III. China affairs.
The President of the United States, if the following terms are approved by His Excellency and guaranteed by the Government of Japan, might request the Chiang-Kai-Shek regime to negotiate peace with Japan.
a. Independence of China
b. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory, in accordance with an agreement to be reached between Japan and China
c. No acquisition of Chinese territory
d. No imposition of indemnities
e. Resumption of the "Open Door"; the interpretation and application of which shall be agreed upon at some future, convenient time between the United States and Japan
f. Coalescence of the Governments of Chiang-Kai-Chek [sic] and of Wang-Ching-Wei
g. No large-scale or concentrated immigration of Japanese into Chinese territory
h. Recognition of Manchukuo
With the acceptance by the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime of the aforementioned Presidential request, the Japanese Government shall commence direct peace negotiations with the newly coalesced Chinese Government, or constituent elements thereof.
The Government of Japan shall submit to the Chinese concrete terms of peace, within the limits of aforesaid general terms and along the line of neighborly friendship, joint defense against communistic activities and economic cooperation.
[Should the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime reject the request of President Roosevelt, the United States Government shall discontinue assistance to the Chinese] [b]
IV. Naval, aerial and mercantile marine relations in the Pacific.
a. As both the Americans and the Japanese are desirous of maintaining the peace in the Pacific, they shall not resort to such disposition of their naval forces and aerial forces as to menace each other. Detailed, concrete agreement thereof shall be left for determination at the Proposed joint Conference.
b. At the conclusion of the projected Conference, each nation might dispatch a courtesy naval squadron to visit the country of the other and signalize the new era of Peace in the Pacific.
c. With the first ray of hope for the settlement of China affairs, the Japanese Government will agree, if desired, to use their good offices to release for contract by Americans certain percentage of their total tonnage of merchant vessels, chiefly for the Pacific service, so soon as they can be released from their present commitments. The amount of such tonnage shall be determined at the Conference.
V. Commerce between both nations and their financial cooperation.
When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such commodities are as respectively available or required by either of them. Both governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it could be elaborated at the proposed conference and concluded in accordance with usual procedure.
For the advancement of economic cooperation between both nations, it is suggested that the United States extend to Japan a gold credit in amounts sufficient to [foster trade and industrial] [c] development directed to the betterment of Far Eastern economic conditions and to the sustained economic cooperation of the Governments of the United States and of Japan.
Page A-32
VI. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
On the pledged basis of guarantee that Japanese activities in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means, without resorting to arms, American cooperation and support shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.
VII. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.
a. The Governments of the United States and of Japan will not acquiesce in the future transfer of territories or the relegation of existing States within the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific area to any European Power.
b. The governments of the United States and of Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands and will consider means to come to their assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression by any third Power.
c. [The Government of Japan requests the friendly and diplomatic assistance of the Government of the United States for the removal of Hongkong and Singapore as doorways to further political encroachment by the British in the Far East.] [d]
d. Japanese Immigration to the United States and to the Southwestern Pacific area shall receive amicable consideration—on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.
Conference.
a. It is suggested that a Conference between Delegates of the United States and of Japan be held at Honolulu and that this Conference be opened for the United States by President Roosevelt and for Japan by Prince Konoye. The delegates could number less than five each, exclusive of experts, clerks, etc.
b. There shall be no foreign observers at the Conference.
c. This Conference could be held soon as possible (May 1941) after the present understanding has been reached.
d. The agenda of the Conference would not include a reconsideration of the present understanding but would direct its efforts to the specification of the prearranged agenda and drafting of instruments to effectuate the understanding. The precise agenda could be determined upon by mutual agreement between both governments.
Addendum.
The present understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.
The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments.
[a] The English text with a few omissions was sent to Tokyo by Admiral Nomura on April 30, 1941, though the Japanese text of this same proposal had already been sent on April 17, 1941 (See I, 47). Clauses of the original text which were omitted in the dispatch of April 30th to Tokyo. (I, 41) have been marked by brackets.
[b] Omitted in dispatch to Tokyo.
[c] Omitted in dispatch to Tokyo.
[d] Omitted in dispatch to Tokyo.
Trans. 5-1-41/5-3-41
Page A-33
No. 42
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
14 April 1941
(Urgent)
# 227.
Strictly secret. To be handled in Government code.
This morning of the 14th I had an interview with Secretary of State Hull at his private residence. I said that not only should the Governments of our two nations agree to maintain peace in the Pacific Ocean, but the time has now come when both should take a larger view and without delay. The Secretary expressed accord, and I continued, "We being presumably viewed as an enemy, the American fleet is cruising in the Southern Pacific and naval instructors are being sent here and there, and in Manila a conference is being held between England, the United States and the Netherlands. Viewed from the standpoint of military experts, this is a most unfortunate trend and is certainly a step in the direction of war. The responsible military officials of Japan cannot overlook such things as this. The war fever of both countries is rising. In the United States the thirst for blood is gradually increasing. In the Atlantic convoying is about to be exercised. This, I tell you, is an inflammatory situation. It looks to me as though a declaration of war is imminent. Japan cannot but feel the gravest concern. Now, Sir, don't you think there might be a little change?" To my first statement he offered no particular comment. However, with the second he expressed accord. Next, Secretary HULL questioned me about the military policy of Japan and I explained that, "For example, a year or so ago Prince KONOYE made a statement to the effect that Japan is ready to make peace with China on the basis of equality with no indemnity and no annexation. There were some opponents at the time but the people agreed and they are still of this mind. The Japanese are united in one firm mind under the Emperor." Then I went on to explain to him something of our form of Government and international ideals. He seemed pleased and to understand, and said, "We are much alike." We went on to converse more or less about mutual economic problems, the stabilization of the Pacific, etc., and he promised me that at his very first opportunity he and I were going to have a conference. I think that before long he is going to inform me as to the date.
By the way, I explained the new treaty between Tokyo and Moscow and concluded by stating that the pacification of the Pacific would be the first step in the eventual winding up of hostilities in Europe, with which Secretary HULL expressed agreement.
Trans. 4-15-41
No. 43
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
14 April 1941
(Very urgent)
# 229.
Secret. To be handled in Government Code.
The effect upon our country of the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality agreement is something for which sufficient gratitude cannot be expressed to you and I know full well the extent to which our Government and people appreciate your efforts. Japanese-American relations being extremely delicate at this time, it would be well to carefully heed the handling this pact is accorded in newspaper articles and editorials. As I told you in my # 227 [a], I made my explanations to Secretary HULL early in the morning of the 14th. As a direct result of these
Page A-34
conversations, Secretary HULL's opinions and phraseology on the occasion of the newspaper correspondents' interview of that day were not only extremely moderate, (please refer to my special report) but it seemed to me that he was probably doing his utmost to calm public opinion all over the country. And in this connection we, too, must see to it that our own papers do not play up this agreement as though it were directed against the United States. I believe that it would be wise not to arouse American public opinion. Therefore, on this point please send me your comments. That is all for the present.
http://Louis2J2Sheehan2Esquire.US
[a] See I. 42.
Trans. 4-15-41 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Saturday, January 10, 2009
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