Medical thriller writer Michael Palmer's first novel was The Sisterhood. It featured a group of nurses who start an underground organization to help people to die in hospitals around the country. "Nurses bound together in mercy," the jacket reads, "pledged to end human suffering." However, within the organization, some "mercy-killers" take things too far and patients who should have survived end up dead. What began as a benign act of compassion became a wellspring of evil.
This story is fiction. What follows is not.
It was a nurse's aide in Vienna, Austria, who started the murder spree at Lainz General Hospital. Most of the people who go there are elderly, many of them with terminal illnesses. It's not difficult to hide a murder or two among people who are already at death's door. Even so, it wasn't as if Waltraud Wagner wanted to kill not at first, anyway.
It started in 1983 and by the time officials began to look into the suspicious deaths some six years later, the death toll stood at 42. However, an unofficial count was in the hundreds.
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire , 23, had a 77-year-old patient who one day asked the girl to "end her suffering." Wagner hesitatingly obliged by overdosing the woman with morphine. It was then that she discovered she enjoyed this kind of power, and it didn't take much to recruit accomplices from the night shift. Maria Gruber, 19, was happy to join. So was Ilene Leidolf, 21. The third recruit was a grandmother, 43-year-old Stephanija Mayer.
Wagner was the "death pavilion" leader, and they planned the murders as a group. She taught the others how to give lethal injections, and she added some fatal mechanisms of her own creation. The "water cure" involved holding a patient's nose while forcing him or her to drink. That was an agonizing death that filled the lungs, but undiscoverable as outright murder. Many elderly patients had fluid in their lungs.
Moving from compassion to sadism, the women took out patients who merely annoyed them by soiling sheets or asking for help too often. Such people were issued their "tickets to God."
At first, these nurses killed sporadically, but by 1987, they were escalating. Rumors began to spread that there was a killer on Pavilion 5.
It was their own carelessness that finally stopped them. Over drinks one day, they relived one of their latest cases, laughing over the patient's distress and the fact that she deserved her fate. At a table nearby sat a doctor. What he overheard sent him scurrying to the police station, and they quickly launched an investigation. It took six weeks, but all four women were arrested on April 7, 1989. The doctor in charge of their ward was suspended.
Collectively they confessed to 49 murders, and Wagner took credit for giving a "free bed with the good Lord" to 39 of them. She had decided that their deaths were long overdue, and she reveled in the fact that the power over their lives rested with her. However, one of her accomplices believed that Wagner's death count was closer to 200 in just the past two years.
As she sat in prison awaiting trial, Wagner scaled her culpability back to ten murders, all of them for reasons of mercy.
The jury didn't buy it. Ultimately, Wagner was convicted of 15 murders, 17 attempts, and two counts of assault. She was sentenced to life in prison. Leidolf got life as well, on conviction of five murders, while the other two drew fifteen years for manslaughter and attempted murder charges.
As the state attorney put it, "It's a small step from killing the terminally ill to the killing of insolent, burdensome patients, and from there to that which was known under the Third Reich as euthanasia. It is a door that must never be opened again."
And yet it has been opened again and again. And not all the nurses are female.
Friday, December 25, 2009
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
inhabited 3.inh.00309 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Although the pair never met, 22-year-old Gwynneth Rees had a lot in common with Elizabeth Figg. Both had come to London as teenagers, having suffered unwanted pregnancies and fallen out with their families (Rees was from South Wales, Figg from the North-west of England). Both had come to London looking for a more glamorous existence than small-town Britain could offer. Yet like so many naïve young girls before them, they had fallen into the twilight world of prostitution, chased from pillar to post by violent pimps, corrupt landlords and sleazy punters. At the time of their deaths, both were also suffering from a common problem for ladies of the night — Sexually Transmitted Diseases.
Gwynneth Rees
Gwynneth Rees
Rees' body, naked but for a nylon stocking, was found barely a mile along the riverbank from Elizabeth Figg's, on a garbage dump on the opposite side of the river, on November 8, 1963. A post-mortem revealed several teeth were missing and she had in all likelihood been strangled with a ligature. She had been last seen nearly six weeks earlier, getting into a car with a man on the night of September 29, 1963.
When police looked into her background, they found no shortage of potential suspects.
Rees was ponced for a time by Cornelius "Connie" Whitehead, a violent criminal who would later be convicted as an associate of notorious East End gangsters, the Kray Twins. He thought nothing of delivering regular "whackings" to his girls, which may have been one reason why Rees left him shortly before her disappearance and he was reportedly looking for her.
The Kray Twins
The Kray Twins
That summer she had become pregnant. This was another common predicament for prostitutes in the days before the contraceptive pill became widely available, since insisting on the use of condoms was likely to reduce your appeal to potential clients. She already had two children (neither of which were in her care), and abortion was still illegal in the UK at that time. Fellow prostitutes said that at the time of her disappearance she had been looking to contact an illegal abortionist she knew of.
Two terminations she had previously undergone had left her with an infection of the fallopian tubes. That was hardly surprising given the methods used. Typically these amateur physicians would fill a syringe with boiling water, antiseptic and melted soap and squirt the resulting liquid deep inside the hapless patient, aiming to trigger a miscarriage within 48 hours. It usually worked, but there were obvious dangers associated with it, such as the above-mentioned condition, or even blood poisoning. Yet investigators had to ask themselves: even if Rees had died as a result of the abortion, and certain guilty parties had to get rid of the body, why dispose of her naked corpse on a garbage heap by the Thames, where it was always likely to be discovered? And why strangle her? Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Whatever the cause of her death, once again police had precious little to go on other than speculation and casual suspicions. Inevitably, their investigations were hampered by the widespread disdain for the police that existed in the outlaw world which prostitutes inhabited.
Indeed, neither of the above cases lived long in Londoners' memory. Where prostitutes were concerned, there were rarely many worried friends and family members insisting on finding out exactly what happened, and many privately believed that "tarts" such as Rees and Figg had only themselves to blame. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Even fellow prostitutes regarded the deaths as the equivalent of industrial accidents — unfortunate but inevitable given the dangers inherent in their line of work.
Yet within a few months, this unloved sector of London society would be walking the streets in a climate of fear the like of which they had never experienced.
Gwynneth Rees
Gwynneth Rees
Rees' body, naked but for a nylon stocking, was found barely a mile along the riverbank from Elizabeth Figg's, on a garbage dump on the opposite side of the river, on November 8, 1963. A post-mortem revealed several teeth were missing and she had in all likelihood been strangled with a ligature. She had been last seen nearly six weeks earlier, getting into a car with a man on the night of September 29, 1963.
When police looked into her background, they found no shortage of potential suspects.
Rees was ponced for a time by Cornelius "Connie" Whitehead, a violent criminal who would later be convicted as an associate of notorious East End gangsters, the Kray Twins. He thought nothing of delivering regular "whackings" to his girls, which may have been one reason why Rees left him shortly before her disappearance and he was reportedly looking for her.
The Kray Twins
The Kray Twins
That summer she had become pregnant. This was another common predicament for prostitutes in the days before the contraceptive pill became widely available, since insisting on the use of condoms was likely to reduce your appeal to potential clients. She already had two children (neither of which were in her care), and abortion was still illegal in the UK at that time. Fellow prostitutes said that at the time of her disappearance she had been looking to contact an illegal abortionist she knew of.
Two terminations she had previously undergone had left her with an infection of the fallopian tubes. That was hardly surprising given the methods used. Typically these amateur physicians would fill a syringe with boiling water, antiseptic and melted soap and squirt the resulting liquid deep inside the hapless patient, aiming to trigger a miscarriage within 48 hours. It usually worked, but there were obvious dangers associated with it, such as the above-mentioned condition, or even blood poisoning. Yet investigators had to ask themselves: even if Rees had died as a result of the abortion, and certain guilty parties had to get rid of the body, why dispose of her naked corpse on a garbage heap by the Thames, where it was always likely to be discovered? And why strangle her? Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Whatever the cause of her death, once again police had precious little to go on other than speculation and casual suspicions. Inevitably, their investigations were hampered by the widespread disdain for the police that existed in the outlaw world which prostitutes inhabited.
Indeed, neither of the above cases lived long in Londoners' memory. Where prostitutes were concerned, there were rarely many worried friends and family members insisting on finding out exactly what happened, and many privately believed that "tarts" such as Rees and Figg had only themselves to blame. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Even fellow prostitutes regarded the deaths as the equivalent of industrial accidents — unfortunate but inevitable given the dangers inherent in their line of work.
Yet within a few months, this unloved sector of London society would be walking the streets in a climate of fear the like of which they had never experienced.
Thursday, July 30, 2009
Basic Terms of Peace between Japan and China
By establishing its attitude toward the negotiations on a broad scope, the Japanese government had, in its proposals, embraced all the existing problems. During a conversation on September 10, 1941 Ambassador Grew had submitted a question concerning mediation between Japan and China. Foreign Minister Toyoda had delivered to him the confidential terms of a fundamental peace between Japan and China, pointing out that they were not new proposals but merely clarification of the proposals submitted to America on September 4, 1941. Since the situation had grown more critical during the past month, the Japanese Foreign Minister urged Ambassador Nomura to impress the authorities of the United States with the necessity of reaching a successful agreement without further delay.[335]
According to Mr. Toyoda, from the time that the American newspapers had begun to editorialize on the Japanese-American negotiations, these negotiations had become a major topic of conversation throughout the entire world. Within four or five days, the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact would be celebrated. In spite of the fact that the Japanese government desired that the day's activities be conducted in a calm manner, the Japanese Foreign Minister was well aware that an anti-American group within the country would take the opportunity to threaten Japanese-American relations by provoking incidents. Since it was obvious that Japan's internal situation was extremely critical, Foreign Minister Toyoda directed Ambassador Nomura to inform Secretary Hull immediately of the details of his conversation with Ambassador Grew and to request a prompt reply.[336]
[333] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 631-633.
[334] III, 193.
[335] III, 194.
[336] III, 195.
[72]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
81. Ambassador Nomura Forwards a Japanese Report on America's Attitude Toward War
In summarizing a Japanese report on the American attitude toward war in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, Ambassador Nomura, in a message to Tokyo on September 22, 1941,[337] discussed the desire of the United States to adopt any plan which would bring about the ultimate destruction of Germany. In order to prevent Soviet Russia from making a separate peace, England and the United States had rendered all possible assistance, hoping to maintain Russia's fighting strength for an offensive in the spring provided its troops survived the winter months. By contributing millions of dollars for equipment, the United States also hoped to strengthen Britain's will to continue the fight.
Because the strength of the American Navy was increasing constantly, the submarine menace in the Atlantic did not cause as much alarm as formerly, although the United States recognized that utter annihilation of the submarine was impossible.[338] According to the Japanese report, the American attitude toward war as a general rule was extremely casual. If war with Japan did develop the American public would accept it as inevitable.
Because of their economic superiority over Japan, the American people believed that it would be a naval war primarily, and that the United States would be victorious after a very short struggle. Only a few were fully aware of the dangers involved in war with Japan. There still remained those who argued against reaching a peace at the expense of China.[339]
According to an article written in the New York Times, attempts to ameliorate the situation existing between Japan and the United States were dead-locked because Japan's continued occupation of China was against the fundamental principles laid down by the United States. For this reason, Prime Minister Konoye had requested a personal conference with President Roosevelt.[340]
Public opinion in the United States held that in view of Germany's war aims a non-aggressive American policy would result only in failure. Believing that Italy would withdraw from the war, that occupied nations would uprise and, finally, that the endurance of the German people themselves would fail, Americans continued to believe that participation in a war would not be fatal. If they went to war with Japan, the American people felt that naval participation alone was sufficient, and that no expeditionary forces would be dispatched on a large scale.
Nevertheless, certain preparations were being undertaken by military authorities. In Congress, where the majority backed the government's foreign policy, a sharp decline in the strength of the isolationist group was noted.[341]
President Roosevelt had given consideration to the possibility that in case Soviet Russia fell, a Japanese aggression would cause a simultaneous clash in both the Atlantic and Pacific. However, the greater portion of the American Navy still remained in the Pacific.
With regard to Japanese peace terms, it was rumored that Japan was demanding treaty ports in four southern provinces of China. Although the United States did not wish to sacrifice China to Japan, if Japan gave up forceful aggression, the United States would not only restore trade relations with Japan but would even render economic assistance. Ambassador Nomura expressed his opinion of this report by stating that the observer "had hit the nail on the head".[342]
[337] III, 196.
[338] Ibid.
[339] III, 197.
[340] Ibid.
[341] III, 198.
[342] III, 199.
[73]
82. Japan Explains Its Retaining of Troops in China
At Mr. Terasaki's request, Mr. Dooman, Counselor to the American Embassy in Japan, called on the Japanese Foreign Office.[343] A statement, supplementing those made to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda on the previous day and outlining Japan's reasons for retaining troops in China, had been prepared for communication to Ambassador Grew and for subsequent transmission to the United States government.[344]
In this document the Japanese government stated that in order to aid in the construction of a peaceful China and to ensure the security and defense of Japan itself, it recognized the necessity of stationing Japanese armed forces in certain areas of China. Because the uncertainty of internal stability in China had always proved a source of danger, Japan feared that intrigue, instigated by external sources, might follow the conclusion of the war between these two countries. The activities of the Communistic elements had already been detrimental to the maintenance of peace, and Japan felt that if such conditions were to recur any promotion of China's national life or welfare would be greatly impeded.[345]
From the economic standpoint alone, it was obvious that the activities of any neighboring territories would effect Japan's existence. Moreover, in view of the warlike attitude prevalent throughout the world, the defense of Japan could be endangered by any sudden unfavorable situation in China. Although Japan was prepared to withdraw armed forces wherever their presence was no longer required, it was imperative that a nucleus of Japanese troops be retained in certain areas of China. Any proposal to maintain peace by the stationing of international armed forces was inacceptable because of public opinion in China and because of the direct influence the internal condition of China had upon Japan.[346]
83. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 23, 1941)
(a) State Department's Report[347]
Upon his own request, Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apartment on September 23, 1941. Handing Secretary Hull a copy of the "Basic Terms of Peace between Japan and China"[348] and also a document entitled "A Reply to the American Communication of September 10, 1941",[349] Ambassador Nomura announced that these documents contained a full explanation of Japan's attitude regarding the disputable points in its recent proposals. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Ambassador Nomura said that any further clarification of the Tripartite Pact's effect upon Japan might best be left for discussion at the proposed meeting between the government heads.
Another document delivered to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 23, 1941 defined the phrase "equitable basis" to mean economic activities which were neither monopolistic, exclusive nor exploitative in nature, but which were based on the policy of nondiscrimination insofar as natural limitations permitted. Japan did not intend to be the sole
[343] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 634.
[344] Ibid.
[345] "Oral statement made to the Counselor of the American Embassy in Japan (Dooman) by the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office (Terasaki)", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 640-641. Foreign Minister Toyoda sent Mr. Koshu a copy of this document on September 23, 1941 with instructions to deliver it to Secretary Hull. See III, 200.
[346] Ibid.
[347] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 23, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 634-635.
[348] This document was handed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Matsuoka on September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 633. For the English text sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 22, 1941, see III, 191-192.
[349] This document was a copy of the one handed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 13, 1941, (see S.D., II, 623-624), and wired to Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941, see III, 175-176. Ambassador Nomura referred to it in his conversation with Secretary Hull on September 9, 1941, see S.D., II, 629-631 and III, 186-188.
[74]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
interpreter of this term. This document was not mentioned in the State Department's report of this conversation, but its text has been printed in the official documents and Ambassador Nomura referred to it in his report of this interview.[350]
After promising to study these papers as expeditiously as possible, Secretary Hull inquired concerning Ambassador Nomura's impressions regarding the present situation. Stating that he appreciated the position of the United States, Ambassador Nomura pointed to the domestic difficulties in Japan. If the meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye could be effected, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the psychological reaction in Japan would be extremely favorable to the re-establishment of friendly relations with America.
After referring to a previous American suggestion that the Japanese government assert control over public opinion and in this way attain support for the liberal program to be adopted by Japan and the United States, Secretary Hull asked if Ambassador Nomura believed that a conference between the heads of the two governments would actually be more effective. According to Ambassador Nomura efforts had already been made to influence Japanese public opinion, and favorable results had been achieved. Nevertheless, a meeting between the leaders of the two governments would provide not only support for those elements desiring peaceful negotiations with the United States, but it would also counteract the pro-Axis factions in Japan.
Secretary Hull then reiterated his belief that both Japan and the United States would gain more from peaceful collaboration than by forceful opposition to one another's policies. Pointing to Germany as an example of the difficulties resulting from excessive expenditures for armaments, Secretary Hull remarked that no country could benefit from the staggering cost of an attempted world conquest. Ambassador Nomura agreed fully with his views.[351]
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report
Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on September 23, 1941 that in order to communicate Foreign Minister Toyoda's interpretation of various paragraphs and phrases in the Japanese proposals which had been questioned by the United States, and at the same time to deliver a copy of the Japanese definition of "equitable basis", he had called on the Secretary of State on September 23, 1941.[352]
On presenting the outline of Japan's terms of peace with China, the Japanese Ambassador had pointed out that these latest documents, coupled with previous statements made by the Japanese government, had completely explained all Japanese policies. Therefore, no further explanation would be made to either Secretary Hull in Washington, or Ambassador Grew in Tokyo, and all matters pertaining to the Tripartite Pact would be left for the meeting between the leaders of both countries except those points which had already been discussed at preliminary conferences. Ambassador Nomura stated that these latest Japanese proposals were intended to enlarge rather than narrow the scope of the original American proposals.[353]
Because of certain Axis elements, domestic problems in Japan had become increasingly critical. Therefore, the Japanese government sincerely desired that a decision be reached
[350] "Document handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 636. This term was interpreted during Foreign Minister Toyoda's conversation with Ambassador Grew on September 13, 1941, see S.D., II, 622. It was sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941, see III, 177-178.
[351] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 23, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 634-635.
[352] III, 201.
[353] Ibid.
[75]
regarding the "leaders conference" before the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact was celebrated in Japan on September 27, 1941.[354]
Assuring Ambassador Nomura that he was devoting every effort to the materialization of the leaders conference, Secretary Hull stated that it was desirable, however, that the Japanese government first influence Japanese public opinion to adopt an attitude more favorable to the United States. Ambassador Nomura replied that Japan had been able to improve conditions in this regard.
In Ambassador Nomura's personal opinion, conformity with the Tripartite Pact and improvement of American-Japanese relations could be handled along parallel lines by the Japanese government, and a meeting of the leaders would strengthen peace in the Pacific.[355] At this point Secretary Hull informed Ambassador Nomura that he had received Ambassador Grew's report of the conference with Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 22, 1941.[356] Since the points discussed in this conference were now under careful consideration, Secretary Hull hoped to be able to reply in the near future. Ambassador Nomura then attempted to have Secretary Hull express a favorable opinion toward the materialization of the "leaders conference", but the Secretary of State refused to make a definite commitment.
In view of the existing international situation, however, Secretary Hull believed that now was the time for the United States and Japan to work toward the reconstruction of a peaceful world. But although Japan and the United States were ideally situated to lead world affairs, Secretary Hull doubted if the caliber of the statesmanship of both countries was capable of undertaking such a vast problem.
Firmly convinced that the meeting between the two leaders would immeasurably strengthen both governments' stand in the Pacific and would aid world peace, Ambassador Nomura once more urged that Secretary Hull work toward this goal.[357]
84. Ambassador Nomura Asks Tokyo To Clarify Its Proposals
After holding a telephone conversation with Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 24, 1941, Ambassador Nomura requested in a dispatch to the Japanese Foreign Minister on September 24, 1941 that certain points discussed be further clarified.[358] In accordance with instructions from his government, Ambassador Nomura had informed Secretary Hull in a conference on September 23, 1941 that the Japanese government had nothing more to say in regard to the various proposals it had extended to the United States. At present, Ambassador Nomura was marking time while waiting for a reply from Secretary Hull.[359]
In acknowledging receipt of a message from Tokyo on the preceding day, Ambassador Nomura stated that he did not fully understand the reasons offered by Foreign Minister Toyoda in explanation of the necessity for retaining Japanese troops in specified areas of China. The Japanese Ambassador feared that the United States would interpret the statement as a plan to station Japanese troops anywhere at all throughout the length and breadth of China. Anxious to carry out fully the Japanese government's instructions, Ambassador Nomura asked that a written explanation of the proposed peace plans, mentioned by the Japanese Foreign Minister in his Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
telephone conversation, be forwarded to him immediately.[360]
[354] III, 195.
[355] III, 201
[356] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 631-633.
[357] III, 201.
[358] III, 202.
[359] Ibid.
[360] III, 203.
[76]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
85. Japanese Spies Disclose American Attitude Toward Japan
While Japan waited for the United States' answer to its proposals, their espionage agents attempted to determine the American attitude toward the present negotiations. Mr. Morishima, head of Japanese espionage activities in the United States, sent a special report to Tokyo on September 26, 1941.[361]
Mr. Morishima stated that because Prime Minister Konoye had initiated negotiations with the United States, and had taken a temperate stand with regard to the navigation of American tankers, Washington officials concluded that Japan was in a desperate condition. Consequently, at the time of Prince Konoye's return to power, Washington believed that an understanding with Japan could be reached.[362]
The delay in reaching the understanding, however, had been occasioned by the constantly growing suspicion that the present Japanese policy of appeasement was motivated by the desire to gain time, while Germany won a decisive victory in Russia. Gradually, the American officials had begun to feel that no agreement should be reached at the expense of China.
Though desiring to effect a satisfactory compromise with Japan, the United States believed that any agreement concerning Japanese problems also involved England, Soviet Russia, and the Far East. As far as the European war was concerned, America had decided to maintain its present position of strengthening Allied resistance, since an Axis victory would gravely imperil American national defense. In case Germany should win on the Russian front, the United States felt the necessity of eliminating the threat which Japan constituted in the Pacific.[363]
Mr. Morishima declared that America would first try to ensure that Japan would refrain from further invasion before amending its relations with the government at Tokyo. If Japan revised its intention to seize territory an understanding would be possible immediately, but no temporary agreement would be considered, merely for expediency's sake. Despite all negotiations, the United States planned to send a military mission to China and to continue furnishing lend-lease material to China until definite assurance was given that Japan would cease Far Eastern aggression.[364]
According to Mr. Morishima's information, it seemed evident that the United States would carry through its vast plans for the reconstruction and cultivation of China in spite of any agreement concluded with Japan. Since America's expressed desires did not coincide with Japan's national policy, a strong faction in Japan disapproved of the present attempts for establishing amity between the two countries. Similarly, in the United States, an anti-Japanese wing, encouraged by Chungking, spread propaganda to the effect that a Japanese-American rapprochement would involve the sacrifice of China.[365]
By maintaining close contact with the American society called The Friends of China, the Chungking government was opposing a Japanese-American rapprochement. Furthermore, The American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression had initiated a campaign for economic pressure against Japan, and was opposing the efforts of both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to settle these problems peacefully.[366]
[361] III, 204.
[362] Ibid.
[363] III, 205.
[364] III, 206.
[365] III, 207.
[366] III, 208.
[77]
86. Foreign Minister Toyoda Urges Increased Diplomatic Efficiency
During the period of diplomatic crisis, Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that only exceptional statesmanship on the part of Foreign Office officials would enable the Japanese government to obtain its desired objectives. Therefore, while the frank expression of opinions from Japanese officials abroad were still welcomed, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that no action be taken which might impair the solidarity of Foreign Office personnel or interfere with the execution of Japanese Foreign Office policy. In a message on September 26, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked that all Japanese Ambassadors inspire the members of these offices to achieve a maximum diplomatic efficiency.[367]
87. Foreign Minister Toyoda Forbids Textual Changes By Ambassador Nomura
Although realizing the difficulties currently experienced by Ambassador Nomura in the execution of his duties and appreciating fully that Ambassador Nomura had views divergent from his own, Foreign Minister Toyoda, nevertheless, requested on September 26, 1941, that no changes be made in any Japanese communications without first asking permission from the Foreign Office in Tokyo.[368] The Japanese Foreign Minister had previously notified Ambassador Nomura that the texts of the messages from Tokyo were composed only after careful deliberation by the various Japanese ministries involved.[369]
Turning next to the basic terms of peace between Japan and China which had been recently sent from Tokyo, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked whether Ambassador Nomura had found an opportunity to present them to Secretary Hull. Referring to the recent conversation held between President Roosevelt and Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Foreign Minister asked whether President Roosevelt had mentioned a promise made by Japan that there would be no further increase of troops stationed in French Indo-China in order to ensure the success of Japanese-American negotiations.
Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that the American President had referred to this promise when "with smiling cynicism" he had stated that Japan might occupy Thailand while Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt were holding their peace conference, just as Japanese troops had marched into French Indo-China while Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull had conducted informal peace negotiations.
Because of the hostile attitude of Germany toward the proposed understanding between Japan and the United States, and the increasing international tension, Foreign Minister Toyoda requested that Ambassador Nomura interview the American officials to ascertain their views on all problems involved in the negotiations.[370]
88. Ambassador Nomura Answers Foreign Minister Toyoda's Message
Replying to Foreign Minister Toyoda on the same day, September 26, 1941, Ambassador Nomura stated that he had already communicated his government's basic terms for peace between Japan and China to the American authorities. In referring to Foreign Minister Toyoda's questions regarding President Roosevelt's statement, Ambassador Nomura insisted that the American President had made no mention of any Japanese promise to avoid stationing troops in French Indo-China, nor had he inquired concerning the number of troops already stationed there.
[367] III, 209.
[368] III, 210.
[369] Ibid.
[370] Ibid.
[78]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
In the conversation that was to take place between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura later in the day, the Japanese Ambassador promised to convey Foreign Minister Toyoda's reasons for maintaining troops in a certain specified area of China, and also to hand Secretary Hull the text of the proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.
Ambassador Nomura also assured Foreign Minister Toyoda that he neither added nor subtracted from the messages or instructions sent to him by his government. However, the English text of messages sent from Tokyo often differed from the original Japanese text and in view of this, Ambassador Nomura suggested that Foreign Minister Toyoda check the English translations more thoroughly before sending them.[371]
89. Ambassador Nomura Sends Japanese Proposals to Secretary Hull (September 27, 1941)
Under his government's instructions, on September 27, 1941 Ambassador Nomura sent Mr. Matsudaira to give Secretary Hull a copy of the Japanese proposals which had been delivered to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941.[372]
In Ambassador Nomura's covering note which was attached to the proposals, he stated that when handing to Ambassador Grew the original set of proposals, Mr. Terasaki had declared that the Japanese government was awaiting a reply from the United States regarding the projected meeting between the two government heads. In order to bring about this conference Japan had formulated a statement along the lines of the American Draft Understanding of June 21, 1941, incorporating all the proposals since communicated to the American government. Prepared solely for the convenience of the United States, these new proposals were not to be interpreted as an inflexible Japanese treaty.[373]
90. Ambassador Nomura Reports Discrepancy in Copies of Japanese Peace Terms
Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on September 27, 1941, a few days after delivering a copy of the Japanese government's terms for peace with China to Secretary Hull, that he had been notified by the State Department of certain discrepancies between the proposal handed to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo and that which he had given to the Secretary of State.[374] Mr. Ballantine of the State Department had pointed out that though the Japanese peace terms relayed from Ambassador Grew in Tokyo contained nine articles, the outline received from Ambassador Nomura contained only the first five articles. Since Ambassador Nomura had explained that there was always the possibility of errors in transmission, he requested in his report that Tokyo check the message in question and advise him of its findings.[375]
In reading Ambassador Nomura's report, it should be noted that despite Ambassador Nomura's seemingly honest bewilderment concerning this matter and his request to have Tokyo check on the transmission of the message, a copy of the original Japanese dispatch, sent by Tokyo on September 22, 1941, and now in American communication intelligence files, contains nine articles. It is not certain, therefore, whether the communication clerks in the Japanese Embassy did not receive the complete text, or whether accidentally or deliberately they did not deliver the complete text to Ambassador Nomura. Another possibility, which apparently does not hold in view of Ambassador Nomura's request for further check by Tokyo, is that the Japanese Ambassador deliberately omitted the last four articles for reasons of his own.
[371] III, 211.
[372] "The Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", September 27, 1941, S.D., II, 636. The Japanese translation of the resume in English of Mr. Terasaki's remarks was sent by Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo on September 25, 1941, III, 212.
[373] "Japan's proposals submitted to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 25, 1941, S.D., II, 637-640. For complete text sent by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura on September 25, 1941, see III, 213.
[374] III, 214.
[375] Ibid.
[79]
91. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 27, 1941)
(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[376]
Since Foreign Minister Toyoda received Ambassador Grew on September 27, 1941 immediately after attending various functions celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Ambassador Grew believed that the Japanese Foreign Minister wished to emphasize that Japan was still anxious to establish amicable negotiations with the United States. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
In reiterating Japan's desires to consummate the meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt, Foreign Minister Toyoda inquired if America had set forth its views regarding the Japanese proposal for a meeting of the two government heads. Ambassador Grew replied that the only information received from Secretary Hull had been the report that, during a discussion on September 23, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had handed the Secretary of State certain written material, which Secretary Hull promised to examine as expeditiously as possible in order to make a prompt reply.
The Japanese Foreign Minister then conveyed orally to Ambassador Grew various considerations regarding the position of the Japanese government in connection with the present informal conversations.[377] Pointing to the critical condition into which Europe had fallen as the result of a war which had involved various powers, Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that if the United States and Japan were to relinquish their hold over the key to peace in the Pacific, then world civilization would be imperiled.
Numerous incidents occurring between Japan and the United States had greatly disturbed peaceful relations, but if the conditions between Japan and the United States could be adjusted in a friendly manner, the effects would be felt throughout the world. It was for this reason that Japan was so determined to adjust any differences with the United States.
Upon assuming the post of Foreign Minister two months before, Admiral Toyoda had begun to work unceasingly toward the re-establishment of friendly relations between the two countries, and with the same objective in mind, Prime Minister Konoye had expressed his willingness to confer with President Roosevelt. Misunderstanding had arisen with Germany and Italy as a result of Prince Konoye's desire to meet with President Roosevelt, but Japan was willing to make sacrifices in order to demonstrate clearly its sincerity in desiring not only to adjust Japanese-American problems but also to maintain peace in the Pacific and to re-establish it in other areas of the world.
Moreover, though there was no precedent in Japanese history for a Prime Minister's going abroad to confer with the head of another government, Prince Konoye was motivated at this time by a sincere desire for peace. Nevertheless, Japan would not succumb to American pressure in reaching an understanding. Because of the allegations to the effect that Japan was being forced to its knees by the United States, which had been made in American newspapers, Foreign Minister Toyoda felt it necessary to repeat this fact.
Since Japanese-American relations were exceedingly complicated, it was quite possible that there would be many problems left unsettled at the conclusion of the meeting between the leaders of the two countries. The political effects of such an epochal meeting would greatly influence the settlement of any divergent views existing at present.
If the meeting did not materialize in spite of the fact that both countries were in accord as to its value and if the United States delayed too long in making a reply, it was doubtful whether
[376] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 27, 1941, S.D., II, 641-645.
[377] "For translation of Japanese text of Foreign Minister Toyoda's Oral Statement sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 27, 1941, see III, 215. A resume in English of this conversation was handed to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 29, 1941, S.D., II, 652-654.
[80]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
another favorable opportunity would soon occur. Since Japan had already announced the proposals it would make at the meeting by submitting a complete resume to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941, in accordance with the lines contained in the American proposal for June 21, 1941, the United States was fully aware of Japan's position.
All details connected with the transporting of Prime Minister Konoye and his party to the meeting place had been arranged, and Japan was in a position to hold the meeting at any time. Only a reply from the United States was necessary to complete the preparations already underway.
Foreign Minister Toyoda pointed out that any further delay would place the Japanese government in an exceedingly difficult position because the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact might be used by the pro-Axis elements in Japan to vitiate the efforts of the Japanese Cabinet to improve relations with the United States. Since time was of paramount importance, Japan suggested that the meeting be scheduled for some time between October 10 to October 15, 1941. If held any later, the weather in the north Pacific and along the Alaskan coast would be decidedly unfavorable.
In conducting a conference of this type, it was of the utmost importance that both countries respect the other's reliability and sincerity. Foreign Minister Toyoda felt sure that President Roosevelt fully appreciated Prime Minister Konoye's character and motives in this matter. Stating that the entire Japanese Cabinet was behind Prime Minister Konoye's move, including high army and navy officers who would attend the conference in order to dissipate doubt as to their collaboration with Prince Konoye's plans, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that the opportunity not be lost to adjust Japanese-American relations by a conference between the leaders of both countries.
In conclusion, the Japanese Foreign Minister expressed the hope that none of his statements would be misinterpreted or considered as setting a time limit upon any reply from the American government.[378]
(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[379]
Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura on September 22, 1941 that after the ceremonies celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1941 had taken place, he had requested Ambassador Grew to call upon him. After talking to the American Ambassador along the lines of his special report to Ambassador Nomura, Foreign Minister Toyoda again strongly urged that Ambassador Grew recommend to the United States that the meeting of the leaders of the two governments take place without further delay.
In view of both internal and external circumstances affecting Japanese policies, it would be impossible to postpone the meeting indefinitely. Foreign Minister Toyoda instructed Ambassador Nomura, when speaking with American officials, to place the primary emphasis on the materialization of this proposed conference.[380]
Foreign Minister Toyoda was particularly anxious to have Ambassador Nomura emphasize the fact that although the Japanese government had made its final statement with regard to the negotiations, it did not consider that all questions and answers were now useless. Foreign Minister Toyoda welcomed any questions and was anxious to respond cordially to them, but since the United States government had not sent a single query since September 10, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda was deeply concerned.
[378] Ibid.
[379] III, 216.
[380] Ibid.
[81]
According to Mr. Toyoda, from the time that the American newspapers had begun to editorialize on the Japanese-American negotiations, these negotiations had become a major topic of conversation throughout the entire world. Within four or five days, the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact would be celebrated. In spite of the fact that the Japanese government desired that the day's activities be conducted in a calm manner, the Japanese Foreign Minister was well aware that an anti-American group within the country would take the opportunity to threaten Japanese-American relations by provoking incidents. Since it was obvious that Japan's internal situation was extremely critical, Foreign Minister Toyoda directed Ambassador Nomura to inform Secretary Hull immediately of the details of his conversation with Ambassador Grew and to request a prompt reply.[336]
[333] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 631-633.
[334] III, 193.
[335] III, 194.
[336] III, 195.
[72]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
81. Ambassador Nomura Forwards a Japanese Report on America's Attitude Toward War
In summarizing a Japanese report on the American attitude toward war in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, Ambassador Nomura, in a message to Tokyo on September 22, 1941,[337] discussed the desire of the United States to adopt any plan which would bring about the ultimate destruction of Germany. In order to prevent Soviet Russia from making a separate peace, England and the United States had rendered all possible assistance, hoping to maintain Russia's fighting strength for an offensive in the spring provided its troops survived the winter months. By contributing millions of dollars for equipment, the United States also hoped to strengthen Britain's will to continue the fight.
Because the strength of the American Navy was increasing constantly, the submarine menace in the Atlantic did not cause as much alarm as formerly, although the United States recognized that utter annihilation of the submarine was impossible.[338] According to the Japanese report, the American attitude toward war as a general rule was extremely casual. If war with Japan did develop the American public would accept it as inevitable.
Because of their economic superiority over Japan, the American people believed that it would be a naval war primarily, and that the United States would be victorious after a very short struggle. Only a few were fully aware of the dangers involved in war with Japan. There still remained those who argued against reaching a peace at the expense of China.[339]
According to an article written in the New York Times, attempts to ameliorate the situation existing between Japan and the United States were dead-locked because Japan's continued occupation of China was against the fundamental principles laid down by the United States. For this reason, Prime Minister Konoye had requested a personal conference with President Roosevelt.[340]
Public opinion in the United States held that in view of Germany's war aims a non-aggressive American policy would result only in failure. Believing that Italy would withdraw from the war, that occupied nations would uprise and, finally, that the endurance of the German people themselves would fail, Americans continued to believe that participation in a war would not be fatal. If they went to war with Japan, the American people felt that naval participation alone was sufficient, and that no expeditionary forces would be dispatched on a large scale.
Nevertheless, certain preparations were being undertaken by military authorities. In Congress, where the majority backed the government's foreign policy, a sharp decline in the strength of the isolationist group was noted.[341]
President Roosevelt had given consideration to the possibility that in case Soviet Russia fell, a Japanese aggression would cause a simultaneous clash in both the Atlantic and Pacific. However, the greater portion of the American Navy still remained in the Pacific.
With regard to Japanese peace terms, it was rumored that Japan was demanding treaty ports in four southern provinces of China. Although the United States did not wish to sacrifice China to Japan, if Japan gave up forceful aggression, the United States would not only restore trade relations with Japan but would even render economic assistance. Ambassador Nomura expressed his opinion of this report by stating that the observer "had hit the nail on the head".[342]
[337] III, 196.
[338] Ibid.
[339] III, 197.
[340] Ibid.
[341] III, 198.
[342] III, 199.
[73]
82. Japan Explains Its Retaining of Troops in China
At Mr. Terasaki's request, Mr. Dooman, Counselor to the American Embassy in Japan, called on the Japanese Foreign Office.[343] A statement, supplementing those made to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda on the previous day and outlining Japan's reasons for retaining troops in China, had been prepared for communication to Ambassador Grew and for subsequent transmission to the United States government.[344]
In this document the Japanese government stated that in order to aid in the construction of a peaceful China and to ensure the security and defense of Japan itself, it recognized the necessity of stationing Japanese armed forces in certain areas of China. Because the uncertainty of internal stability in China had always proved a source of danger, Japan feared that intrigue, instigated by external sources, might follow the conclusion of the war between these two countries. The activities of the Communistic elements had already been detrimental to the maintenance of peace, and Japan felt that if such conditions were to recur any promotion of China's national life or welfare would be greatly impeded.[345]
From the economic standpoint alone, it was obvious that the activities of any neighboring territories would effect Japan's existence. Moreover, in view of the warlike attitude prevalent throughout the world, the defense of Japan could be endangered by any sudden unfavorable situation in China. Although Japan was prepared to withdraw armed forces wherever their presence was no longer required, it was imperative that a nucleus of Japanese troops be retained in certain areas of China. Any proposal to maintain peace by the stationing of international armed forces was inacceptable because of public opinion in China and because of the direct influence the internal condition of China had upon Japan.[346]
83. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 23, 1941)
(a) State Department's Report[347]
Upon his own request, Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apartment on September 23, 1941. Handing Secretary Hull a copy of the "Basic Terms of Peace between Japan and China"[348] and also a document entitled "A Reply to the American Communication of September 10, 1941",[349] Ambassador Nomura announced that these documents contained a full explanation of Japan's attitude regarding the disputable points in its recent proposals. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Ambassador Nomura said that any further clarification of the Tripartite Pact's effect upon Japan might best be left for discussion at the proposed meeting between the government heads.
Another document delivered to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 23, 1941 defined the phrase "equitable basis" to mean economic activities which were neither monopolistic, exclusive nor exploitative in nature, but which were based on the policy of nondiscrimination insofar as natural limitations permitted. Japan did not intend to be the sole
[343] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 634.
[344] Ibid.
[345] "Oral statement made to the Counselor of the American Embassy in Japan (Dooman) by the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office (Terasaki)", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 640-641. Foreign Minister Toyoda sent Mr. Koshu a copy of this document on September 23, 1941 with instructions to deliver it to Secretary Hull. See III, 200.
[346] Ibid.
[347] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 23, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 634-635.
[348] This document was handed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Matsuoka on September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 633. For the English text sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 22, 1941, see III, 191-192.
[349] This document was a copy of the one handed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 13, 1941, (see S.D., II, 623-624), and wired to Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941, see III, 175-176. Ambassador Nomura referred to it in his conversation with Secretary Hull on September 9, 1941, see S.D., II, 629-631 and III, 186-188.
[74]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
interpreter of this term. This document was not mentioned in the State Department's report of this conversation, but its text has been printed in the official documents and Ambassador Nomura referred to it in his report of this interview.[350]
After promising to study these papers as expeditiously as possible, Secretary Hull inquired concerning Ambassador Nomura's impressions regarding the present situation. Stating that he appreciated the position of the United States, Ambassador Nomura pointed to the domestic difficulties in Japan. If the meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye could be effected, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the psychological reaction in Japan would be extremely favorable to the re-establishment of friendly relations with America.
After referring to a previous American suggestion that the Japanese government assert control over public opinion and in this way attain support for the liberal program to be adopted by Japan and the United States, Secretary Hull asked if Ambassador Nomura believed that a conference between the heads of the two governments would actually be more effective. According to Ambassador Nomura efforts had already been made to influence Japanese public opinion, and favorable results had been achieved. Nevertheless, a meeting between the leaders of the two governments would provide not only support for those elements desiring peaceful negotiations with the United States, but it would also counteract the pro-Axis factions in Japan.
Secretary Hull then reiterated his belief that both Japan and the United States would gain more from peaceful collaboration than by forceful opposition to one another's policies. Pointing to Germany as an example of the difficulties resulting from excessive expenditures for armaments, Secretary Hull remarked that no country could benefit from the staggering cost of an attempted world conquest. Ambassador Nomura agreed fully with his views.[351]
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report
Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on September 23, 1941 that in order to communicate Foreign Minister Toyoda's interpretation of various paragraphs and phrases in the Japanese proposals which had been questioned by the United States, and at the same time to deliver a copy of the Japanese definition of "equitable basis", he had called on the Secretary of State on September 23, 1941.[352]
On presenting the outline of Japan's terms of peace with China, the Japanese Ambassador had pointed out that these latest documents, coupled with previous statements made by the Japanese government, had completely explained all Japanese policies. Therefore, no further explanation would be made to either Secretary Hull in Washington, or Ambassador Grew in Tokyo, and all matters pertaining to the Tripartite Pact would be left for the meeting between the leaders of both countries except those points which had already been discussed at preliminary conferences. Ambassador Nomura stated that these latest Japanese proposals were intended to enlarge rather than narrow the scope of the original American proposals.[353]
Because of certain Axis elements, domestic problems in Japan had become increasingly critical. Therefore, the Japanese government sincerely desired that a decision be reached
[350] "Document handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 636. This term was interpreted during Foreign Minister Toyoda's conversation with Ambassador Grew on September 13, 1941, see S.D., II, 622. It was sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941, see III, 177-178.
[351] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 23, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 634-635.
[352] III, 201.
[353] Ibid.
[75]
regarding the "leaders conference" before the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact was celebrated in Japan on September 27, 1941.[354]
Assuring Ambassador Nomura that he was devoting every effort to the materialization of the leaders conference, Secretary Hull stated that it was desirable, however, that the Japanese government first influence Japanese public opinion to adopt an attitude more favorable to the United States. Ambassador Nomura replied that Japan had been able to improve conditions in this regard.
In Ambassador Nomura's personal opinion, conformity with the Tripartite Pact and improvement of American-Japanese relations could be handled along parallel lines by the Japanese government, and a meeting of the leaders would strengthen peace in the Pacific.[355] At this point Secretary Hull informed Ambassador Nomura that he had received Ambassador Grew's report of the conference with Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 22, 1941.[356] Since the points discussed in this conference were now under careful consideration, Secretary Hull hoped to be able to reply in the near future. Ambassador Nomura then attempted to have Secretary Hull express a favorable opinion toward the materialization of the "leaders conference", but the Secretary of State refused to make a definite commitment.
In view of the existing international situation, however, Secretary Hull believed that now was the time for the United States and Japan to work toward the reconstruction of a peaceful world. But although Japan and the United States were ideally situated to lead world affairs, Secretary Hull doubted if the caliber of the statesmanship of both countries was capable of undertaking such a vast problem.
Firmly convinced that the meeting between the two leaders would immeasurably strengthen both governments' stand in the Pacific and would aid world peace, Ambassador Nomura once more urged that Secretary Hull work toward this goal.[357]
84. Ambassador Nomura Asks Tokyo To Clarify Its Proposals
After holding a telephone conversation with Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 24, 1941, Ambassador Nomura requested in a dispatch to the Japanese Foreign Minister on September 24, 1941 that certain points discussed be further clarified.[358] In accordance with instructions from his government, Ambassador Nomura had informed Secretary Hull in a conference on September 23, 1941 that the Japanese government had nothing more to say in regard to the various proposals it had extended to the United States. At present, Ambassador Nomura was marking time while waiting for a reply from Secretary Hull.[359]
In acknowledging receipt of a message from Tokyo on the preceding day, Ambassador Nomura stated that he did not fully understand the reasons offered by Foreign Minister Toyoda in explanation of the necessity for retaining Japanese troops in specified areas of China. The Japanese Ambassador feared that the United States would interpret the statement as a plan to station Japanese troops anywhere at all throughout the length and breadth of China. Anxious to carry out fully the Japanese government's instructions, Ambassador Nomura asked that a written explanation of the proposed peace plans, mentioned by the Japanese Foreign Minister in his Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
telephone conversation, be forwarded to him immediately.[360]
[354] III, 195.
[355] III, 201
[356] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 631-633.
[357] III, 201.
[358] III, 202.
[359] Ibid.
[360] III, 203.
[76]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
85. Japanese Spies Disclose American Attitude Toward Japan
While Japan waited for the United States' answer to its proposals, their espionage agents attempted to determine the American attitude toward the present negotiations. Mr. Morishima, head of Japanese espionage activities in the United States, sent a special report to Tokyo on September 26, 1941.[361]
Mr. Morishima stated that because Prime Minister Konoye had initiated negotiations with the United States, and had taken a temperate stand with regard to the navigation of American tankers, Washington officials concluded that Japan was in a desperate condition. Consequently, at the time of Prince Konoye's return to power, Washington believed that an understanding with Japan could be reached.[362]
The delay in reaching the understanding, however, had been occasioned by the constantly growing suspicion that the present Japanese policy of appeasement was motivated by the desire to gain time, while Germany won a decisive victory in Russia. Gradually, the American officials had begun to feel that no agreement should be reached at the expense of China.
Though desiring to effect a satisfactory compromise with Japan, the United States believed that any agreement concerning Japanese problems also involved England, Soviet Russia, and the Far East. As far as the European war was concerned, America had decided to maintain its present position of strengthening Allied resistance, since an Axis victory would gravely imperil American national defense. In case Germany should win on the Russian front, the United States felt the necessity of eliminating the threat which Japan constituted in the Pacific.[363]
Mr. Morishima declared that America would first try to ensure that Japan would refrain from further invasion before amending its relations with the government at Tokyo. If Japan revised its intention to seize territory an understanding would be possible immediately, but no temporary agreement would be considered, merely for expediency's sake. Despite all negotiations, the United States planned to send a military mission to China and to continue furnishing lend-lease material to China until definite assurance was given that Japan would cease Far Eastern aggression.[364]
According to Mr. Morishima's information, it seemed evident that the United States would carry through its vast plans for the reconstruction and cultivation of China in spite of any agreement concluded with Japan. Since America's expressed desires did not coincide with Japan's national policy, a strong faction in Japan disapproved of the present attempts for establishing amity between the two countries. Similarly, in the United States, an anti-Japanese wing, encouraged by Chungking, spread propaganda to the effect that a Japanese-American rapprochement would involve the sacrifice of China.[365]
By maintaining close contact with the American society called The Friends of China, the Chungking government was opposing a Japanese-American rapprochement. Furthermore, The American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression had initiated a campaign for economic pressure against Japan, and was opposing the efforts of both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to settle these problems peacefully.[366]
[361] III, 204.
[362] Ibid.
[363] III, 205.
[364] III, 206.
[365] III, 207.
[366] III, 208.
[77]
86. Foreign Minister Toyoda Urges Increased Diplomatic Efficiency
During the period of diplomatic crisis, Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that only exceptional statesmanship on the part of Foreign Office officials would enable the Japanese government to obtain its desired objectives. Therefore, while the frank expression of opinions from Japanese officials abroad were still welcomed, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that no action be taken which might impair the solidarity of Foreign Office personnel or interfere with the execution of Japanese Foreign Office policy. In a message on September 26, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked that all Japanese Ambassadors inspire the members of these offices to achieve a maximum diplomatic efficiency.[367]
87. Foreign Minister Toyoda Forbids Textual Changes By Ambassador Nomura
Although realizing the difficulties currently experienced by Ambassador Nomura in the execution of his duties and appreciating fully that Ambassador Nomura had views divergent from his own, Foreign Minister Toyoda, nevertheless, requested on September 26, 1941, that no changes be made in any Japanese communications without first asking permission from the Foreign Office in Tokyo.[368] The Japanese Foreign Minister had previously notified Ambassador Nomura that the texts of the messages from Tokyo were composed only after careful deliberation by the various Japanese ministries involved.[369]
Turning next to the basic terms of peace between Japan and China which had been recently sent from Tokyo, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked whether Ambassador Nomura had found an opportunity to present them to Secretary Hull. Referring to the recent conversation held between President Roosevelt and Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Foreign Minister asked whether President Roosevelt had mentioned a promise made by Japan that there would be no further increase of troops stationed in French Indo-China in order to ensure the success of Japanese-American negotiations.
Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that the American President had referred to this promise when "with smiling cynicism" he had stated that Japan might occupy Thailand while Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt were holding their peace conference, just as Japanese troops had marched into French Indo-China while Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull had conducted informal peace negotiations.
Because of the hostile attitude of Germany toward the proposed understanding between Japan and the United States, and the increasing international tension, Foreign Minister Toyoda requested that Ambassador Nomura interview the American officials to ascertain their views on all problems involved in the negotiations.[370]
88. Ambassador Nomura Answers Foreign Minister Toyoda's Message
Replying to Foreign Minister Toyoda on the same day, September 26, 1941, Ambassador Nomura stated that he had already communicated his government's basic terms for peace between Japan and China to the American authorities. In referring to Foreign Minister Toyoda's questions regarding President Roosevelt's statement, Ambassador Nomura insisted that the American President had made no mention of any Japanese promise to avoid stationing troops in French Indo-China, nor had he inquired concerning the number of troops already stationed there.
[367] III, 209.
[368] III, 210.
[369] Ibid.
[370] Ibid.
[78]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
In the conversation that was to take place between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura later in the day, the Japanese Ambassador promised to convey Foreign Minister Toyoda's reasons for maintaining troops in a certain specified area of China, and also to hand Secretary Hull the text of the proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.
Ambassador Nomura also assured Foreign Minister Toyoda that he neither added nor subtracted from the messages or instructions sent to him by his government. However, the English text of messages sent from Tokyo often differed from the original Japanese text and in view of this, Ambassador Nomura suggested that Foreign Minister Toyoda check the English translations more thoroughly before sending them.[371]
89. Ambassador Nomura Sends Japanese Proposals to Secretary Hull (September 27, 1941)
Under his government's instructions, on September 27, 1941 Ambassador Nomura sent Mr. Matsudaira to give Secretary Hull a copy of the Japanese proposals which had been delivered to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941.[372]
In Ambassador Nomura's covering note which was attached to the proposals, he stated that when handing to Ambassador Grew the original set of proposals, Mr. Terasaki had declared that the Japanese government was awaiting a reply from the United States regarding the projected meeting between the two government heads. In order to bring about this conference Japan had formulated a statement along the lines of the American Draft Understanding of June 21, 1941, incorporating all the proposals since communicated to the American government. Prepared solely for the convenience of the United States, these new proposals were not to be interpreted as an inflexible Japanese treaty.[373]
90. Ambassador Nomura Reports Discrepancy in Copies of Japanese Peace Terms
Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on September 27, 1941, a few days after delivering a copy of the Japanese government's terms for peace with China to Secretary Hull, that he had been notified by the State Department of certain discrepancies between the proposal handed to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo and that which he had given to the Secretary of State.[374] Mr. Ballantine of the State Department had pointed out that though the Japanese peace terms relayed from Ambassador Grew in Tokyo contained nine articles, the outline received from Ambassador Nomura contained only the first five articles. Since Ambassador Nomura had explained that there was always the possibility of errors in transmission, he requested in his report that Tokyo check the message in question and advise him of its findings.[375]
In reading Ambassador Nomura's report, it should be noted that despite Ambassador Nomura's seemingly honest bewilderment concerning this matter and his request to have Tokyo check on the transmission of the message, a copy of the original Japanese dispatch, sent by Tokyo on September 22, 1941, and now in American communication intelligence files, contains nine articles. It is not certain, therefore, whether the communication clerks in the Japanese Embassy did not receive the complete text, or whether accidentally or deliberately they did not deliver the complete text to Ambassador Nomura. Another possibility, which apparently does not hold in view of Ambassador Nomura's request for further check by Tokyo, is that the Japanese Ambassador deliberately omitted the last four articles for reasons of his own.
[371] III, 211.
[372] "The Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", September 27, 1941, S.D., II, 636. The Japanese translation of the resume in English of Mr. Terasaki's remarks was sent by Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo on September 25, 1941, III, 212.
[373] "Japan's proposals submitted to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 25, 1941, S.D., II, 637-640. For complete text sent by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura on September 25, 1941, see III, 213.
[374] III, 214.
[375] Ibid.
[79]
91. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 27, 1941)
(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[376]
Since Foreign Minister Toyoda received Ambassador Grew on September 27, 1941 immediately after attending various functions celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Ambassador Grew believed that the Japanese Foreign Minister wished to emphasize that Japan was still anxious to establish amicable negotiations with the United States. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
In reiterating Japan's desires to consummate the meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt, Foreign Minister Toyoda inquired if America had set forth its views regarding the Japanese proposal for a meeting of the two government heads. Ambassador Grew replied that the only information received from Secretary Hull had been the report that, during a discussion on September 23, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had handed the Secretary of State certain written material, which Secretary Hull promised to examine as expeditiously as possible in order to make a prompt reply.
The Japanese Foreign Minister then conveyed orally to Ambassador Grew various considerations regarding the position of the Japanese government in connection with the present informal conversations.[377] Pointing to the critical condition into which Europe had fallen as the result of a war which had involved various powers, Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that if the United States and Japan were to relinquish their hold over the key to peace in the Pacific, then world civilization would be imperiled.
Numerous incidents occurring between Japan and the United States had greatly disturbed peaceful relations, but if the conditions between Japan and the United States could be adjusted in a friendly manner, the effects would be felt throughout the world. It was for this reason that Japan was so determined to adjust any differences with the United States.
Upon assuming the post of Foreign Minister two months before, Admiral Toyoda had begun to work unceasingly toward the re-establishment of friendly relations between the two countries, and with the same objective in mind, Prime Minister Konoye had expressed his willingness to confer with President Roosevelt. Misunderstanding had arisen with Germany and Italy as a result of Prince Konoye's desire to meet with President Roosevelt, but Japan was willing to make sacrifices in order to demonstrate clearly its sincerity in desiring not only to adjust Japanese-American problems but also to maintain peace in the Pacific and to re-establish it in other areas of the world.
Moreover, though there was no precedent in Japanese history for a Prime Minister's going abroad to confer with the head of another government, Prince Konoye was motivated at this time by a sincere desire for peace. Nevertheless, Japan would not succumb to American pressure in reaching an understanding. Because of the allegations to the effect that Japan was being forced to its knees by the United States, which had been made in American newspapers, Foreign Minister Toyoda felt it necessary to repeat this fact.
Since Japanese-American relations were exceedingly complicated, it was quite possible that there would be many problems left unsettled at the conclusion of the meeting between the leaders of the two countries. The political effects of such an epochal meeting would greatly influence the settlement of any divergent views existing at present.
If the meeting did not materialize in spite of the fact that both countries were in accord as to its value and if the United States delayed too long in making a reply, it was doubtful whether
[376] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 27, 1941, S.D., II, 641-645.
[377] "For translation of Japanese text of Foreign Minister Toyoda's Oral Statement sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 27, 1941, see III, 215. A resume in English of this conversation was handed to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 29, 1941, S.D., II, 652-654.
[80]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
another favorable opportunity would soon occur. Since Japan had already announced the proposals it would make at the meeting by submitting a complete resume to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941, in accordance with the lines contained in the American proposal for June 21, 1941, the United States was fully aware of Japan's position.
All details connected with the transporting of Prime Minister Konoye and his party to the meeting place had been arranged, and Japan was in a position to hold the meeting at any time. Only a reply from the United States was necessary to complete the preparations already underway.
Foreign Minister Toyoda pointed out that any further delay would place the Japanese government in an exceedingly difficult position because the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact might be used by the pro-Axis elements in Japan to vitiate the efforts of the Japanese Cabinet to improve relations with the United States. Since time was of paramount importance, Japan suggested that the meeting be scheduled for some time between October 10 to October 15, 1941. If held any later, the weather in the north Pacific and along the Alaskan coast would be decidedly unfavorable.
In conducting a conference of this type, it was of the utmost importance that both countries respect the other's reliability and sincerity. Foreign Minister Toyoda felt sure that President Roosevelt fully appreciated Prime Minister Konoye's character and motives in this matter. Stating that the entire Japanese Cabinet was behind Prime Minister Konoye's move, including high army and navy officers who would attend the conference in order to dissipate doubt as to their collaboration with Prince Konoye's plans, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that the opportunity not be lost to adjust Japanese-American relations by a conference between the leaders of both countries.
In conclusion, the Japanese Foreign Minister expressed the hope that none of his statements would be misinterpreted or considered as setting a time limit upon any reply from the American government.[378]
(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[379]
Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura on September 22, 1941 that after the ceremonies celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1941 had taken place, he had requested Ambassador Grew to call upon him. After talking to the American Ambassador along the lines of his special report to Ambassador Nomura, Foreign Minister Toyoda again strongly urged that Ambassador Grew recommend to the United States that the meeting of the leaders of the two governments take place without further delay.
In view of both internal and external circumstances affecting Japanese policies, it would be impossible to postpone the meeting indefinitely. Foreign Minister Toyoda instructed Ambassador Nomura, when speaking with American officials, to place the primary emphasis on the materialization of this proposed conference.[380]
Foreign Minister Toyoda was particularly anxious to have Ambassador Nomura emphasize the fact that although the Japanese government had made its final statement with regard to the negotiations, it did not consider that all questions and answers were now useless. Foreign Minister Toyoda welcomed any questions and was anxious to respond cordially to them, but since the United States government had not sent a single query since September 10, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda was deeply concerned.
[378] Ibid.
[379] III, 216.
[380] Ibid.
[81]
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
recruit 3.rec.0 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Synopsis
A choir group, "Getting Gay With Kids," visits South Park to recruit more kids for their upcoming concert in Costa Rica for the benefit of the rain forests. The boys are forced to join by Mr. Mackey as a punishment for their unruly behavior in class. In Costa Rica, they leave the "comfort" of the capital to take a tour of a nearby rain forest. Their guide is eventually devoured by a snake, and they become stranded.
Full Recap
Miss Stevens is in Mr. Garrison's class recruiting students for a choir tour called "Getting Gay With Kids". They are going to Central America to help to save the Rainforest. Our boys cause trouble and are sent to the office. Kenny has fallen for one of the girls in the choir, so when Mr. Mackey punishes the boys by forcing them to join the choir, he is the only one who is happy about it. The children are on their way to San Jose, Costa Rica. Kenny meets with Kelly, who starts calling him Lenny, Benny and anything other than his name. Miss Stevens also tells Cartman that she plans on changing him; she's got a lot of work ahead of her. Miss Stevens brings the children to much the President of Costa Rica. The President offers them a tour of the rainforest, but first they do a preview concert. Miss Stevens is dismayed by Kyle's lack of rhythm.
On their tour of the rainforest, the children see the wonders of the rainforest, which Cartman keeps trying to beat. Their tour guide is killed and eaten by a snake. Miss Stevens and the children are on their own. Kelly tells Kenny that she likes him, which is bad for her, because she doesn't want her heart broken. Outside the rainforest, Mr. Mackey wonders what has happened to the choir. In the rainforest, Miss Stevens back is covered by a huge bug. They run into a group of revolutionaries. Miss Stevens tries to entertain the troops. They are going to be sent away, when government troops arrive starting a battle.
Miss Stevens and the children are still wandering around the rainforest. Back in San Jose, the concert is about an hour away from starting. Cartman decides to leave the hippie activist. Cartman finds a crew working on a deforestation project and asks for help. In San Jose, the President stalls for time by telling Polish jokes. Meanwhile Miss Stevens and the remaining children find a group of natives who are intent upon killing them. As they run away the fall victim to quicksand.
The natives pull them out and tie them up. They plan on sacrificing Miss Stevens. Miss Stevens changes her mind and decides the rain forest really sucks, just as Cartman and the construction workers arrive to save the day. Miss Stevens and the children are so happy to be saved that they literally change their tune about the rainforest.
Kenny almost dies when he lies to his girlfriend and is struck by lightning. Ironically she revives him, while all Stan and Kyle can do is say their catchphrase and not define who "they" are.
A choir group, "Getting Gay With Kids," visits South Park to recruit more kids for their upcoming concert in Costa Rica for the benefit of the rain forests. The boys are forced to join by Mr. Mackey as a punishment for their unruly behavior in class. In Costa Rica, they leave the "comfort" of the capital to take a tour of a nearby rain forest. Their guide is eventually devoured by a snake, and they become stranded.
Full Recap
Miss Stevens is in Mr. Garrison's class recruiting students for a choir tour called "Getting Gay With Kids". They are going to Central America to help to save the Rainforest. Our boys cause trouble and are sent to the office. Kenny has fallen for one of the girls in the choir, so when Mr. Mackey punishes the boys by forcing them to join the choir, he is the only one who is happy about it. The children are on their way to San Jose, Costa Rica. Kenny meets with Kelly, who starts calling him Lenny, Benny and anything other than his name. Miss Stevens also tells Cartman that she plans on changing him; she's got a lot of work ahead of her. Miss Stevens brings the children to much the President of Costa Rica. The President offers them a tour of the rainforest, but first they do a preview concert. Miss Stevens is dismayed by Kyle's lack of rhythm.
On their tour of the rainforest, the children see the wonders of the rainforest, which Cartman keeps trying to beat. Their tour guide is killed and eaten by a snake. Miss Stevens and the children are on their own. Kelly tells Kenny that she likes him, which is bad for her, because she doesn't want her heart broken. Outside the rainforest, Mr. Mackey wonders what has happened to the choir. In the rainforest, Miss Stevens back is covered by a huge bug. They run into a group of revolutionaries. Miss Stevens tries to entertain the troops. They are going to be sent away, when government troops arrive starting a battle.
Miss Stevens and the children are still wandering around the rainforest. Back in San Jose, the concert is about an hour away from starting. Cartman decides to leave the hippie activist. Cartman finds a crew working on a deforestation project and asks for help. In San Jose, the President stalls for time by telling Polish jokes. Meanwhile Miss Stevens and the remaining children find a group of natives who are intent upon killing them. As they run away the fall victim to quicksand.
The natives pull them out and tie them up. They plan on sacrificing Miss Stevens. Miss Stevens changes her mind and decides the rain forest really sucks, just as Cartman and the construction workers arrive to save the day. Miss Stevens and the children are so happy to be saved that they literally change their tune about the rainforest.
Kenny almost dies when he lies to his girlfriend and is struck by lightning. Ironically she revives him, while all Stan and Kyle can do is say their catchphrase and not define who "they" are.
Monday, May 25, 2009
infections 8.inf.002002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
So the researchers tested how the knockout mouse immune system fared against a parasite called Toxoplasma gondii. The team used T. gondii because mice fighting off the parasite require robust activation of T cells; mice with weak T cell activity will die from the infection within one week. The mice lacking the receptor still mustered up a healthy response to the parasite, indicating that DR3 is not essential for fighting off the infection, Siegel’s team found.
Though still preliminary, the results suggest that blocking the DR3 receptor may help in treating multiple sclerosis, asthma and other autoimmune diseases where T cell dysfunction plays a role, says Tania Watts, an immunologist at the University of Toronto in Canada.
Croft agrees.
“It’s certainly a very provocative study and has put DR3 and TL1A in the same type of therapeutic league as some of the other members of the TNF receptor family,” he says. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Moving forward
Still, researchers need to confirm that DR3 isn’t essential in fighting off other infections, Watts says. So researchers should see how knockout mice hold up against influenza. “We want to know if it’s a good treatment for lung inflammation for asthma,” she says. “So what’s it going to do with a common lung infection?”
Even if DR3 knockout mice are hale and hearty after a battery of immune assaults, the results need to be translated to humans, Siegel says. Since researchers can’t simply knock out DR3 genes in humans, the team needs to use a drug that keeps TL1A from binding to the DR3 receptor, he says. But developing that drug could happen quickly, he adds.
“Because [DR3] is the same family of receptors as TNF, companies can go very quickly,” he says. “They can probably make this blocking antibody within a matter of months because they know how to do these things so well.”
From there, it may be three to five years before clinical trials could start, assuming all goes well, he says.
Though still preliminary, the results suggest that blocking the DR3 receptor may help in treating multiple sclerosis, asthma and other autoimmune diseases where T cell dysfunction plays a role, says Tania Watts, an immunologist at the University of Toronto in Canada.
Croft agrees.
“It’s certainly a very provocative study and has put DR3 and TL1A in the same type of therapeutic league as some of the other members of the TNF receptor family,” he says. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Moving forward
Still, researchers need to confirm that DR3 isn’t essential in fighting off other infections, Watts says. So researchers should see how knockout mice hold up against influenza. “We want to know if it’s a good treatment for lung inflammation for asthma,” she says. “So what’s it going to do with a common lung infection?”
Even if DR3 knockout mice are hale and hearty after a battery of immune assaults, the results need to be translated to humans, Siegel says. Since researchers can’t simply knock out DR3 genes in humans, the team needs to use a drug that keeps TL1A from binding to the DR3 receptor, he says. But developing that drug could happen quickly, he adds.
“Because [DR3] is the same family of receptors as TNF, companies can go very quickly,” he says. “They can probably make this blocking antibody within a matter of months because they know how to do these things so well.”
From there, it may be three to five years before clinical trials could start, assuming all goes well, he says.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
manila 3.man.0001002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
China’s frenetic construction of coal-fired power plants has raised worries around the world about the effect on climate change. China now uses more coal than the United States, Europe and Japan combined, making it the world’s largest emitter of gases that are warming the planet.
But largely missing in the hand-wringing is this: China has emerged in the past two years as the world’s leading builder of more efficient, less polluting coal power plants, mastering the technology and driving down the cost.
While the United States is still debating whether to build a more efficient kind of coal-fired power plant that uses extremely hot steam, China has begun building such plants at a rate of one a month.
Construction has stalled in the United States on a new generation of low-pollution power plants that turn coal into a gas before burning it, although Energy Secretary Steven Chu said Thursday that the Obama administration might revive one power plant of this type. But China has already approved equipment purchases for just such a power plant, to be assembled soon in a muddy field here in Tianjin.
“The steps they’ve taken are probably as fast and as serious as anywhere in power-generation history,” said Hal Harvey, president of ClimateWorks, a group in San Francisco that helps finance projects to limit global warming.
Western countries continue to rely heavily on coal-fired power plants built decades ago with outdated, inefficient technology that burn a lot of coal and emit considerable amounts of carbon dioxide. China has begun requiring power companies to retire an older, more polluting power plant for each new one they build.
Cao Peixi, the president of the China Huaneng Group, the country’s biggest state-owned electric utility and the majority partner in the joint venture building the Tianjin plant, said his company was committed to the project even though it would cost more than conventional plants.
“We shouldn’t look at this project from a purely financial perspective,” he said. “It represents the future.”
Without doubt, China’s coal-fired power sector still has many problems, and global warming gases from the country are expected to continue increasing. China’s aim is to use the newest technologies to limit the rate of increase.
Only half the country’s coal-fired power plants have the emissions control equipment to remove sulfur compounds that cause acid rain, and even power plants with that technology do not always use it. China has not begun regulating some of the emissions that lead to heavy smog in big cities.
Even among China’s newly built plants, not all are modern. Only about 60 percent of the new plants are being built using newer technology that is highly efficient, but more expensive.
With greater efficiency, a power plant burns less coal and emits less carbon dioxide for each unit of electricity it generates. Experts say the least efficient plants in China today convert 27 to 36 percent of the energy in coal into electricity. The most efficient plants achieve an efficiency as high as 44 percent, meaning they can cut global warming emissions by more than a third compared with the weakest plants.
In the United States, the most efficient plants achieve around 40 percent efficiency, because they do not use the highest steam temperatures being adopted in China. The average efficiency of American coal-fired plants is still higher than the average efficiency of Chinese power plants, because China built so many inefficient plants over the past decade. But China is rapidly closing the gap by using some of the world’s most advanced designs.
After relying until recently on older technology, “China has since become the major world market for advanced coal-fired power plants with high-specification emission control systems,” the International Energy Agency said in a report on April 20.
China’s improvements are starting to have an effect on climate models. In its latest annual report last November, the I.E.A. cut its forecast of the annual increase in Chinese emissions of global warming gases, to 3 percent from 3.2 percent, in response to technological gains, particularly in the coal sector, even as the agency raised slightly its forecast for Chinese economic growth. “It’s definitely changing the baseline, and that’s being taken into account,” said Jonathan Sinton, a China specialist at the energy agency.
But by continuing to rely heavily on coal, which supplies 80 percent of its electricity, China ensures that it will keep emitting a lot of carbon dioxide; even an efficient coal-fired power plant emits twice the carbon dioxide of a natural gas-fired plant.
Perhaps the biggest question now is how much further China can go beyond the recent steps. In particular, how fast will it move toward power plants that capture their emissions and store them underground or under the seafloor?
That technology could, in theory, create power plants that contribute virtually nothing to global warming. Many countries hope to develop such plants, though progress has been halting; Energy Secretary Chu has promised steps to speed up the technology in the United States.
China has just built a small, experimental facility near Beijing to remove carbon dioxide from power station emissions and use it to provide carbonation for beverages, and the government has a short list of possible locations for a large experiment to capture and store carbon dioxide. But so far, it has no plans to make this a national policy.
China is making other efforts to reduce its global warming emissions. It has doubled its total wind energy capacity in each of the past four years, and is poised to pass the United States as soon as this year as the world’s largest market for wind power equipment. China is building considerably more nuclear power plants than the rest of the world combined, and these do not emit carbon dioxide after they are built.
But coal remains the cheapest energy source in China by a wide margin. China has the world’s third-largest coal reserves, after the United States and Russia.
“No matter how much renewable or nuclear is in the mix, coal will remain the dominant power source,” said Ashok Bhargava, a China energy expert at the Asian Development Bank in Manila.
Another problem is that China has finally developed the ability to build high-technology power plants only at the end of a national binge of building lower-tech coal-fired plants. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Construction is now slowing because of the economic slump.
By adopting “ultra-supercritical” technology, which uses extremely hot steam to achieve the highest efficiency, and by building many identical power plants at the same time, China has cut costs dramatically through economies of scale. It now can cost a third less to build an ultra-supercritical power plant in China than to build a less efficient coal-fired plant in the United States.
But largely missing in the hand-wringing is this: China has emerged in the past two years as the world’s leading builder of more efficient, less polluting coal power plants, mastering the technology and driving down the cost.
While the United States is still debating whether to build a more efficient kind of coal-fired power plant that uses extremely hot steam, China has begun building such plants at a rate of one a month.
Construction has stalled in the United States on a new generation of low-pollution power plants that turn coal into a gas before burning it, although Energy Secretary Steven Chu said Thursday that the Obama administration might revive one power plant of this type. But China has already approved equipment purchases for just such a power plant, to be assembled soon in a muddy field here in Tianjin.
“The steps they’ve taken are probably as fast and as serious as anywhere in power-generation history,” said Hal Harvey, president of ClimateWorks, a group in San Francisco that helps finance projects to limit global warming.
Western countries continue to rely heavily on coal-fired power plants built decades ago with outdated, inefficient technology that burn a lot of coal and emit considerable amounts of carbon dioxide. China has begun requiring power companies to retire an older, more polluting power plant for each new one they build.
Cao Peixi, the president of the China Huaneng Group, the country’s biggest state-owned electric utility and the majority partner in the joint venture building the Tianjin plant, said his company was committed to the project even though it would cost more than conventional plants.
“We shouldn’t look at this project from a purely financial perspective,” he said. “It represents the future.”
Without doubt, China’s coal-fired power sector still has many problems, and global warming gases from the country are expected to continue increasing. China’s aim is to use the newest technologies to limit the rate of increase.
Only half the country’s coal-fired power plants have the emissions control equipment to remove sulfur compounds that cause acid rain, and even power plants with that technology do not always use it. China has not begun regulating some of the emissions that lead to heavy smog in big cities.
Even among China’s newly built plants, not all are modern. Only about 60 percent of the new plants are being built using newer technology that is highly efficient, but more expensive.
With greater efficiency, a power plant burns less coal and emits less carbon dioxide for each unit of electricity it generates. Experts say the least efficient plants in China today convert 27 to 36 percent of the energy in coal into electricity. The most efficient plants achieve an efficiency as high as 44 percent, meaning they can cut global warming emissions by more than a third compared with the weakest plants.
In the United States, the most efficient plants achieve around 40 percent efficiency, because they do not use the highest steam temperatures being adopted in China. The average efficiency of American coal-fired plants is still higher than the average efficiency of Chinese power plants, because China built so many inefficient plants over the past decade. But China is rapidly closing the gap by using some of the world’s most advanced designs.
After relying until recently on older technology, “China has since become the major world market for advanced coal-fired power plants with high-specification emission control systems,” the International Energy Agency said in a report on April 20.
China’s improvements are starting to have an effect on climate models. In its latest annual report last November, the I.E.A. cut its forecast of the annual increase in Chinese emissions of global warming gases, to 3 percent from 3.2 percent, in response to technological gains, particularly in the coal sector, even as the agency raised slightly its forecast for Chinese economic growth. “It’s definitely changing the baseline, and that’s being taken into account,” said Jonathan Sinton, a China specialist at the energy agency.
But by continuing to rely heavily on coal, which supplies 80 percent of its electricity, China ensures that it will keep emitting a lot of carbon dioxide; even an efficient coal-fired power plant emits twice the carbon dioxide of a natural gas-fired plant.
Perhaps the biggest question now is how much further China can go beyond the recent steps. In particular, how fast will it move toward power plants that capture their emissions and store them underground or under the seafloor?
That technology could, in theory, create power plants that contribute virtually nothing to global warming. Many countries hope to develop such plants, though progress has been halting; Energy Secretary Chu has promised steps to speed up the technology in the United States.
China has just built a small, experimental facility near Beijing to remove carbon dioxide from power station emissions and use it to provide carbonation for beverages, and the government has a short list of possible locations for a large experiment to capture and store carbon dioxide. But so far, it has no plans to make this a national policy.
China is making other efforts to reduce its global warming emissions. It has doubled its total wind energy capacity in each of the past four years, and is poised to pass the United States as soon as this year as the world’s largest market for wind power equipment. China is building considerably more nuclear power plants than the rest of the world combined, and these do not emit carbon dioxide after they are built.
But coal remains the cheapest energy source in China by a wide margin. China has the world’s third-largest coal reserves, after the United States and Russia.
“No matter how much renewable or nuclear is in the mix, coal will remain the dominant power source,” said Ashok Bhargava, a China energy expert at the Asian Development Bank in Manila.
Another problem is that China has finally developed the ability to build high-technology power plants only at the end of a national binge of building lower-tech coal-fired plants. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Construction is now slowing because of the economic slump.
By adopting “ultra-supercritical” technology, which uses extremely hot steam to achieve the highest efficiency, and by building many identical power plants at the same time, China has cut costs dramatically through economies of scale. It now can cost a third less to build an ultra-supercritical power plant in China than to build a less efficient coal-fired plant in the United States.
Saturday, May 2, 2009
water 3.wat.003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
For years, conservation advocates have told consumers to turn down the thermostat on their hot-water heaters — largely to save energy, but also to avoid scalding showers and baths. At least for some people, however, this green tactic could prove dangerous, new studies indicate.
“The number one cause of waterborne disease outbreaks in the United States,” says environmental engineer Marc Edwards, “is not contaminants leaving the water treatment plant (we do a good job of killing those). It’s the pathogens that grow in home water heaters.”
Last weekend, seven reporters attending the Society of Environmental Journalists annual meeting toured Edwards’ lab of at Virginia Tech, in Blacksburg — and were treated to some sobering information about water quality. Like that in water heaters.
On its website, the Department of Energy notes that, “Although some manufacturers set water heater thermostats at 140 ºF, most households usually only require them set at 120 ºF.” For each 10º drop in temperature, consumers can expect to see a three to five percent savings on energy use. Moreover, DOE points out, setting that thermostat to 120º could extend the heater’s lifetime by slowing the buildup of minerals and corrosion within it.
What DOE and other energy-conservation sites don’t point out is that 140 ºF will kill a number of potentially lethal waterborne organisms, like the ones responsible for Legionnaire’s disease and NTM, short for nontuberculous mycobacterial infections. Indeed, 120º provides a nurturing environment for such toxic microbes
Owing to lead-poisoning concerns, people should never drink hot tap water. That’s why the primary route to respiratory disease from these germs comes through inhalation of the steam associated with showering or hot tubs. Infections due to these home-grown germs are estimated to kill 3,000 to 12,000 Americans annually, Edwards says.
How come we haven’t heard about this? Mistaken for flu, many cases remain off the radar screen, he says. But check the web and you’ll find Edwards wasn’t exaggerating about a growing link between hot-water heaters and disease. A few months ago in the Journal of Water and Health, Joseph O. Falkinham III, also at Virginia Tech, and his colleagues reported on a shower link to NTM in a 41-year-old New York City physician.
When X-rays from a scan of her chest confirmed the tell-tale nodules for this disease (caused by a bug that’s close kin to those responsible for tuberculosis and leprosy), Falkinham arranged to sample the plumbing in her bathroom. Mycobacterium avium cells were found in all samples. What the microbiologist found: The DNA fingerprint of the bacteria responsible the woman’s lung disease “is the same as the mycobacterium in her hot water, cold water and her showerhead.”
Showerhead? Yep. Unscrew the shower head, he said, and you’ll find “a lot of sediment, crud and slimy stuff.” A biofilm comprising a host of different bugs — including Mycobacterium — develop in the shower head.
With financing from a public interest group representing families of people with NTM, his team is now investigating the plumbing of some 50 households around the country to see if the water lines of other patients with the disease similarly host mycobacteria. “We’re about half-way through the study,” Falkinham told me yesterday, “and the answer is yes.”
So turn up the heat on their hot water heaters and these bugs will die off? Nope.
As with TB germs, once environmental mycobacteria find a human host, they settle in forever. Drugs can keep their numbers down or essentially put the microbes “to sleep,” as Falkinham describes it. But take the drugs away or stress the host and the disease can awaken, leaving its victim with coughs, fever, night sweats and sometimes diarrhea. Untreated, the disease can even kill.
The same essentially also occurs in home plumbing. Once piping or water heaters become infected, residual populations of germs take up permanent residence — usually in biofilms. Later, when the flow of water through plumbing is high, such as during a long shower, bits of biofilm can break loose from surfaces, seeding the water with germs. Some cells will readhere to the inside of piping — or your showerhead. Others will just fly out the faucet.
Falkinham’s investigations indicate that trace quantities of mycobacteria taint most water mains around the country. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire We just boost their populations once they enter home plumbing. Which raises the inevitable question: If these bugs are ubiquitous, why aren’t we all sick?
We probably are all susceptible to infections if concentrations of the microbes get high enough. But studies in the United States and Europe have identified certain populations that appear especially vulnerable. http://LOUIS2J2SHEEHAN.US These include people with HIV, individuals with cystic fibrosis, and especially slender senior citizens.
The question now: Will the risks from contaminated plumbing systems diminish if we raise water-heater temperatures back up into the 140 °F range. No test of that has yet been conducted, although Falkinham is itching to start one.
“The number one cause of waterborne disease outbreaks in the United States,” says environmental engineer Marc Edwards, “is not contaminants leaving the water treatment plant (we do a good job of killing those). It’s the pathogens that grow in home water heaters.”
Last weekend, seven reporters attending the Society of Environmental Journalists annual meeting toured Edwards’ lab of at Virginia Tech, in Blacksburg — and were treated to some sobering information about water quality. Like that in water heaters.
On its website, the Department of Energy notes that, “Although some manufacturers set water heater thermostats at 140 ºF, most households usually only require them set at 120 ºF.” For each 10º drop in temperature, consumers can expect to see a three to five percent savings on energy use. Moreover, DOE points out, setting that thermostat to 120º could extend the heater’s lifetime by slowing the buildup of minerals and corrosion within it.
What DOE and other energy-conservation sites don’t point out is that 140 ºF will kill a number of potentially lethal waterborne organisms, like the ones responsible for Legionnaire’s disease and NTM, short for nontuberculous mycobacterial infections. Indeed, 120º provides a nurturing environment for such toxic microbes
Owing to lead-poisoning concerns, people should never drink hot tap water. That’s why the primary route to respiratory disease from these germs comes through inhalation of the steam associated with showering or hot tubs. Infections due to these home-grown germs are estimated to kill 3,000 to 12,000 Americans annually, Edwards says.
How come we haven’t heard about this? Mistaken for flu, many cases remain off the radar screen, he says. But check the web and you’ll find Edwards wasn’t exaggerating about a growing link between hot-water heaters and disease. A few months ago in the Journal of Water and Health, Joseph O. Falkinham III, also at Virginia Tech, and his colleagues reported on a shower link to NTM in a 41-year-old New York City physician.
When X-rays from a scan of her chest confirmed the tell-tale nodules for this disease (caused by a bug that’s close kin to those responsible for tuberculosis and leprosy), Falkinham arranged to sample the plumbing in her bathroom. Mycobacterium avium cells were found in all samples. What the microbiologist found: The DNA fingerprint of the bacteria responsible the woman’s lung disease “is the same as the mycobacterium in her hot water, cold water and her showerhead.”
Showerhead? Yep. Unscrew the shower head, he said, and you’ll find “a lot of sediment, crud and slimy stuff.” A biofilm comprising a host of different bugs — including Mycobacterium — develop in the shower head.
With financing from a public interest group representing families of people with NTM, his team is now investigating the plumbing of some 50 households around the country to see if the water lines of other patients with the disease similarly host mycobacteria. “We’re about half-way through the study,” Falkinham told me yesterday, “and the answer is yes.”
So turn up the heat on their hot water heaters and these bugs will die off? Nope.
As with TB germs, once environmental mycobacteria find a human host, they settle in forever. Drugs can keep their numbers down or essentially put the microbes “to sleep,” as Falkinham describes it. But take the drugs away or stress the host and the disease can awaken, leaving its victim with coughs, fever, night sweats and sometimes diarrhea. Untreated, the disease can even kill.
The same essentially also occurs in home plumbing. Once piping or water heaters become infected, residual populations of germs take up permanent residence — usually in biofilms. Later, when the flow of water through plumbing is high, such as during a long shower, bits of biofilm can break loose from surfaces, seeding the water with germs. Some cells will readhere to the inside of piping — or your showerhead. Others will just fly out the faucet.
Falkinham’s investigations indicate that trace quantities of mycobacteria taint most water mains around the country. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire We just boost their populations once they enter home plumbing. Which raises the inevitable question: If these bugs are ubiquitous, why aren’t we all sick?
We probably are all susceptible to infections if concentrations of the microbes get high enough. But studies in the United States and Europe have identified certain populations that appear especially vulnerable. http://LOUIS2J2SHEEHAN.US These include people with HIV, individuals with cystic fibrosis, and especially slender senior citizens.
The question now: Will the risks from contaminated plumbing systems diminish if we raise water-heater temperatures back up into the 140 °F range. No test of that has yet been conducted, although Falkinham is itching to start one.
Saturday, April 11, 2009
capabilities 0.cap.12341 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Ridges may help make touch sensation efficient
By Laura Sanders
February 28th, 2009; Vol.175 #5 (p. 10)
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Enlargemagnify
FEELING FINGERTIPSBy designing artificial fingertips (top right), researchers found that real human fingerprints (left and bottom right) may help the finger sense fine-scale textures efficiently.Images courtesy of Science/AAAS
The intricate patterns of swirls on human fingers may do more than help cops nab crooks. A study online January 29 in Science helps crack the case of fingerprints’ real job: Epidermal ridges, fingerprints’ professional name, likely serve as filters to help in the efficient detection of fine textures.http://LOUIS2J2SHEEHAN.US
“The functional role of fingerprints has remained something of a mystery,” says Sliman Bensmaia, a neuroscientist at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore who studies touch sensations. But the new results show that “fingerprints enhance our ability to perceive surface texture.”
When a finger sweeps over a finely textured surface, such as a cotton sleeve or a wooden coffee table, the interaction sends a large range of vibrations into the skin. Specialized sensors called Pacinian fibers, the tips of nerve fibers, detect only a select few of the vibrations — those right around 250 hertz — before sending the signal to the brain, where the touch sensation is processed. Other receptors in the finger detect different frequencies.
To study the details of touch, a group of physicists led by Georges Debrégeas at the CNRS École Normale Supérieure research center in Paris took a robotics approach. The researchers developed biomimetic sensors to detect vibrations similar to those created when fingers move over a fine texture. Elastic caps that mimicked human fingertip skin covered the sensors. One fake fingertip had ridges similar in size and distribution to human fingerprints, and another was left smooth.
The vibrations detected by the two sensors, one smooth and one covered in fingerprints, showed very different properties. The sensor covered in fingerprints registered much less variation in vibrations, while the smooth sensor picked up a much larger range of signals.
Like sunglasses that filter out UV light and let the useful visible light through, the artificial fingerprints filtered out vibrations above and below 250 hertz, leaving only the vibrations that could be detected by Pacinian fibers. Fingerprints, the researchers propose, make the touch-sensing system more efficient by sculpting the input to activate only the receptor meant to sense it..
“If you take white noise, like a completely random texture, and scan across it, the low and high vibrations get dampened,” explains Ellen Lumpkin, a neuroscientist at Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, who was not involved in the study.http://LOUIS2J2SHEEHAN.US
The researchers also found that fingerprints only do their vibration-filtering job when the finger motion is perpendicular to the fingerprint ridges. http://LOUIS2J2SHEEHAN.US But not to worry: Human fingerprints are patterned in swirls — every direction of swiping will activate some filtering properties.
“The nice thing is that pattern doesn’t matter,” Debrégeas says. The distinctiveness of fingerprint patterns from one person to the next doesn’t seem to have an effect on filtering capabilities.
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire The new work points to an interesting parallel between fingertips and another sensory organ — the cochlea in the ear. The cochlea works by breaking down a complex sound into its components, acting, as Lumpkin calls it, as a frequency analyzer. “Like the cochlea is a frequency analyzer for sounds, the fingertips are frequency analyzers for fingers,” says Lumpkin. Humans’ ability to see color also depends on frequency selection. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Specific proteins respond selectively to the light waves of different colors, allowing humans to see colors efficiently.
Figuring out the complicated system of touch sensation is important work, Bensmaïa says. A prosthetic hand with fingerprints could “greatly enhance amputees’ ability to perceive texture,” he says.
Lumpkin points out that the study was conducted on artificial tissue, not the real thing, which will be far more difficult. “What we have is a plausible model,” Lumpkin says. “This could be the way it works in biology. Now, biologists need to verify that.”
By Laura Sanders
February 28th, 2009; Vol.175 #5 (p. 10)
font_down font_up Text Size
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Enlargemagnify
FEELING FINGERTIPSBy designing artificial fingertips (top right), researchers found that real human fingerprints (left and bottom right) may help the finger sense fine-scale textures efficiently.Images courtesy of Science/AAAS
The intricate patterns of swirls on human fingers may do more than help cops nab crooks. A study online January 29 in Science helps crack the case of fingerprints’ real job: Epidermal ridges, fingerprints’ professional name, likely serve as filters to help in the efficient detection of fine textures.http://LOUIS2J2SHEEHAN.US
“The functional role of fingerprints has remained something of a mystery,” says Sliman Bensmaia, a neuroscientist at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore who studies touch sensations. But the new results show that “fingerprints enhance our ability to perceive surface texture.”
When a finger sweeps over a finely textured surface, such as a cotton sleeve or a wooden coffee table, the interaction sends a large range of vibrations into the skin. Specialized sensors called Pacinian fibers, the tips of nerve fibers, detect only a select few of the vibrations — those right around 250 hertz — before sending the signal to the brain, where the touch sensation is processed. Other receptors in the finger detect different frequencies.
To study the details of touch, a group of physicists led by Georges Debrégeas at the CNRS École Normale Supérieure research center in Paris took a robotics approach. The researchers developed biomimetic sensors to detect vibrations similar to those created when fingers move over a fine texture. Elastic caps that mimicked human fingertip skin covered the sensors. One fake fingertip had ridges similar in size and distribution to human fingerprints, and another was left smooth.
The vibrations detected by the two sensors, one smooth and one covered in fingerprints, showed very different properties. The sensor covered in fingerprints registered much less variation in vibrations, while the smooth sensor picked up a much larger range of signals.
Like sunglasses that filter out UV light and let the useful visible light through, the artificial fingerprints filtered out vibrations above and below 250 hertz, leaving only the vibrations that could be detected by Pacinian fibers. Fingerprints, the researchers propose, make the touch-sensing system more efficient by sculpting the input to activate only the receptor meant to sense it..
“If you take white noise, like a completely random texture, and scan across it, the low and high vibrations get dampened,” explains Ellen Lumpkin, a neuroscientist at Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, who was not involved in the study.http://LOUIS2J2SHEEHAN.US
The researchers also found that fingerprints only do their vibration-filtering job when the finger motion is perpendicular to the fingerprint ridges. http://LOUIS2J2SHEEHAN.US But not to worry: Human fingerprints are patterned in swirls — every direction of swiping will activate some filtering properties.
“The nice thing is that pattern doesn’t matter,” Debrégeas says. The distinctiveness of fingerprint patterns from one person to the next doesn’t seem to have an effect on filtering capabilities.
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire The new work points to an interesting parallel between fingertips and another sensory organ — the cochlea in the ear. The cochlea works by breaking down a complex sound into its components, acting, as Lumpkin calls it, as a frequency analyzer. “Like the cochlea is a frequency analyzer for sounds, the fingertips are frequency analyzers for fingers,” says Lumpkin. Humans’ ability to see color also depends on frequency selection. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Specific proteins respond selectively to the light waves of different colors, allowing humans to see colors efficiently.
Figuring out the complicated system of touch sensation is important work, Bensmaïa says. A prosthetic hand with fingerprints could “greatly enhance amputees’ ability to perceive texture,” he says.
Lumpkin points out that the study was conducted on artificial tissue, not the real thing, which will be far more difficult. “What we have is a plausible model,” Lumpkin says. “This could be the way it works in biology. Now, biologists need to verify that.”
Saturday, January 10, 2009
hull 9.hul.111 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
4. British Views of the Far East Situation
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Some of the dark shadows of approaching war were lifted by a report of the Japanese Ambassador to London that a recent conciliatory speech of Australian Premier Menzies had been given as a gesture of friendship from Great Britain to Japan. [327] Furthermore, Admiral Nomura in Washington conversed with the British Ambassador, who told him that neither
[321] I, 382, 383.
[322] I, 381.
[323] I, 384, 385.
[324] I, 386.
[325] I, 387.
[326] I, 388.
[327] I, 389.
Page 52
the United States or England desired war in the Pacific, but that in case of difficulty the United States would back up England. According to the British Ambassador's interpretation of recent newspaper stories, the situation in the Far East was somewhat better than it had been, although it was still dangerous. [328]
65. British Counter Intelligence Against the Japanese [329]
The British were exercising censorship of foreign messages at various points in their worldwide communication net. Code messages passing from Havana to Bombay were seized by the British censor in India; [330] a Japanese steamship was stopped by an armed British vessel in the Gulf of Persia, and all mail was removed for inspection; [331] all mail carried on vessels touching at Hongkong was examined by the British authorities, which caused the Japanese to route vessels carrying important mail away from this port. [332]
JAPANESE-DUTCH RELATIONS
66. Japanese Threats Against the Netherlands East Indies
Rumors of approaching war between America and Japan were affecting all Japanese relations in the South Pacific, especially in the Netherlands East Indies where strenuous efforts were being made to keep out Japanese fishermen. [333] A conversation between a Japanese diplomat and an official of the Netherlands East Indies demonstrated some interesting views on both sides regarding the relative strength of the Japanese and the United States navies.
HOFSTRAATEN: "No, you are badly mistaken there. I am satisfied from what I have heard from American naval officers that they could sink the Japanese navy within six weeks."
ISIZAWA: "On the contrary, I have been told by Japanese navy men that in the event of an attack our ships could sink the entire American fleet within two weeks." [334]
Japan seemed to be ready to take severe measures against the Netherlands East Indies, if the occasion arose. [335] Unfortunately, the Japanese had succeeded in getting access to secret documents and messages sent from the Netherlands Ministry in Bangkok to Dutch authorities. A request was sent to Tokyo for a Dutch language translator who could take advantage of this situation, [336] but very shortly thereafter, a secret investigation by the Netherlands government disclosed that a native employee, who possessed keys for all the safes, had been in contact with the Japanese Military Attaché. Since the Japanese had learned of this investigation from a telegram of the British Attaché in Bangkok, it may be presumed that Japan was able to decipher some of the British codes. [337]
Though documentary evidence is not available at the present writing, it is possible that the contents of the original message disclosing this leak in the Netherlands Indies government was revealed to proper authorities at Bangkok by United States officials so that proper measures could be taken to prevent damaging revelations.
[328] I, 390.
[329] I, 391.
[330] I, 392.
[331] I, 393.
[332] I, 394.
[333] I, 398.
[334] I, 395.
[335] Ibid.
[336] I, 396.
[337] I, 397.
Page 53
67. Dutch Counter Intelligence Against the Japanese
As early as January 10, 1941, the Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies were complaining to Tokyo that the Dutch authorities were intensifying their surveillance of Japanese nationals. For this reason, secret documents concerning Japanese plans for arousing the natives and Chinese residents against Dutch authorities were burned to avert their discovery. [338]
The Dutch authorities were exercising very close censorship over the mail of all foreign residents, and Tokyo was warned to send all secret correspondence by official couriers. [339] Since Japanese diplomats in the Netherlands East Indies were engaged in intelligence work, [340] they urged that only civilian couriers be used instead of military men, so as to avoid all misunderstandings with Dutch Authorities. This plea was occasioned by the fact that many Japanese entering Netherlands East Indies as diplomatic couriers were military men in disguise, who were easily spotted by Dutch counter espionage authorities. [341]
68. Japanese-Dutch East Indies Negotiations
Repercussions from Mr. Matsuoka's visit to Berlin and Rome were felt even in the Netherlands East Indies, where Japanese representatives claimed that the refusal of the Dutch to grant them trade advantages was influenced by the British and American governments. The Netherlands government insisted, however, that its decision was based on its own policy of not sending anything to Japan which could then be forwarded to Germany. All Japanese efforts to persuade the Dutch that their goods would not be reshipped to Europe seemed to be unavailing. This was especially true after the visit of Mr. Matsuoka to the Axis capitol. [342]
Japanese diplomatic dispatches from Batavia were quite frank in their appraisal of this situation. Not disguising the fact that all verbal arguments had been of little avail and that, therefore, a new approach would have to be made if their proposal was to be realized, Japanese agents reported that Mr. Matsuoka's trip to Berlin had blocked their negotiations to buy more essential products from the Netherlands East Indies. [343]
Agreeing that the Dutch had no intention of blockading Japan, but were determined to see to it that no supplies of military value would reach Germany from the Netherlands East Indies, Japanese negotiators informed Tokyo that the situation was approaching a crisis. There seemed to be little doubt that the Japanese were planning to seize the Indies eventually, but negotiations were being carried on to ensure a constant stream of supplies until a favorable opportunity arose for military conquest of this area. [344]
JAPANESE-THAI RELATIONS
The Japanese were exerting constant pressure on Thailand to assure themselves of closer economic relations with this country. According to the Japanese, the British were ready to invade Thailand at any time that Japanese-Thaiese cooperation became too great. [345] Japan was somewhat disturbed when Thailand resumed diplomatic relations with Russia, and
[338] I, 399.
[339] I, 400-402.
[340] I, 403, 404.
[341] I, 405, 406.
[342] I, 407-410.
[343] Ibid.
[344] I, 411, 412.
[345] I, 413.
Page 54
Tokyo did not hesitate to inform its diplomats that Japanese-Thailand relations should tend toward promoting Thailand's reliance on Japan. [346] Propaganda broadcasts were transmitted to this area from Tokyo, [347] and though Japan desired a radio beacon for military purposes, Japanese diplomats explained to the Thaiese that it was needed for the safety of the Thailand-Japan Air Service. [348]
In mid-April Japan's pressure on Thailand became intensified. The Thaiese were informed that Japan expected them to accept her offers of assistance; there could be no mistaking Japanese intentions for this area. [349]
The remaining chapters of this study, with their appendices, will appear in subsequent volumes which will be published in the near future for the information of higher authorities who need to know.
[346] I, 414.
[347] I, 415.
[348] I, 416.
[349] I, 417.
Page A-1
APPENDIX I
Preliminary Phase
(February 14, 1941- May 12, 1941)
PART A—THE HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS
No. 1
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
February 15, 1941
# 85.
On the 14th at noon I presented President Roosevelt with my credentials and at the same time with Former Ambassador HORINOUCHI's release from office. In my separate numbers 86 [a] and 87 [b] I describe my own formal statements at the presentation ceremony together with the President's formal responses.
Secretary HULL sat with us during the ceremony and the President assumed a very attentive attitude. We talked of a number of things, in the course of which he referred to the situation in the United States, speaking as follows:
"At present Japanese-American relations are following a gradually worsening path. Incidents in China have mounted to over a hundred and troubles between Japan and the United States are inciting American public opinion. Furthermore, the newspapers of both countries are printing at random inciting articles. This is a matter to be worried about. Secretary HULL and I are endeavoring to quiet public opinion but you will remember the case of the sinking of the Maine long ago and only four years ago happened the Panay incident. I am awfully worried because I fear that through some untoward incident the worst may happen. Japan is gradually penetrating further and further south toward the Hainan Island, the Spratley Islands, French Indo-China and Thai. Now you know that in consideration of the 3-power pact Japan is not free to act independently. I fear that Germany and Italy are going to bring force to bear on you."
In response I said: "Well, it is my intention to do my utmost to prevent a rupture in Japanese-American relations. My personal opinion is that Japan and the United States ought not quarrel with each other but rather when the time comes let both countries have the grave mission of bringing about world peace."
The President replied: "I strongly agree with you and will do my best to improve relations between Japan and the United States, and whenever necessary at any time I will be glad to have interviews with you."
[a] Plain text.
[b] Not available.
Trans. 2-19-41
Page A-2
No. 2
FROM: Washington (Morishima)
TO: Tokyo
January 13, 1941
# 21. (Your special message # 2.) [a]
I see by the papers that WAKASUGI, formerly Consul General in New York, is to accompany Ambassador NOMURA as an adviser and is coming to Washington. No doubt you have been considering what official status he is to be given in his capacity as an adviser. I might say, however, that if he is to be called merely a special official, it would be impossible for him to ask for diplomatic privileges in the United States and, furthermore, he would experience inconvenience in his more important activity and in contacting members of the Congress and the press, to say nothing of the State Department officials. Consequently, he would not be able to accomplish the mission for which he is to be especially sent. I wonder how it would be if the precedent set by Minister NISHI, when he was made a Special Ambassador to Soviet Russia, is followed and WAKASUGI, by special consideration, could be given the combined status of Minister and Counselor. I might also mention, for your reference in this connection, that among the diplomats here, especially in the case of those from Italy, -----, Mexico, Brazil, and Great Britain, there are in each office two Commercial Attaches, in addition to the Ambassador, and one of these two Attaches is given the status of Minister.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 1-15-41
No. 3
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
17 February 1941
# 93.
(We are unable to decipher your message # 67a from the 18th letter on. Please retransmit.)
Regarding Wakasugi's rating, besides the situation explained in my message # 216, Great Britain has given one of her Counselors a Minister's ranking, and also shortly she will add one more Minister. (Minister to Canada is to be transferred to Canberra as High Commissioner.)
It has also been reported that U.S. will promote her Counselor at London to a Minister, and the Legal Adviser to the newly appointed Ambassador, KOHEN (Cohen?) will also be given the Minister's ranking.
In view of the above and in consideration of the performance of his duties in relation to the State Department and the diplomatic corps in general, please decide on Wakasugi's diplomatic rank and reply as soon as possible.
[a] Re appointment of Col. Iwakuro as Aide to Military Attaché at Washington.http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG
[b] Re status of Wakasugi.
Trans. 3-5-41
Page A-3
No. 4
FROM: Washington (Japanese Ambassador)
TO: London
February 14, 1941
# 6. Message from Tokyo # 68. (Part 1 of 3)
In my recent discussions in the Diet this Foreign Minister in order to persuade the United States to reflect have frankly expressed our attitude and determination and endeavor to make it clear that our national strength is not exhausted. Now when you take office, will you please begin with the President and inform both the officials and people of the United States of the following points. Please endeavor to impress them upon your listeners:
1. It is my mission to rescue our civilization from chaos and to bring peace and prosperity to the Pacific in which both Japan and America are interested. In the accomplishment of this task our two countries ought to cooperate and pull together. Since the new year, compromises between our two countries have been less in evidence. Unfortunately the American officials and people refuse to understand our real intention; or else they mistakenly deem that our aims are at odds with their own welfare. This is a very grave and dangerous hallucination. We have an uncheckable determination to oppose any country whose design it is to thwart us. Now, I hear that the Americans think that among our people there are those who secretly despise the Tri-Partite Treaty. (Of course, all countries have their dissenters.) The Americans hope that, through the prolongation of the China trouble, we will be shorn of our national strength and that if they take a strong attitude toward us they can break the solidarity of our people and bring us to our knees. At least, I hear there are such Americans, and if it is true, this sort of mistake may bring about most regrettable results.
2. It is true that our national strength is to be a certain extent exhausted; however, it is not as much so as American propaganda would indicate. Further, it is the character of our people to resent pressure from the outside and to combat it savagely. By adding to our troubles, losses and our setbacks in war, the Americans should know that they are only consolidating the morale of our folk. Now, I have seen many Americans who have traveled among us Japanese and, judging from them, if the United States was in the same predicament, the same thing would result. The Americans ought to know what result will come from following this sort of policy. On the other hand, our people must not forget that by departing from reason and acting emotionally, making compromises with people who meet them half way with sympathy and kindness, they often get further than in any other way. Now, perhaps those who are the leaders in the United States may be this sort of people.
Trans. 2-17-41
No. 4A
FROM: Washington (Japanese Ambassador)
TO: London
February 14, 1941
# 6. Message from Tokyo # 68. (Part 2 of 3) [a]
3. Do you know that in all Japan there is not one man who actually wants to fight the United States? Unfortunately, however, if trouble of any sort arises between Japan and the United States, the Soviet is sure to work directly upon the American people and try to instigate them to war. America has never started a war willfully on her own.
Page A-4
4. What does the United States have to gain by fighting Japan? In all the United States, I will wager there is not one who desires to defeat Japan and see the race of Yamato shattered but, on the other hand, if there be a man who thinks of that even in his wildest dreams, let him know once and for all that this cannot be done. Now let's suppose for a moment that they did defeat us and forced upon us another Versailles Treaty. It would not take us any thirty years to throw off that yoke. No, our deliverance would come swiftly. Behold the resurgence of the German Reich! Japan has a government such as no country on this earth possesses. By the eternal glory of our emperor, the King of Heaven, we have overcome every vicissitude through which we have passed in years gone by. If we were to go down now, swifter than that of Germany would be our restoration and like lightening would come our vengeance and in this there is no element of doubt. The imperial family is the fountainhead from whence issues the uniform stream of our national existence. We have a peerless nation, totally and completely incomprehensible to all outsiders. In sum, if Japan and the United States, who have always been friends, now break, it will be a tragedy for both and the civilization of the world will be cast into chaos. Under these circumstances I can tell you one thing; the United States ought to ------ absolutely must ----- think this matter through.
[a] DoD comment: Part 2, above, of Mr. Matsuoka's message was not available to the original historian. Through recent research, the message has been located. Such instances will occur throughout this history from time to time; suffix "A" will so indicate.
Trans. 2-17-41
No. 5
FROM: Washington (Japanese Ambassador)
TO: London
February 14, 1941
# 6. Message from Tokyo # 68. (Part 3 of 3).
5. If Japan and the United States fight, Soviet Russia is sure to move; and suppose that Japan is completely defeated as the United States hopes that she will be, then Soviet Russia will grab the whole of China and Bolshevize her, and on the wave of her success, she will Bolshevize the greater part of Asia. I wonder if the United States presages such an eventuality? If, in one chance out of a million, Japan should go under, a fearful situation would prevail in the Far East.
6. The foreign policy of Imperial Japan is based on a logic unique in the world. Its utmost concern is the security of world peace and prosperity. She had not, in the least, any intention of attacking the United States. Therefore, that the United States is intensely working towards the building up of her defenses is a phenomenon beyond our comprehension. Japan and the United States should never oppose each other, but cooperate. Recent words and actions of political leaders in the United States have been extremely provocative, and it would seem that their object is to build a defense sufficiently powerful to enable the United States to act as a police official for the whole world. Such a thing is indeed not only regrettable for the sake of peace in the Pacific, but also unbecoming of the United States. Instead of interfering often with the right to livelihood enjoyed by the other powers, the United States, I believe, should awaken to the responsibilities that are hers by right and that she has towards world peace, and in the spirit of mutual concession, should devote all her energy to the solution of the impending crisis and to the promotion of the well-being of humanity.
Relay to London.
Trans. 2-17-41
Page A-5
No. 6
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State.
(Paraphrase)
3
TOKYO, Jan 27, 1941—6 p.m.
(Received January 27—6:38 a.m.)
(125)
A member of the Embassy was told by my ----- colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of "trouble" between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use of all the Japanese military facilities. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic.
Grew
711.94/1935: Telegram
(S.D. II, P. 133)
No. 7
FROM: Honolulu (Okuda)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) [a]
February 15, 1941
# 027.
Chief of Office Routing.
To Chief of Fifth Branch, Section 3 of the General Staff and Captain Ogawa:
WOTUTO requested on the 14th that the information noted below be forwarded to you. I find it difficult to relay the information contained in paragraph 1, but I do so anyway.
1. Indications seem to be that the U.S. has decided to declare war on Japan within the next three weeks.
2. Definite advice will be available twenty-four hours in advance of such a declaration by the U.S.
3. The U.S. plans to cut Japanese trade lanes to South America.
[a] To foreign ministry.
Trans. 2-18-41
Page A-6
No. 8
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
February 19, 1941
# 095
At the time of my assuming my post the newspapers of this country manifested a spirit of welcoming me personally as one who has a large number of friends in this country and as being well acquainted with conditions here, but they are all agreed in saying that as far as the future of Japanese-American relations is concerned there is nothing to do but wait for future developments. The newspapers have also reported the President's press conference of the 11th (see my special intelligence report) and activities of the Japanese Navy in the French Indo China area; taking the attitude that Japanese-American relations still permit of no optimism.
To cite some of the more noteworthy newspapers articles, the New York Herald Tribune of the 12th pointed out the great significance of the statement by President Roosevelt on the day of Ambassador Nomura's assumption of his post, to the effect that there will be no change in the established policy of assistance to Britain, even though the U.S. should become involved in war in the Far East; and asserted that even though Ambassador Nomura will likely begin conversations with the U.S. government officials looking to Japanese-American negotiations, unless the Japanese are prepared to make greater concessions than they are generally anticipated now, there is very little hope of any success. It also set forth that the Ambassador personally is friendly to the U.S., that during his office as Foreign Minister he had worked for the renewal of the trade treaty, and that he will likely renew his efforts for the conclusion of a treaty.
The Evening Star on the 12th related how the German and Italian diplomatic representatives in Washington turned out to welcome the Ambassador at the station on his arrival, suggesting that Germany and Italy expect the new Ambassador to bring about some joint diplomatic moves with the German-Italian Axis in Washington. It was asserted that local diplomatic circles will be watching with interest to see what conciliatory moves will be made by Ambassador Nomura in trying to enlist American good-will for the improvement of Japanese-American relations. It was further stated that when it comes to the actual problems, expressions of intentions and personal relationships, mean nothing, but that friendship of the U.S. for Japan will depend upon Japan's actions in the Far East and South Pacific, and that the new Ambassador knows well what the conditions are for bringing about closer relations between Japan and America.
Trans. 2-26-41
No. 9
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
February 19, 1941
# 96.
Although it has been but a few days since I assumed my post, I wish to report my general observations.
(1) There are definite indications of American-British solidarity and identity of feelings Germany in the present war. Although no tangible proof can be given, the general sentiment in America against Germany appears to be as strong as, if not stronger, than it was during the world war.
Page A-7
(2) Since the Tripartite Treaty, there is a definite feeling among the people here that Japan is their real enemy, and also that, coinciding with the German spring offensive, Japan will embark on her southward advance and that Japan is using the Thailand-French Indo-China situation as an excuse to prepare herself for an attack on Singapore.
(3) There is much talk of America's backing England, Australia, New Zealand, and Dutch Indies against Japan's southward advance.
(4) In the event of American-British joint naval action, many capital ships will be needed in the Pacific and many smaller ships in the Atlantic. Therefore, if the situation demands it, British capital ships will take over the Pacific area and American destroyers will take over the Atlantic area. On the basis of this argument, there are some who believe that in exchange for the aid of latest type British capital ships, America will furnish destroyers to assist England. This is a very important question, deserving our utmost consideration.
(5) Some are bold enough to say that, in a year or two, the American fleet at Hawaii will make a westward advance, claiming that Japan's southward advance is part of her national plan and for that reason America cannot maintain a neutral attitude. Should Britain fall, the Americans will add whatever remains of the British fleet to her own fleet to attack Japan.
Please communicate the contents of this message to the War Minister and the Navy Minister.
Trans. 2-21-41
No. 10
February 20, 1941
Japan Must Expand Nomura Says
Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, new Japanese Ambassador, said yesterday that his country must expand southward, that he hopes the expansion can be by peaceful economic means but that he cannot promise Japan will not use force to carry out the program.
Describing Japan as a nation bent only on preserving the peace, the Ambassador declared that war can be avoided between the United States and Japan unless the initiative comes from the American side.
"Japan will expand to the south peacefully and economically," he said in Japanese to an interpreter at his first press conference since arriving in Washington February 11.
Doesn't Expect War With U.S.
Under the present economic bloc system Japan can no longer get goods from far places. Naturally she has to get them nearby.
"I cannot say with absolute definiteness whether Japan will have to resort to force to secure these necessities," he added.
He did not expect war with the United States, he said, unless this country makes the first move.
Six feet in height and a veteran of more than three decades in his country's navy, the Ambassador took great delight in his rejoinders to questions fired by a group of forty reporters.
Though he has a good command of the English language, Nomura spoke through an interpreter, yesterday, apparently to give himself more time to prepare careful answers to all questions.
Page A-8
The picture he painted of Japan's activities and of her "new order" for Asia was one of a peaceful nation intent on removing trade barriers.
Atmosphere Not so Good
Persistently reporters attempted to get him to express some of Japan's objections to recent American and British military movements in the Far East, to admit a danger of war with the United States, to voice Japan's objections to fortification of the far Pacific Island of Guam and to disclose the degree of cooperation existing between Japan and Germany.
None of these attempts was successful.
Whenever a barbed question was asked the Ambassador and his interpreter would laugh uproariously, slap thighs and prepare an answer.
The closest that Nomura came to saying that Japanese-American relations were something less than rosy was a statement at the start, that he found the "atmosphere in Washington not quite so good as I expected when I was in Japan. I thought it would not be so bad".
"Do you believe there is danger of war between the United States and Japan," Nomura was asked.
"Personally I believe that there should not be war, and there will not be war," he replied. "But of course that is my personal opinion."
"Can there be any commercial equality in Asia in view of Japan's program?" was the next question.
"I believe that eventually, when peace and normal conditions are restored in China, it will be quite possible to restore normal policies and guarantees to United States commerce," Nomura said.
"Of course at present there are military controls. Without these controls it would be impossible to carry out our operations. It is inevitable that there will be certain cases of impairing third-power interests. But this is merely temporary."
Queried on Guam
Asked if Japan objected to strengthening by the United States of Guam and Samoa, voted yesterday by the house, Nomura replied:
"Of course from the Japanese side we don't like to see an air or naval base so near our territory, especially a base of a great power like the United States."
"But we cannot interfere."
Asking if he had any objection to British reinforcements arriving at Singapore, the Japanese envoy replied similarly: "Singapore doesn't concern us. It is a British base."
Asked whether he had brought with him any concrete suggestions for improving relations, Nomura replied that "I can not answer that."
"Do you think Japan will have to expand her territory some more in order to establish this new order?" the Ambassador was asked.
"No," he replied—in English.
Regarding current activities in Indo-China and Thailand he said,
"Indo-China and Thailand have special reference to the China war. The main object of Japan there is the economic, or exchange of goods." He explained that his country is interested chiefly in making sure that no war supplies get into China from Indo-China or Thailand."
Nomura was asked, "Will Japan extend her relations with the Axis?"
"There is a treaty and Japan will stick to it," he said.
If the United States goes to war against Germany would Japan declare war on the United States?" was the next stickler.
Page A-9 http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG
"I don't think the United States will declare war against Germany, so the situation you refer to will not arise." Nomura answered.
"Does the treaty obligate Japan to go to war against the United States if the United States goes to war against Germany?" the envoy was asked.
"That is a question of treaty interpretation; I will refrain from going into it," he said cautiously.
Then he volunteered the following:
"When Japan entered upon the Axis treaty it was her intention to preserve the peace. Her motives were entirely peaceful. We wanted to avoid war with the United States."
Asked for a comment on a statement by Undersecretary of State Welles, Tuesday, that Japan should express her intention in deeds not words the Japanese Ambassador said:
"That remark by Mr. Welles may mean some criticism against Japanese or some other country. Japan sincerely tries to carry out her words."
The press conference broke up when a reporter asked whether he believed "the Roosevelt Administration is trying to get the United States into a war."
"I'll ask you," said Admiral Nomura, laughing heartily.
Nomura was characterized recently by President Roosevelt as an old friend.
(Washington Post)—(20 February 1941: Columns 1 & 2)
No. 11
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington
February 27, 1941
# 100.
On the 27th the German Ambassador called on me and said that according to a telegram from the German Ambassador in Washington, you said, in response to a question put to you at the press conference regarding Japan's stand in the event of German-American war, that "it involved the question of the application of the Tripartite Agreement."
As the German Ambassador wishes to verify the above phrase let me know the facts relative to it.
Trans. 3-3-41
No. 12
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
February 28, 1941
# 122. Re your # 100. [a]
At a press interview on February 19th, they cornered me with queries as to whether Japan would join the war in case the United States does. I explained, "That is a matter of the Tripartite Pact, and I do not wish to discuss it. Originally this Pact was concluded with peaceful intentions toward the United States."
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For your information I am sending you the clipping (Washington Post) by separate wire (# 123). [b]
[a] The German Amb. in Tokyo desires verification of your statement in Washington re the question of application of the Tripartite Agreement being involved in the event of a U.S.-German war.)
[b] See No. 13.
Trans. 3-4-41
No. 13
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
March 2, 1941
# 123.
"If the United States goes to war against Germany, would Japan declare war on the United States," was the next stickler. "I don't think the United States will declare war against Germany, so the situation you refer to will not arise," NOMURA answered. "Does the treaty obligate Japan to go to war against the United States if the United States goes to war against Germany," the Envoy was asked. "That is a question—I will refrain from going into it," he said cautiously. Then he volunteered the following: "When Japan entered upon the Axis Treaty it was her intention to preserve the peace. Her motives were entirely peaceful. We wanted to avoid war with the United States."
Note: This is request message. It was referred to in No. 14 (Tokyo to Washington # 107) in which Matsuoka warns Nomura to be extremely careful in his replies to such questions and to keep pace with the Foreign Office.
Trans. 3-11-41
No. 14
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington
March 4, 1941
# 107.
Re your # 123 [a].
Though Your Excellency is sufficiently aware of the necessity of being extremely cautious in your replies to questions as to whether Japan will enter the conflict in the event the United States attacks Germany, I am gradually clarifying this in the affirmative at the Plenary Budget Sessions of the Lower House. As far as your manner of answering questions is concerned, henceforth, when questions are put to you on successive occasions, please keep pace with me. Please transmit your wire and this one to Germany.
[a] No. 13.
Trans. 3-8-41
Page A-11
No. 15
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
March 8, 1941
# 136.
(Part 1 of 2) Strictly Secret.
To be handled in Government Code.
Today, the 8th, at HULL's residence, we had a secret conversation all by ourselves lasting for more than two hours.
The Secretary explained to me his economic policy and said that the economics of extreme nationalism was bound to invite war and that he had at one time concluded a treaty especially with Canada even against preferentialism practiced within the British Empire. From this point on we entered into the main stream of our discussion. I said:
"The President had once pointed out that Japanese-American relations were in a state of deterioration. Suppose that the worse came to worst; this worst state of affairs would recur every ten or twenty years and nothing would be so unfortunate as that to both countries."
The Secretary agreed with me in this view, and so I proceeded, saying:
"We need, at this time, to maintain in a cool-headed manner our promises to each other and reduce to the minimum anything that is provocative." He again concurred in this.
I then warned him by emphatically pointing out how the embargo arouses antagonism. However, he did not make any satisfactory reply.
Then the Secretary stated:
"The great aspiration on the part of HITLER for military conquest is as insatiable as were those of NAPOLEON and ALEXANDER. It appears that Japan approves of such conquest and that what she professes as the New Order in the Far East is in fact merely the conquest of the Great Far East by force of arms."
Then our conversation shifted to the subject of China, French Indo-China and Thailand. I said, "What Japan is seeking in China are three things, namely; as may be clearly seen from Japan's treaty with that government, a good neighbor (of course if a third power attempts to establish military bases in China, Japan would object to it as a threat to her); economic cooperation (Japan places great importance on such products as iron and coal. She has no intention of interfering with any third power in the matter of ordinary commerce); and an anti-Communist agreement (the Communist Party is succeeding in the northwestern part of China), and Japan is trying to get these on the basis of equality. So long as the army is in China, it has for its object victory. War, as it is fought today, is an economic war as well; and so it is inevitable that the economic state in the occupied territories assumes the form of economic planning and control."
The Secretary did not very strongly object to this view, and merely stated "The question of the 250 protests could well be settled without touching upon this question."
Trans. 3-13-41
Page A-12
No. 16
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
March 8, 1941
# 136.
(Part 2 of 2)
Strictly secret. To be handled in Government code.
I said to him: "Heretofore French Indo-China has followed the policy of seclusion too closely. It is necessary for Japan to get her to open her doors in order that Japan may cope with the present tendency of dividing the world into economic spheres. As to Thailand, we would like to have her also become a good neighbor of ours. I suppose you already know that we have a treaty of friendship with her. I don't know personally whether naval forces were used or not in the recent mediation. They may have been used in demonstrating our power so as to hasten a successful conclusion of the mediation."
To this, he did not say a word in reply.
Then the Secretary said: "How about the advance towards Singapore and into the Dutch East Indies?", which he thought was the most important point of our conversation and, quoting the arguments presented by politicians, he seemed to express fear over the possibility of Japan's planning a more aggressive military conquest in the Greater Far East.
I explained, "There was no danger of Japan advancing towards Singapore and the Dutch East Indies by means of force unless circumstances make it unavoidable. What Japan wants from the Dutch East Indies is of an economic nature."
As regards 'unless circumstances make it unavoidable,' since it was previously stated that if the United States stiffens the embargo, those who advocate that we should acquire oil wells would get the upper hand regardless of the question of whether we must acquire oil from some other place, I asked him what he thought of this. The Secretary seemed to think that Japan would be forced rather by the Tripartite Alliance than by the embargo. (Regarding this point, the President also expressed a similar view at the time of our first meeting).
Furthermore, the Secretary appeared to be greatly concerned over the alleged visit which you are to make to the European countries.
At any rate, today's conversation was only a beginning. He said that he would discuss such questions only with an Ambassador and "off the record" whether the discussion is official or private; and added that although the President is in complete agreement with his views, he would be glad to arrange for my interview with the President. He went so far as to show me the back-door entrance to the White House so that I could avoid the newspaper men.
We agreed to consider today's conversation as having taken place with neither party taking the initiative. Since I expect to have similar conversations in the future, will you please be especially careful not to let this matter leak out to the officials on the outside.
Trans. 3-13-41
No. 17
FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo
March 9, 1941
# 134.
On the 5th, Wakasugi met and talked with Roy Howard. The outline of what Howard had to say is given below, for whatever interest it may have:
1. Howard said that his travel schedule had made it impossible for him to have accepted the kind invitation of the Foreign Minister. He also said that he felt the necessity of rushing
Page A-13
home to the U.S. to aid his friend Wilkie in his campaign for the Presidency which at that time seemed to be going against him.
However, Howard said, he is considering making another visit to the Far East as soon as the British Aid Bill, which is at present being discussed in Congress, is decided upon.
2. Howard, on his last trip, flew from Rangoon to Chungking and thence to Hongkong. While in Chungking he called on Chiang Kai-Shek and other key men. Chiang's spirits were so high that he appeared even younger than he did when Howard saw him on the previous trip. His, as well as the others', spirit to fight on against Japan is as ever on the increase.
Howard said that he asked Chiang Kai-Shek if he had any intention of accepting Japanese demands of setting up a patrol area between North China and the Soviet Union to guard against Communism; to suppress anti-Japanese sentiment in China; to cooperate in the economic development of China, and through these acts to settle Sino-Japanese differences.
Chiang's reply, Howard said, could not be quoted here but the gist of it was that now that Japan had set up the Nanking government and installed Wang Ching-wei therein, there was no hope of any amicable settlement.
3. With regard to the query as to the possibility of settling the Sino-Japanese incident through the mediation of the President of the United States, Howard said that if Japan guaranteed non-aggression against China, there was, in his opinion, a possibility. (The same opinion was expressed by President Stewart of Yenching University in Peking when Wakasugi saw him there recently.)
4. Howard said that he knew the Foreign Minister well. "Matsuoka", he said, "has a realistic view of politics. He knows that win or lose the battle, an American-Japanese war would end in nothing but losses for both countries and absolutely no gains. This conviction on the part of Matsuoka is one guarantee of peace between the two countries."
He added confidentially that he has described the man Matsuoka as a realist to the President.
5. Howard said that the most difficult problem in the relations between the U.S. and Japan is America's ignorance of the truth behind Japan's avowed goal of establishing a New Order in East Asia.
Americans, as a rule, are under the impression that-----(garbled). Through this, Japan, disregarding all foreign interests and intentions in the Far East, will attempt to do what she pleases to suit herself through force of arms.
Since the signing of the Tripartite Pact, this impression is growing stronger all the time, for Germany has used this very same system in Europe.
It is true that the U.S. has used force against her neighbors in the past, Howard said, giving as instances Nicaragua, Mexico, and Cuba. However, since then, the U.S. has been trying to right these wrongs and to offer cooperative assistance.
At present, the U.S. policy is to settle all differences with foreign countries by treaty terms and through international law. In this way, she is hoping to bring about order throughout the world.
In view of this, the U.S. cannot tolerate the setting up of a new order program fashioned to suit Japan and Japan only, for, if allowed, it would break down the U.S.'s policy from its very foundation.
The country is unified in the belief that two policies cannot exist in this world.
To ease this fundamental difference between the two countries, Howard suggests that the fact that Japan's real intentions are peaceful and involve only economic factors, be explained by someone like the Foreign Minister. He adds that in his opinion, it would be well to repeat at every opportunity that Japan does not have any political or militaristic ambitions; that Japan is not embarked upon any domination program.
Page A-14
6. Japan is not grasping the most important points to publicize in her propaganda work. It is useless for Japan to spend so much time trying to explain the China Incident.
Americans are very ignorant of foreign affairs, he said. This can be seen by the fact that they are under the impression that a totalitarian state like China is a Democracy. Americans with Communistic leanings even claimed the Soviet Union to be a democracy until the German-Soviet Union anti-aggression pact was signed.
Japan should publicize the fact that in actuality, Japan is similar to a democracy and that there is no reason for the U.S. to look upon her as an enemy.
Mailed to all consuls general in U.S. and Canada, (plus Honolulu).
Trans. 3-11-41
No. 18
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
March 8, 1941
# 135.
To be handled in Government Code.
(Secret outside the Department).
I had an opportunity to talk with many well-known persons and newspaper men in New York. Viewing the developments taking place in the two countries, giving aid to Britain has virtually become a national policy with nationwide support. The influence of the Isolationists is steadily declining and although no one advocates the sending of troops to Europe, pending the passage of the bill to aid Great Britain, preparations are progressing for shipment of arms and materials to Britain in increasing numbers. Eventually, many say, that American warships will be used to convoy these shipments. Although at present there is no likelihood of Congress declaring war, it is certain that the President as a Commander-in-Chief has the power to dispatch warships to any part of the world.
The United States believes that if Great Britain succeeds in withstanding the German spring offensive, the war would become a drawn out affair in view of the fact that submarine warfare is not intended to be decisive but one of gradual exhaustion, and, therefore, the prospect of a victory would increase. Although the United States realizes that in comparison with the position Germany held during the first World War, it is at present much stronger, the people do not discuss this subject. As to Japanese-American relations, they believe they have reached a stalemate and since the United States does not wish inwardly to face crises on two fronts simultaneously, the China question has somewhat receded from the focus of interest. Due to the fact that peaceful settlement has been reached recently in French Indo-China, the people of the United States did not make a great ado over this question; however, as regards the question of French Indo-China versus Thai, they regard this question as a policy on the part of Japan to acquire bases for further southward advance, and so, if troops are moved further in the direction of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, they will begin to consider the situation as very serious for both the United States and Great Britain. Consequently, in such an event the United States would launch a thorough-going embargo against Japan and then, although the United States would not move her principal naval forces westward, she might cut off our sea routes and thus institute what may be called a long distance blockade. They see that there is a chance of such a strategy developing into a long-drawn-out and extensive guerrilla war on the sea.
As to the Axis Powers, they regard Italy as having already fallen under German pressure and for this reason they do not consider her an important factor. In other words, Germany comes
Page A-15
first; Japan, second. For this reason, Japan should face the situation in a cool-headed manner and avoid, as far as possible, expressing views that may be provocative. Inasmuch as there is the possibility of the present war becoming a long-drawn-out affair, Japan should make ready for any unforeseen eventuality ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- I believe that there is little prospect of improvements being achieved by means of temporary makeshifts and that there is no other way but for Japan to adopt a bold counter-policy.
Please transmit this message to the Premier and to the Navy and War Ministers.
Trans. 3-11-41
No. 19
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
February 25, 1941
# 112.
The following are the impressions I got as the result of meeting with various foreign representatives. I forward it to you for whatever value it may be.
1. With Japanese-U. S. relations in a critical condition, it is natural that the newspapers are full of speculations as to the possibility of war between the two countries. Inquiries of me on this point are frequent, as may be imagined. I have replied to all questions concerning the "southward expansion" program along the lines contained in your instructions.
2. I met the British Ambassador on this the 25th. He spoke very softly and his general attitude was very calm and collected.
He said that even though Japan had decided to sit at the same table as Germany and Italy, England had no actual differences with Japan. He brought up the subject of our so-called "southward expansion", but when I explained the matter to him, indicated satisfaction and comprehension. He continued by saying that England's war spirit was high and that with the aid of the United States, victory was a certainty. Today, Italy as a threat to Egypt is a thing of the past.
He added that he hoped that Japan would not misjudge the general outlook.
I said that it seemed inevitable that a war which involved both naval and continental warfare would be a long drawn out affair. "Was England making preparations for a long drawn out War?" I asked.
He replied that it may be said today that the air force holds the key to victory or defeat. England is gradually strengthening her air power. Great Britain once said that the war would last for three years. It is just at the half way mark at present, he said.
3. The representative of the Soviet Union told me that the U.S.S.R. would probably remain neutral for an indefinite period.
4. The Italian representative said that Germany and Italy would not welcome a long term war. The United States, on the other hand, has the ability to withstand a war lasting several years, if they are determined to do so. Moreover, the U.S. is gradually moving in the direction of entering the war, he said.
Trans. 2-26-41
Page A-16
http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG
No. 20
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
14 March 1941
# 145.
As it had been reported that the President would soon be taking a vacation trip, I had arrangements made by the Secretary of State and had a secret interview with him for an hour and a half this afternoon. (The Secretary of State was present taking notes.) The conversation ranged over a number of topics, and I told him that if further positive assistance is given China, and the "embargo" against Japan is made more rigid, this would cause uneasiness among our people, and that there ought to be some way of doing something to improve relations between the two countries. To this the President replied that the most serious obstacle is the Tripartite Alliance, that this had been a surprise to the American people; who feel that likely there will be greater developments than are to be seen in the wording of the published text of the same, and that in view of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's visit to Europe it is feared that there might be a further drive southward in concerted action with Germany's offensive. I replied that this would not necessarily follow, that our foreign policy is determined not by the Foreign Minister alone, but by all the Cabinet members. Being a person who is reluctant to give assent ----- I did not expect that he would say anything ----- .
The Secretary was pleased over the day's interview and urged that Japan take the "initiative" in bringing about a better situation. (Just before this the President did say that there would likely be some way out.). Inasmuch as they had again inquired regarding the matter of a southward push, I replied that I thought there was no danger of this. The President also added that one great problem after the war will be the regulation armaments. He said that personally he is very fond of the Navy, (his private room is decorated with nothing but pictures of battleships), but that as we well know there are many difficulties involved in carrying on a war with the Pacific Ocean intervening, and that it would not be a wise thing to burden the people with the heavy costs of an armament race between Japan and the U.S.; also that the appearance of motion pictures of Matsuoka and Hitler would have a disquieting effect upon the people. I agreed that this is quite possible ----- (last 3 lines garbled).
(On request of Tokyo's # 122, the last three lines were retransmitted in # 149 (See I, 21) from Washington.)
Trans. 3-19-41
No. 21
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
17 March 1941
# 149.
Regarding your # 122 [a], the portion of the message requested retransmission is as follows: "I agreed that the was quite possible and we finished our talk in good spirits. Details will be sent later. Please keep this matter secret for future occasion."
[a] "Send last part of your # 145," (Nomura's talk with Roosevelt, 14 March.)
Trans. 8-11-41
Page A-17
No. 22
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
15 March 1941
# 146.
(In 4 parts, complete).
The particulars of my interview with the President on the 14th were as follows:
I began by saying that I would address him with the frankness of a seaman, and that he would please pardon if I appeared impolite. He remarked laughingly that my English would do. Further prefacing my remarks with the statement that while Japan does not wish to fight America, if the present attitudes of the two countries are persisted in, a crisis in the Pacific must be reached, I came to the question of the difficulties involved in carrying on a frontal war with America, and told him that in the event of a Japan-American war, a war in the Pacific would not be an easy thing for the United States either, that even if the U.S. should win, the result of such a war would be the loss of peace and order in the Far East, that Soviet influence would become prevalent in the Far East, bringing about a recurrence of the difficulties of the monarchial days. Manchukuo would likely come under this influence, with the danger of China and even the entire Far East becoming Sovietized. The U.S. would have nothing to gain thereby. On the other hand in meeting Great Britain's continental blockade in the Atlantic, Germany's use of submarines and airplanes to attack Great Britain's shipping in a counter-blockade would become increasingly violent, with bombings even of non-military establishments, and also greater activity in the way of British counter-attacks. This war cannot be terminated by (such means) but will become a long drawn out war of exhaustion. The former great war affords proof that a long drawn out war brings serious reactions socially to both the victors and the vanquished alike, if not indeed social revolution. (The President gave assent to this point.) At such a time as this both the governments of Japan and the U.S. bear a grave responsibility for cooperating in maintaining the peace of the Pacific, and for preventing the spread of hostilities.
Coming next to the question of Japan's policy on the continent, I stated that it was Japan's policy to reach a local settlement of the dispute between Japan and China and to prevent its spread, but that one reason for its having become as extensive and long drawn out as it has, is the absolute anti-Japanese attitude of the Nationalist Government. Inasmuch as I had explained to the Secretary of State, the other day, what it is that Japan asks of China, I would omit a repetition of this, only to say that the treaty made with the Wang government gives evidence of the spirit of good neighborliness, friendship, and equality with which we are cooperating in economic matters and in an effort to resist Communism.
(Part 2)
There seem to be various misunderstandings in regard to the new order in East Asia, and I myself do not know of any clear definition as to what it is, however, it does mean that Japan is to be able to secure the commodities essential to her existence while preserving friendly relations with the adjacent neighbor nations, and the "bloc" economics and the economic pressure of the powers have given impetus to this program. To go more into detail, we desire to have the economic and trade doors open to our nearby neighboring nations, and we are planning for cooperative prosperity, but we are making no demands for territory. It is the same thing as the Pan Americanism or good neighbor policy of your country, but due to the fact that we are not as clever as your country in carrying it out we frequently invite misunderstandings.
The President and the Secretary looked at each other and laughed; I told them that I believed that even these matters were not such as could not be settled without recourse to
Page A-18
war, but that if at this time further positive assistance is given China and if the "embargo" is made more rigid, the relations between the two nations would be still further aggravated, however I still believed that some way can be found for an amicable solution.
To this the President replied as follows:
(1) My grandfather traveled and traded in all parts of China ----- entered a certain harbor of Haiti (?) on a Japanese merchant ship ----- sold a lot of goods at 10¢ and 15¢ apiece to the Negroes, also entered Santiago, Cuba, and sold all the stock that had accumulated. ----- saw that Japan was well able to compete with other countries on a basis of equality.
(Part 3)
----- in regard to Mexico, for example, we would be able to overcome her by force, but this would result in more harm than good. Some senators have advocated the acquisition of the islands in the Caribbean, (this, he said, is no national secret), but he said that Great Britain paid out $20,000,000 for two million Negroes, and that there is no need of taking these over. He said that he could not believe that Japan could continue long to govern China with her civilization of several millenniums, even though she might do so for a time.
Hitler's success -—--- (the Secretary ----- agreed ----- repeating "world conquest -----. Iraq ----- make Africa a colonial territory -----. After Germany's victory in the war, and the new order in East Asia, the U.S. will stand ----- and there she can never consent to this. Furthermore when Mussolini with Hitler's ----- Germany victory, a friend of which Japan must beware.
(2) China has an old civilization and by means of the radio her language is becoming unified, and she is about to emerge from the period of ruling military cliques into national unity. Until rather recently Russia was made up of nomadic peoples, a large part of them illiterate. Her civilization is behind the times and she is ruled by one man, Stalin, and is not in a position to profit -----. According to the report of an attaché who was with the 8th Route Army, the program of the 8th Route Army is not Communistic but "educational", but he may be somewhat mistaken.
I then told him something of the way the Communist influence has permeated the northwestern areas of China, and that the Japan-China emergency must not be allowed to continue on indefinitely. -----.
(Part 4)
(3) The Tripartite Alliance stirred up the American people tremendously. As long as such a treaty exists there is danger that ----- developments ----- result in southern advance in concert with Germany.
I therefore explained to him that this treaty has been forced upon us by the oppressive acts of the U.S. and that its object was "preventative" and not "offensive" and that it is therefore to be called a peaceful treaty, but he said it remains to be seen what the results of the Foreign Minister's visit to Europe will be. However, there may still be some way of bringing about a change for better in the situation.
(4) The policy of the government is to break Germany and to help Britain to win, and therefore exports even to the Soviet, of cotton, and machine tools, for instance, if they enter Germany from Russia will increase Germany's power to continue the war. This has given rise to embarrassing problems between us and Russia. Further explanation was then made regarding the "embargo" against Japan.
(5) Now and then persons calling themselves representatives of the Japanese government come over, but the U.S. government cannot deal with them. However, if it is necessary, it is always ready to talk freely with the Ambassador, as we have today, through the President, or the Secretary of State.
Page A-19
At any rate the conversation was pleasant throughout and they were concerned over the situation in the Far East. The Secretary finally thanked me, and made the statement reported in the latter part of my previous message.
Please be careful that this, as well as the former (previous) message [a] by no means be allowed to leak out.
[a] (See I, 20 & 21).
Trans. 3-18-41
No. 23
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
20 March 1941
# 157.
My observations concerning the present activities of the United States are as follows:
On the 19th the Lower House approved the $7,000,000,000 "Aid for Britain" Budget by a vote of 337 to 55 and without amendments. In addition to this they had previously approved a $3,500,000,000 Defense Budget. The President recently made a stirring address. Now the belligerent spirit of the people is being stirred up so that they are beginning more and more to support the dictatorial powers of the President. Well, when it comes to actually assisting Great Britain, ships are what is most needed and at present Great Britain's month losses, through sinking, amount to 500,000 tons. The argument has been put forward that in the United States' ship building program, it is better to construct more small craft than warships. In any case it is very difficult to speedily increase ship building capacity. Nevertheless, it is being said that by next year twice as many craft will be produced as this year. When it comes to delivering ships to Great Britain, there is a growing feeling here that, if necessary, they should be convoyed by American warships. By and large, it appears that the officials are making a great many military preparations. I do not think that the Congress will ever declare war, but for that matter the United States is actually already in the war. Influential American officials say that Germany may have a temporary success, and even though she succeeds in landing troops in Great Britain, long term occupation of those islands will be impossible. They hold that even though Great Britain is invaded, the war will not end but rather that, in that case, it will be a long, long struggle, ending no one knows when.
Relayed to London and Berlin.
Trans. 3-22-41
No. 24
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
20 March 1941
# 160.
The activities of the United States in connection with the convoy system exercised by the American Navy are as follows:
1. Now that the "Aid to Britain" Law has passed, America finds that she cannot immediately transfer the craft which constitute the most urgent need. The United States knows that she cannot exercise her aid to Britain unless the threat on the high seas is eliminated. Therefore, some sort of convoy system carried on by the Navy is deemed essential. It has been reported recently that German submarines are in the waters near this country and consequently popular opinion is gradually coming to recognize this necessity. The Committee to Defend
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America by Aiding the Allies, which seems to reflect the opinions of the Government and which was formed last year before destroyers were transferred to Britain, recently passed a resolution to the effect that if convoys are needed, they shall be afforded. The Navy, too, recognized this necessity, and the President, himself, is said to have ordered the Navy to draw up a definite plan.
2. Since it is feared that through convoying ships the United States may precipitate its entry into the war, substitute proposals have been advanced; namely—
a. That American warships to transferred to England and that they do the convoying.
b. That the cruising limits under the Neutrality law be extended and that the convoy limits of British craft be curtailed.
3. Concerning convoys, there is a prohibition stipulation in the "Aid to Britain" Law. However, constitutionally speaking, this has no effect in limiting the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief. From a constitutional point of view, therefore, it is very doubtful if this clause has any meaning. Furthermore, the President is said to be considering abolishing from the Neutrality Law the provision (the cash and carry principle) prohibiting American merchantmen from stopping in belligerent zones.
Relayed to London, Berlin, and New York.
Trans. 3-22-41
No. 25
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
21 March 1941
# 162.
Relayed to London and Berlin.
It is estimated that not only the Democratic Representatives but also two thirds of the Republicans will vote approval of the policy of the administration, when the vote is taken in the House on the 7 billion dollar budget for carrying out the so-called Aid-to-Britain bill.
Some of the leaders of the Republican party who formerly were opposed to aiding Britain are now among those who will vote for the appropriation. Public opinion in the U.S. is rallying to the support of the President's aid for Britain.
Trans. 3-25-41
No. 26
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Berlin
24 March 1941
# 5.
Strictly Secret.
To be handled in Government code.
Please transmit the following message concerning the present state of affairs in the United States to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA:
By virtue of the expansion of her own national defense and her assistance to Great Britain, the United States had de facto already entered the war. It will take a considerable length of time before the United States' full power is behind her program of assistance to Britain and the big question of the moment is sea shipping. The number of ships recently sunk has mounted to a high figure and it is impossible to fully make up for them. Consequently, the officials of the United States are most anxious about this situation. The Congress is not likely,
Page A-21
at least at this stage, to declare war, but I would say that there is a possibility that American warships may presently begin to convoy. I am, however, following every detail of this situation because I know that convoying materials to England is going to have a tremendous effect upon the American people. The trend now is to concentrate the main strength of the American Navy in the Atlantic and, in coordination with Great Britain, to protect British territory in the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, the minds of the officials of the United States appear also to be made up to protect the Netherlands Indies. The United States is in addition following the policy of assisting China as much as possible so long as she restrains Japan and of preventing Japan's advance to the south. Notwithstanding all this, at least while the Atlantic is the primary focus of interest, the United States certainly desires at least a temporary peace in the Pacific. There can be no mistake on this point. For all the cheering and crying that American assistance will bring victory to England, those responsible are beyond any question trembling within themselves. Apparently there are also officials, who might be said to have the power of life and death, who on the surface loudly proclaim that a land invasion of Great Britain is next to impossible, and that the chances of its success are remote, and that Great Britain is sure to win, but who underneath the surface are pessimistic. Now, things have come to the point where people who speak of peace are anathematized by the title of defeatist and they are dwindling in numbers. It will take two years for assistance to England to reach its peak; that is to say, in June, year after next, and thereafter the plans are to have it continue at that rate for three years.
Trans. 3-27-41
No. 27
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Berlin and London
25 March 1941
# 047.
(Circular).
Action Tokyo as # 171.
Re my # 170 [a] and # 168 [a].
Even though this appropriation is passed, it is recognized that it will take time for it to get into operation so that the U.S. will be able to do anything toward replenishing the shipping lost by Great Britain. Of the merchant ships (5,000,000 tons) to be built with the shipbuilding funds provided in this appropriation ($629,000,000) together with those to be completed that are now under construction (3,500,000 tons), at the most only about 1,000,000 tons could be completed during the current year, and this would not be easy for the U.S. -----. It is thought that this is the reason why it is not advisable for the U.S. Navy to engage in convoy duty.
[a] See I, 27A.
Trans. 3-27-41
Page A-22
No. 27A
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
March 22, 1941
# 168.
1. Because of the shortage of bottoms, the President, the Secretary of the Navy and Naval Affairs Committee of Congress have on successive occasions stated that American commercial ships will be transferred to England. I have news which seems to indicate that the Naval Affairs Committee of Congress on the 21st made a statement supporting the transfer of some ships (five is said to be the number). This matter is being held over until the arrival of the British Envoy SALTE and until the people see how critical the situation is. This is to forewarn you.
2. On the occasion of a discussion for an additional naval budget in Congress on the 21st, a proposal prohibiting the use of already existing funds in the conveying of goods sent in the Aid to British Program was overwhelmingly voted down. The above is for your information.
Relayed to London and Berlin. Have relayed information to New York.
Trans. 3-26-41
No. 28
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
22 March 1941
# 167.
At the present time there are two bills before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House which call for strong economic restrictions against Japan. These two plans are as I give them below. This is but another example of the sort of bills they have been passing against us all along. Though I do not believe that they are of immediate concern, I give them for your information.
1. One bill (already presented in the House in Washington) calls for an embargo against the export of military goods to Japan, against transportation of such equipment on American ships, restrictions against American products being shipped on Japanese ships, and the prevention of activities by American people of companies that would aid Japan.
2. I am sending the details, by mail, of a resolution requesting the President to institute strong economic restrictions against Japan because of the occupation of Chinese territory by Japanese forces.
Have relayed information to New York.
Trans. 3-26-41
No. 29
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: London, Berlin and Rome
2 April 1941
# 66.
(Circular). Message to Tokyo # 207.
I. To the protests of Berlin and Rome over the confiscation of their ships, the American government will take a bristlingly hostile attitude, and returning them is the last thing that the United States would consider. I cannot consider otherwise than that. Washington's relations with those two governments will follow an ever-narrowing route.
II. The German and Italian ships will be handled in a manner more or less different from those of Denmark. (The charge of sabotage is a mere fabrication.) To the extent that general
Page A-23
principles and United States law will permit, these vessels will in all probability be somehow used to assist Great Britain, nor is there likely to be any objection.
III. It appears that the authorities of this country are conferring with the several American states on the question of the confiscation of vessels.
Relayed to London, Berlin and Rome. Have relayed information to New York.
Trans. 4-4-41
No. 30
FROM: Washington (Jap. Amb.)
TO: London, Berlin and Rome
2 April 1941
# 65.
(Circular). Message to Tokyo as # 206. Secret.
Aroused more and more by the course of the military situation, the Government of the United States is taking advantage of the National Defense legislation (and of course the Aid-to-Britain law) in order to strengthen her attitude of suppressing the Axis powers. An example of this can be found in the confiscation of ships, and in all probability Washington is going to take successive vigorous measures along the line of convoying, etc. But when it comes to the question of economics, although I regard it as inevitable that they will take the same course and extend the export quota system, nevertheless that is a matter they are considering very deeply. Gradually by degrees they are whipping up the spirit of the people upon whose approval they wish to base their actions. I do not think they can easily be deterred, and their talk of "short of war" is gradually turning to "economic warfare". We must be ever on the alert because of this trend.
Relayed to England, Germany, and Italy.
Trans. 4-4-41
No. 31
FROM: Rome
TO: Washington
10 April 1941
No number.
Message to Tokyo # 205.
In connection with the question of American seizures of Italian ships, Director PRUNAS [a] told ANDO [b] confidentially: "At the present time the Italian Government is protesting this act as being contrary to International Law but it seems that the American Government is again disregarding International Law and scheming to confiscate them. We are making a very profound study of retaliatory steps to be taken in such an event. Rest assured that should we put these into operation they will be blanket retaliatory measures. Furthermore, in the case that they do confiscate them, it will take at least six months of repair to put them in usable shape because the interiors of these Italian ships were severely damaged by their crews.
"Though Mexico, Venezuela and Costa Rica in Central and South America have already taken steps similar to the United States; Brazil, Argentina and Chile will not take such measures.
Page A-24
On this last point he is understood to have been very optimistic.
Relayed to Washington, London and Berlin. Relay to London.
[a] Director General of the Transoceania Bureau of the Italian Foreign Office.
[b] Secretary in the Japanese Embassy in Rome.
Trans. 4-12-41
No. 32
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Rome
4 April 1941
# 2.
(Message to Tokyo as # 218, April 4th).
Re my # 207 [a].
On the 4th the Italian Commercial Attaché told IGUCHI [b] confidentially that in all probability the Italian Government would demand the recall of the American Naval Attaché in Rome because of the American demand for the recall of the Italian Naval Attaché in Washington. Furthermore, if the American authorities decide to confiscate Italian ships in the United States, (at the present time the American flag has been taken down and again they are flying the Italian flag), in revenge the Italian Government is considering the confiscation of a part of American owned property in Italy (this is said to be something more than $150,000,000).
Relayed to Rome. Have relayed information to New York.
[a] See I, 29 in which Washington reports on the confiscation of German and Italian ships.
[b] Japanese Embassy Counselor in Washington.
Trans. Not dated
No. 33
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
11 April 1941
# 225.
(Abstract)
The passage of the lend-lease bill has made America optimistic about the war in Europe and Africa. However, the situation in the Balkans and the English failure in Africa, threatening as it does Alexandria and the Suez and Dakaar, have stirred up feeling in America. The sinking in one day of 400,000 tons of shipping as was done on March 23rd, has alarmed public opinion, for England and America together cannot turn out more than 2,000,000 tons a year.
Trans. 4-18-41
No. 34
FROM: New York (Morishima)
TO: Tokyo
12 April 1941
# 147.
President ROOSEVELT has been issuing orders one after another with special bearing on the sanctioning of the navigation of American ships on the high seas arranging preparations for the defense of Greenland; and generally everyone throughout the country has welcomed this
Page A-25
as an approved measure of assistance toward England, even such persons as Colonel Lindbergh himself. They are endorsing the leasing of Greenland as an appropriate step in America's National Defense program. On the other hand, in view of Germany's preeminent success in the Balkans, and the ever present threat to British maritime communications, further effective measures are being demanded, particularly in both the Christian Science Monitor and the Tribune editorials of the 12th.
1. Greenland will become a base for naval convoys.
2. It is a fact that munitions will be transported to the Suez in American ships.
3. The United States is considering going so far as to transfer to England the recently stolen German and Italian ships.
4. Colonel Donovan at a Foreign Policy discussion meeting held in Chicago on the 11th, in supporting the convoy question, proposed the occupation of Dakar [a], or the acquisition of usable harbors in Ireland as a result of British-American pressure and he went on to say that if necessary the United States should unhesitatingly enter the war. These comments are creating quite a stir.
This is for your information. Please transmit this to all competent ambassadors in Europe.
[a] French West Africa.
Trans. 4-18-41
No. 35
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
4 April 1941
# 214.
Re my # 212 [a] and # 213 [a].
In connection with the export quota system, as you know, in response to our numerous strong protests, for a year now the United States has taken the unwarranted attitude that it is unreasonable for foreign countries to keep prating about things which are necessary to the United States' defense program. (See my # 1679 [b] of last year.) Well, the United States does not attempt to conceal the fact that her objective is to bring pressure to bear and to restrain Japan. This is specifically why they are carrying out the measures which trouble us. So long as they take this attitude, it is futile for me to negotiate with the State Department on the question of obtaining the present licenses. No matter how much I negotiate on both of these matters, I will get nowhere. An official in charge at the Export Control Office very cynically remarked to Lawyer SIEBOLD; "Why, for us to use our good offices to get licenses for Japan would, after all, be giving a big boost to a technical enemy, wouldn't it?" From that, I think you can see how just about every one of the American officials feels.
[a] Available in code under study.
[b] MORISHIMA reports on the reasons for the limitations placed on exports.
Trans. 4-8-41
Page A-26
No. 36
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
15 April 1941
# 228.
(In 2 parts, complete).
Received from New York as # 048 to me.
Relayed to Tokyo as New York # 148 of 15 April.
New York—Tokyo # 065 [a]
Re my Washington—Tokyo # 164 [b]
I. The president of the YU Company [c] is confined to his home by sickness. According to my telegram # 65 [a] Yamaoka and the lawyer for "YU" have been holding conversations. Inasmuch as he has not yet applied for a permit, in order to expedite matters, I went with Yamaoka, on the 12th to call on the vice president. (The chief engineer and the lawyer were also present at this interview.)
The "YU" Company's opinions relative to the four points presented to them by Yamaoka are as follows:
(a) Concerning the "non-selective polymerization process, including catalytic hydrogen and tri-potassium phosphate process," the "tri-potassium phosphate process" cannot yet be manufactured by them, since it does not belong to them. It is a patent of the Shell Development Corporation and therefore the "YU" Company cannot apply for a permit.
(b) As to the "catalytic cracking process, including hydrogen transfer as a part thereof", there is no objection to applying for a permit for it, however, the "hydrogen transfer" ----- there is danger that the State Department may consider that it comes within the export embargo on aviation gasoline.
(c) As to the "catalytic desulpharization process":
(1) The "YU" Company is still studying it in the laboratory and it is not yet a "commercial process" and hence the problem of an export permit belongs to the future and need not be considered at this time.
(2) Inasmuch as the scope is rather broad and there is danger that it might be dealt with as aviation gasoline and thus come under the embargo, it would be better to deal with "crude, or other charging stock". (The original draft was presented as it was. After the attitude of the State Department has been ascertained it is to be considered again).
(3) The transfer of the "Phillips Desulpharization Process" to a third party is also forbidden.
(d) Materials such as a catalyst, etc., as requested in the 1938 and 1928 contracts, including the foregoing process". Even if a request for a comprehensive permit for the "materials" mentioned in the above were made by the "YU" Company it would be impossible to have it granted. Therefore there is no objection to requesting a permit for the "catalysts" only mentioned above ----- in case of ----- it will become an actual problem.
II. The "YU" Company's opinion is as (1) and is a reasonable one I think. Now, then there is a possibility of obtaining an export permit, we should immediately put in a request for a permit for only those things for which there is a reasonable expectation of having a request granted. And therefore in harmony with their opinion we have made application for a permit -----. Please convey the "YU" Company's views to Saneyoshi [d] and if he has any opinions, the talk may continue ----- having informed Saneyoshi please have another conference.
III. Further in regard to "materials" the Ambassador's telegram # 214 (?) [e] to Your Excellency ----- is necessary to get in touch with the State Department ----- other than "catalysts" ----- to delay needlessly the negotiations regarding materials ----- there is no other way than to request negotiations through the Embassy..
Page A-27
IV. For any further negotiations with the "YU" Company it will be necessary to have Saneyoshi (of the Japan Gasoline Company) come to America.
[a] See I.
[b] See I, 199.
[c] Universal Oil Products Co. of Chicago (?).
[d] Masao Saneyoshi, an official of the Japanese Gasoline Co.
[e] See I, 35. Ambassador Nomura reports that it is useless for him to continue negotiations with the U.S. in matters pertaining to licenses and protests over the export quota system, as the U.S. is not attempting to conceal the fact that her objective is to bring pressure to bear and restrain Japan.
Trans. 4-22-41
No. 37
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Nanking
16 April 1941
# 111.
(Part 1 of 2).
Message to Tokyo as # 617.
Re my # 616 [a].
On the 15th I sent a member of my staff to the American Consulate General and he said to Chief Consul STANTON: "Our Army, through its espionage agencies, has procured an unimpeachable report that the gasoline in question was purchased by the Chungking Commercial Section. After loading, the responsibility for the shipment rests on Chungking. Furthermore, we know that Chungking has not even got any war insurance. For over a year now we have suspected such shipments as being destined for the enemy and have been on the lookout. Naturally we feel strongly impelled to seize them." STANTON retorted: "Well, I will not even pretend to deny that this gasoline was about to be shipped to Chungking. I will not quibble. The customs have produced the necessary documents and this is a bona fide export. Any interference on the part of you Japanese is illegal." My staff member pointed out: "The Military does not raise the point as to whether or not this is to be included in the embargo which has recently been brought into force. The whole thing is this: the gasoline is for the use of our enemy, the Chungking Government, and we are going to confiscate it." STANTON retorted: "As to whether or not this is enemy produce, the burden of proof is on the Japanese. Furthermore, suppose it is destined for Chungking. Until it is turned over to them, it belongs to Texas. You say it is 'tekisan' (enemy produce): I say it is 'Texan' (evidently having heard the Japanese use the word 'tekisan', STANTON makes a pun using the word 'tekisan' for 'Texan'.) Now, say that you Japanese set aside the regulations of the customs and seize this gasoline on the mere charge that it is bound for the Central Army, the American concerns have not heard of any regulations permitting such deeds being publicly announced. If you start to seize American goods on the basis of unannounced regulations, it will be just too bad for you. By what logic could you possibly call such an act proper and reasonable?" My staff member answered: "Well, we got it straight from our espionage agencies and they will furnish definite proof. Pretty soon you'll understand why this proof cannot be denied."
[a] See I, 39.
Trans. 4-18-41
No. 38
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Nanking
16 April 1941
# 111.
Message to Tokyo as # 617.
Part 2 of 2.
"Don't think that just by calling our plans to seize this gasoline improper and unreasonable you can move us in our determination to confiscate it." STANTON replied "Well, Texas, through this incident, is going to incur a great loss. I will immediately protest to Japan by note and will demand reparations. What is more, I will wire the facts to both Washington and Tokyo." My man countered by saying "The diplomatic officials know that there is a good basis for our argument. They also know that Texas will incur no loss. A mere protest from the United States won't do any good. If you simply report the details of this to Tokyo, all that will ensue is a big argument and you will wind up where you are right now. I mean the United States will have no recourse in settling this matter but to withdraw its complaint immediately." My man started to walk out, but STANTON sat down and said "You may say if you will that Texas will incur no damage, but until this gasoline is bought up, Texas will suffer a sizeable loss." He was rather nasty, and in conclusion my man stated "Well I wasn't thinking about it being bought up. You know I am not authorized to go deeply into these things. However, I may safely say that Japanese officials are of the unanimous opinion that the American concerns shall not undergo any losses. Since this gasoline is for the enemy, we can't compromise. But, if it is true that Texas actually will suffer, it might be possible to get in touch with Hongkong and have them consider this point. In any case, I will communicate this to the Consul General in Shanghai."
Trans. 4-18-41
No. 39
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Nanking
16 April 1941
# 110.
Message to Tokyo as # 616.
Re your # 294 [a].
1. In connection with our schemes to procure petroleum mentioned in 2 of your telegram, I sought the advice of the purchasing agents and the Chief of the Constabulary. They replied that this gasoline must, at any cost, be prevented from reaching the hands of the Chungking officials, and that the thing to do is to seize it immediately.
2. As to whether or not this gasoline seems under the export embargo regulation of the customs, upon investigation I find that the export permit was obtained before this regulation went into effect on April 7th, and that the transaction is foolproof.
3. After finding out these things, on the 14th I called the military and naval officials to my residence and announced the contents of your telegram. As a result of our conversation, we agreed as follows:
If we follow the plan suggested in 3 of your message in handling this matter, from the very beginning it will smell of corruption, and if we merely say that we suspect that it is for the aid of CHIANG KAI-SHEK, we would make ourselves vulnerable to a come-back on the part of the United States. No.! We must have an air-tight case. Therefore, as we all agreed, the besthttp://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG
Page A-29
thing to do is to negotiate by insinuations, claiming that we have a witness (some imaginary person) whom we will not name.
Relayed to Nanking.
[a] Tokyo wires Nanking and Shanghai concerning a report that the U.S. is about to exercise a comprehensive Petroleum embargo against Japan.
Trans. (Not dated)
No. 40
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking
12 April 1941
# 118.
Message to Shanghai as # 294.
Re your # 575 [a].
1. We have received a report that the United States is about to exercise a comprehensive petroleum embargo against Japan in the near future. Soon we are going to have Ambassador NOMURA inform the American Government that if they carry out this measure, our Empire cannot but act with determination. We are going to have Ambassador NOMURA advise them not to embargo petroleum. Therefore, although we do not like to hold up the gasoline in question, if you get any definite proof that the Chungking Commerce Section has purchased it, go ahead and seize it.
2. So far I have received no report from you on the schemes mentioned in my # 153 [b] for purchasing petroleum. (Please report on this immediately.) These negotiations are going on and if it is seen that success is imminent and that this seizure will damage the negotiations, you may release the gasoline. I will leave this up to your judgment, which should be guided by developments in your city.
3. If you cannot find the actual proof mentioned in the preceding paragraph 1, take suitable steps to prevent the exports mentioned in your # 539a. If we cannot get the results we desire, we will come forth with an out and out charge that the goods are suspected of being sent to assist CHIANG KAI-SHEK and summarily seize them.
[a] Not available.
[b] Available; Not translated.
Tans. 4-14-41
No. 41
Proposal Presented to the Department of State Through the Medium of Private American and Japanese Individuals on April 9, 1941. [a]
The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.
Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.
Page A-30
It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of an entente cordiale, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.
For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. We, therefore, suggest that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both governments in honor and in act.
It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a Conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective Governments.
We presume to anticipate that our Governments could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:
1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.
3. The relations of both nations toward the China affair.
4. Naval, aerial and mercantile marine relations in the Pacific.
5. Commerce between both nations and their financial cooperation.
6. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
7. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.
Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual understanding subject, of course, to modifications by the United States Government and subject to the official and final decision of the Government of Japan.
I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
The Governments of the United States and of Japan might jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.
Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.
Both Governments might declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others.
Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.
II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.
The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of its Axis Alliance was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the extension of military grouping among nations not directly affected by the European War.
The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined by no aggressive alliance aimed to assist any one nation against another. The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.
Page A-31
III. China affairs.
The President of the United States, if the following terms are approved by His Excellency and guaranteed by the Government of Japan, might request the Chiang-Kai-Shek regime to negotiate peace with Japan.
a. Independence of China
b. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory, in accordance with an agreement to be reached between Japan and China
c. No acquisition of Chinese territory
d. No imposition of indemnities
e. Resumption of the "Open Door"; the interpretation and application of which shall be agreed upon at some future, convenient time between the United States and Japan
f. Coalescence of the Governments of Chiang-Kai-Chek [sic] and of Wang-Ching-Wei
g. No large-scale or concentrated immigration of Japanese into Chinese territory
h. Recognition of Manchukuo
With the acceptance by the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime of the aforementioned Presidential request, the Japanese Government shall commence direct peace negotiations with the newly coalesced Chinese Government, or constituent elements thereof.
The Government of Japan shall submit to the Chinese concrete terms of peace, within the limits of aforesaid general terms and along the line of neighborly friendship, joint defense against communistic activities and economic cooperation.
[Should the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime reject the request of President Roosevelt, the United States Government shall discontinue assistance to the Chinese] [b]
IV. Naval, aerial and mercantile marine relations in the Pacific.
a. As both the Americans and the Japanese are desirous of maintaining the peace in the Pacific, they shall not resort to such disposition of their naval forces and aerial forces as to menace each other. Detailed, concrete agreement thereof shall be left for determination at the Proposed joint Conference.
b. At the conclusion of the projected Conference, each nation might dispatch a courtesy naval squadron to visit the country of the other and signalize the new era of Peace in the Pacific.
c. With the first ray of hope for the settlement of China affairs, the Japanese Government will agree, if desired, to use their good offices to release for contract by Americans certain percentage of their total tonnage of merchant vessels, chiefly for the Pacific service, so soon as they can be released from their present commitments. The amount of such tonnage shall be determined at the Conference.
V. Commerce between both nations and their financial cooperation.
When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such commodities are as respectively available or required by either of them. Both governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it could be elaborated at the proposed conference and concluded in accordance with usual procedure.
For the advancement of economic cooperation between both nations, it is suggested that the United States extend to Japan a gold credit in amounts sufficient to [foster trade and industrial] [c] development directed to the betterment of Far Eastern economic conditions and to the sustained economic cooperation of the Governments of the United States and of Japan.
Page A-32
VI. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
On the pledged basis of guarantee that Japanese activities in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means, without resorting to arms, American cooperation and support shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.
VII. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.
a. The Governments of the United States and of Japan will not acquiesce in the future transfer of territories or the relegation of existing States within the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific area to any European Power.
b. The governments of the United States and of Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands and will consider means to come to their assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression by any third Power.
c. [The Government of Japan requests the friendly and diplomatic assistance of the Government of the United States for the removal of Hongkong and Singapore as doorways to further political encroachment by the British in the Far East.] [d]
d. Japanese Immigration to the United States and to the Southwestern Pacific area shall receive amicable consideration—on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.
Conference.
a. It is suggested that a Conference between Delegates of the United States and of Japan be held at Honolulu and that this Conference be opened for the United States by President Roosevelt and for Japan by Prince Konoye. The delegates could number less than five each, exclusive of experts, clerks, etc.
b. There shall be no foreign observers at the Conference.
c. This Conference could be held soon as possible (May 1941) after the present understanding has been reached.
d. The agenda of the Conference would not include a reconsideration of the present understanding but would direct its efforts to the specification of the prearranged agenda and drafting of instruments to effectuate the understanding. The precise agenda could be determined upon by mutual agreement between both governments.
Addendum.
The present understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.
The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments.
[a] The English text with a few omissions was sent to Tokyo by Admiral Nomura on April 30, 1941, though the Japanese text of this same proposal had already been sent on April 17, 1941 (See I, 47). Clauses of the original text which were omitted in the dispatch of April 30th to Tokyo. (I, 41) have been marked by brackets.
[b] Omitted in dispatch to Tokyo.
[c] Omitted in dispatch to Tokyo.
[d] Omitted in dispatch to Tokyo.
Trans. 5-1-41/5-3-41
Page A-33
No. 42
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
14 April 1941
(Urgent)
# 227.
Strictly secret. To be handled in Government code.
This morning of the 14th I had an interview with Secretary of State Hull at his private residence. I said that not only should the Governments of our two nations agree to maintain peace in the Pacific Ocean, but the time has now come when both should take a larger view and without delay. The Secretary expressed accord, and I continued, "We being presumably viewed as an enemy, the American fleet is cruising in the Southern Pacific and naval instructors are being sent here and there, and in Manila a conference is being held between England, the United States and the Netherlands. Viewed from the standpoint of military experts, this is a most unfortunate trend and is certainly a step in the direction of war. The responsible military officials of Japan cannot overlook such things as this. The war fever of both countries is rising. In the United States the thirst for blood is gradually increasing. In the Atlantic convoying is about to be exercised. This, I tell you, is an inflammatory situation. It looks to me as though a declaration of war is imminent. Japan cannot but feel the gravest concern. Now, Sir, don't you think there might be a little change?" To my first statement he offered no particular comment. However, with the second he expressed accord. Next, Secretary HULL questioned me about the military policy of Japan and I explained that, "For example, a year or so ago Prince KONOYE made a statement to the effect that Japan is ready to make peace with China on the basis of equality with no indemnity and no annexation. There were some opponents at the time but the people agreed and they are still of this mind. The Japanese are united in one firm mind under the Emperor." Then I went on to explain to him something of our form of Government and international ideals. He seemed pleased and to understand, and said, "We are much alike." We went on to converse more or less about mutual economic problems, the stabilization of the Pacific, etc., and he promised me that at his very first opportunity he and I were going to have a conference. I think that before long he is going to inform me as to the date.
By the way, I explained the new treaty between Tokyo and Moscow and concluded by stating that the pacification of the Pacific would be the first step in the eventual winding up of hostilities in Europe, with which Secretary HULL expressed agreement.
Trans. 4-15-41
No. 43
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
14 April 1941
(Very urgent)
# 229.
Secret. To be handled in Government Code.
The effect upon our country of the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality agreement is something for which sufficient gratitude cannot be expressed to you and I know full well the extent to which our Government and people appreciate your efforts. Japanese-American relations being extremely delicate at this time, it would be well to carefully heed the handling this pact is accorded in newspaper articles and editorials. As I told you in my # 227 [a], I made my explanations to Secretary HULL early in the morning of the 14th. As a direct result of these
Page A-34
conversations, Secretary HULL's opinions and phraseology on the occasion of the newspaper correspondents' interview of that day were not only extremely moderate, (please refer to my special report) but it seemed to me that he was probably doing his utmost to calm public opinion all over the country. And in this connection we, too, must see to it that our own papers do not play up this agreement as though it were directed against the United States. I believe that it would be wise not to arouse American public opinion. Therefore, on this point please send me your comments. That is all for the present.
http://Louis2J2Sheehan2Esquire.US
[a] See I. 42.
Trans. 4-15-41 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Some of the dark shadows of approaching war were lifted by a report of the Japanese Ambassador to London that a recent conciliatory speech of Australian Premier Menzies had been given as a gesture of friendship from Great Britain to Japan. [327] Furthermore, Admiral Nomura in Washington conversed with the British Ambassador, who told him that neither
[321] I, 382, 383.
[322] I, 381.
[323] I, 384, 385.
[324] I, 386.
[325] I, 387.
[326] I, 388.
[327] I, 389.
Page 52
the United States or England desired war in the Pacific, but that in case of difficulty the United States would back up England. According to the British Ambassador's interpretation of recent newspaper stories, the situation in the Far East was somewhat better than it had been, although it was still dangerous. [328]
65. British Counter Intelligence Against the Japanese [329]
The British were exercising censorship of foreign messages at various points in their worldwide communication net. Code messages passing from Havana to Bombay were seized by the British censor in India; [330] a Japanese steamship was stopped by an armed British vessel in the Gulf of Persia, and all mail was removed for inspection; [331] all mail carried on vessels touching at Hongkong was examined by the British authorities, which caused the Japanese to route vessels carrying important mail away from this port. [332]
JAPANESE-DUTCH RELATIONS
66. Japanese Threats Against the Netherlands East Indies
Rumors of approaching war between America and Japan were affecting all Japanese relations in the South Pacific, especially in the Netherlands East Indies where strenuous efforts were being made to keep out Japanese fishermen. [333] A conversation between a Japanese diplomat and an official of the Netherlands East Indies demonstrated some interesting views on both sides regarding the relative strength of the Japanese and the United States navies.
HOFSTRAATEN: "No, you are badly mistaken there. I am satisfied from what I have heard from American naval officers that they could sink the Japanese navy within six weeks."
ISIZAWA: "On the contrary, I have been told by Japanese navy men that in the event of an attack our ships could sink the entire American fleet within two weeks." [334]
Japan seemed to be ready to take severe measures against the Netherlands East Indies, if the occasion arose. [335] Unfortunately, the Japanese had succeeded in getting access to secret documents and messages sent from the Netherlands Ministry in Bangkok to Dutch authorities. A request was sent to Tokyo for a Dutch language translator who could take advantage of this situation, [336] but very shortly thereafter, a secret investigation by the Netherlands government disclosed that a native employee, who possessed keys for all the safes, had been in contact with the Japanese Military Attaché. Since the Japanese had learned of this investigation from a telegram of the British Attaché in Bangkok, it may be presumed that Japan was able to decipher some of the British codes. [337]
Though documentary evidence is not available at the present writing, it is possible that the contents of the original message disclosing this leak in the Netherlands Indies government was revealed to proper authorities at Bangkok by United States officials so that proper measures could be taken to prevent damaging revelations.
[328] I, 390.
[329] I, 391.
[330] I, 392.
[331] I, 393.
[332] I, 394.
[333] I, 398.
[334] I, 395.
[335] Ibid.
[336] I, 396.
[337] I, 397.
Page 53
67. Dutch Counter Intelligence Against the Japanese
As early as January 10, 1941, the Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies were complaining to Tokyo that the Dutch authorities were intensifying their surveillance of Japanese nationals. For this reason, secret documents concerning Japanese plans for arousing the natives and Chinese residents against Dutch authorities were burned to avert their discovery. [338]
The Dutch authorities were exercising very close censorship over the mail of all foreign residents, and Tokyo was warned to send all secret correspondence by official couriers. [339] Since Japanese diplomats in the Netherlands East Indies were engaged in intelligence work, [340] they urged that only civilian couriers be used instead of military men, so as to avoid all misunderstandings with Dutch Authorities. This plea was occasioned by the fact that many Japanese entering Netherlands East Indies as diplomatic couriers were military men in disguise, who were easily spotted by Dutch counter espionage authorities. [341]
68. Japanese-Dutch East Indies Negotiations
Repercussions from Mr. Matsuoka's visit to Berlin and Rome were felt even in the Netherlands East Indies, where Japanese representatives claimed that the refusal of the Dutch to grant them trade advantages was influenced by the British and American governments. The Netherlands government insisted, however, that its decision was based on its own policy of not sending anything to Japan which could then be forwarded to Germany. All Japanese efforts to persuade the Dutch that their goods would not be reshipped to Europe seemed to be unavailing. This was especially true after the visit of Mr. Matsuoka to the Axis capitol. [342]
Japanese diplomatic dispatches from Batavia were quite frank in their appraisal of this situation. Not disguising the fact that all verbal arguments had been of little avail and that, therefore, a new approach would have to be made if their proposal was to be realized, Japanese agents reported that Mr. Matsuoka's trip to Berlin had blocked their negotiations to buy more essential products from the Netherlands East Indies. [343]
Agreeing that the Dutch had no intention of blockading Japan, but were determined to see to it that no supplies of military value would reach Germany from the Netherlands East Indies, Japanese negotiators informed Tokyo that the situation was approaching a crisis. There seemed to be little doubt that the Japanese were planning to seize the Indies eventually, but negotiations were being carried on to ensure a constant stream of supplies until a favorable opportunity arose for military conquest of this area. [344]
JAPANESE-THAI RELATIONS
The Japanese were exerting constant pressure on Thailand to assure themselves of closer economic relations with this country. According to the Japanese, the British were ready to invade Thailand at any time that Japanese-Thaiese cooperation became too great. [345] Japan was somewhat disturbed when Thailand resumed diplomatic relations with Russia, and
[338] I, 399.
[339] I, 400-402.
[340] I, 403, 404.
[341] I, 405, 406.
[342] I, 407-410.
[343] Ibid.
[344] I, 411, 412.
[345] I, 413.
Page 54
Tokyo did not hesitate to inform its diplomats that Japanese-Thailand relations should tend toward promoting Thailand's reliance on Japan. [346] Propaganda broadcasts were transmitted to this area from Tokyo, [347] and though Japan desired a radio beacon for military purposes, Japanese diplomats explained to the Thaiese that it was needed for the safety of the Thailand-Japan Air Service. [348]
In mid-April Japan's pressure on Thailand became intensified. The Thaiese were informed that Japan expected them to accept her offers of assistance; there could be no mistaking Japanese intentions for this area. [349]
The remaining chapters of this study, with their appendices, will appear in subsequent volumes which will be published in the near future for the information of higher authorities who need to know.
[346] I, 414.
[347] I, 415.
[348] I, 416.
[349] I, 417.
Page A-1
APPENDIX I
Preliminary Phase
(February 14, 1941- May 12, 1941)
PART A—THE HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS
No. 1
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
February 15, 1941
# 85.
On the 14th at noon I presented President Roosevelt with my credentials and at the same time with Former Ambassador HORINOUCHI's release from office. In my separate numbers 86 [a] and 87 [b] I describe my own formal statements at the presentation ceremony together with the President's formal responses.
Secretary HULL sat with us during the ceremony and the President assumed a very attentive attitude. We talked of a number of things, in the course of which he referred to the situation in the United States, speaking as follows:
"At present Japanese-American relations are following a gradually worsening path. Incidents in China have mounted to over a hundred and troubles between Japan and the United States are inciting American public opinion. Furthermore, the newspapers of both countries are printing at random inciting articles. This is a matter to be worried about. Secretary HULL and I are endeavoring to quiet public opinion but you will remember the case of the sinking of the Maine long ago and only four years ago happened the Panay incident. I am awfully worried because I fear that through some untoward incident the worst may happen. Japan is gradually penetrating further and further south toward the Hainan Island, the Spratley Islands, French Indo-China and Thai. Now you know that in consideration of the 3-power pact Japan is not free to act independently. I fear that Germany and Italy are going to bring force to bear on you."
In response I said: "Well, it is my intention to do my utmost to prevent a rupture in Japanese-American relations. My personal opinion is that Japan and the United States ought not quarrel with each other but rather when the time comes let both countries have the grave mission of bringing about world peace."
The President replied: "I strongly agree with you and will do my best to improve relations between Japan and the United States, and whenever necessary at any time I will be glad to have interviews with you."
[a] Plain text.
[b] Not available.
Trans. 2-19-41
Page A-2
No. 2
FROM: Washington (Morishima)
TO: Tokyo
January 13, 1941
# 21. (Your special message # 2.) [a]
I see by the papers that WAKASUGI, formerly Consul General in New York, is to accompany Ambassador NOMURA as an adviser and is coming to Washington. No doubt you have been considering what official status he is to be given in his capacity as an adviser. I might say, however, that if he is to be called merely a special official, it would be impossible for him to ask for diplomatic privileges in the United States and, furthermore, he would experience inconvenience in his more important activity and in contacting members of the Congress and the press, to say nothing of the State Department officials. Consequently, he would not be able to accomplish the mission for which he is to be especially sent. I wonder how it would be if the precedent set by Minister NISHI, when he was made a Special Ambassador to Soviet Russia, is followed and WAKASUGI, by special consideration, could be given the combined status of Minister and Counselor. I might also mention, for your reference in this connection, that among the diplomats here, especially in the case of those from Italy, -----, Mexico, Brazil, and Great Britain, there are in each office two Commercial Attaches, in addition to the Ambassador, and one of these two Attaches is given the status of Minister.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 1-15-41
No. 3
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
17 February 1941
# 93.
(We are unable to decipher your message # 67a from the 18th letter on. Please retransmit.)
Regarding Wakasugi's rating, besides the situation explained in my message # 216, Great Britain has given one of her Counselors a Minister's ranking, and also shortly she will add one more Minister. (Minister to Canada is to be transferred to Canberra as High Commissioner.)
It has also been reported that U.S. will promote her Counselor at London to a Minister, and the Legal Adviser to the newly appointed Ambassador, KOHEN (Cohen?) will also be given the Minister's ranking.
In view of the above and in consideration of the performance of his duties in relation to the State Department and the diplomatic corps in general, please decide on Wakasugi's diplomatic rank and reply as soon as possible.
[a] Re appointment of Col. Iwakuro as Aide to Military Attaché at Washington.http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG
[b] Re status of Wakasugi.
Trans. 3-5-41
Page A-3
No. 4
FROM: Washington (Japanese Ambassador)
TO: London
February 14, 1941
# 6. Message from Tokyo # 68. (Part 1 of 3)
In my recent discussions in the Diet this Foreign Minister in order to persuade the United States to reflect have frankly expressed our attitude and determination and endeavor to make it clear that our national strength is not exhausted. Now when you take office, will you please begin with the President and inform both the officials and people of the United States of the following points. Please endeavor to impress them upon your listeners:
1. It is my mission to rescue our civilization from chaos and to bring peace and prosperity to the Pacific in which both Japan and America are interested. In the accomplishment of this task our two countries ought to cooperate and pull together. Since the new year, compromises between our two countries have been less in evidence. Unfortunately the American officials and people refuse to understand our real intention; or else they mistakenly deem that our aims are at odds with their own welfare. This is a very grave and dangerous hallucination. We have an uncheckable determination to oppose any country whose design it is to thwart us. Now, I hear that the Americans think that among our people there are those who secretly despise the Tri-Partite Treaty. (Of course, all countries have their dissenters.) The Americans hope that, through the prolongation of the China trouble, we will be shorn of our national strength and that if they take a strong attitude toward us they can break the solidarity of our people and bring us to our knees. At least, I hear there are such Americans, and if it is true, this sort of mistake may bring about most regrettable results.
2. It is true that our national strength is to be a certain extent exhausted; however, it is not as much so as American propaganda would indicate. Further, it is the character of our people to resent pressure from the outside and to combat it savagely. By adding to our troubles, losses and our setbacks in war, the Americans should know that they are only consolidating the morale of our folk. Now, I have seen many Americans who have traveled among us Japanese and, judging from them, if the United States was in the same predicament, the same thing would result. The Americans ought to know what result will come from following this sort of policy. On the other hand, our people must not forget that by departing from reason and acting emotionally, making compromises with people who meet them half way with sympathy and kindness, they often get further than in any other way. Now, perhaps those who are the leaders in the United States may be this sort of people.
Trans. 2-17-41
No. 4A
FROM: Washington (Japanese Ambassador)
TO: London
February 14, 1941
# 6. Message from Tokyo # 68. (Part 2 of 3) [a]
3. Do you know that in all Japan there is not one man who actually wants to fight the United States? Unfortunately, however, if trouble of any sort arises between Japan and the United States, the Soviet is sure to work directly upon the American people and try to instigate them to war. America has never started a war willfully on her own.
Page A-4
4. What does the United States have to gain by fighting Japan? In all the United States, I will wager there is not one who desires to defeat Japan and see the race of Yamato shattered but, on the other hand, if there be a man who thinks of that even in his wildest dreams, let him know once and for all that this cannot be done. Now let's suppose for a moment that they did defeat us and forced upon us another Versailles Treaty. It would not take us any thirty years to throw off that yoke. No, our deliverance would come swiftly. Behold the resurgence of the German Reich! Japan has a government such as no country on this earth possesses. By the eternal glory of our emperor, the King of Heaven, we have overcome every vicissitude through which we have passed in years gone by. If we were to go down now, swifter than that of Germany would be our restoration and like lightening would come our vengeance and in this there is no element of doubt. The imperial family is the fountainhead from whence issues the uniform stream of our national existence. We have a peerless nation, totally and completely incomprehensible to all outsiders. In sum, if Japan and the United States, who have always been friends, now break, it will be a tragedy for both and the civilization of the world will be cast into chaos. Under these circumstances I can tell you one thing; the United States ought to ------ absolutely must ----- think this matter through.
[a] DoD comment: Part 2, above, of Mr. Matsuoka's message was not available to the original historian. Through recent research, the message has been located. Such instances will occur throughout this history from time to time; suffix "A" will so indicate.
Trans. 2-17-41
No. 5
FROM: Washington (Japanese Ambassador)
TO: London
February 14, 1941
# 6. Message from Tokyo # 68. (Part 3 of 3).
5. If Japan and the United States fight, Soviet Russia is sure to move; and suppose that Japan is completely defeated as the United States hopes that she will be, then Soviet Russia will grab the whole of China and Bolshevize her, and on the wave of her success, she will Bolshevize the greater part of Asia. I wonder if the United States presages such an eventuality? If, in one chance out of a million, Japan should go under, a fearful situation would prevail in the Far East.
6. The foreign policy of Imperial Japan is based on a logic unique in the world. Its utmost concern is the security of world peace and prosperity. She had not, in the least, any intention of attacking the United States. Therefore, that the United States is intensely working towards the building up of her defenses is a phenomenon beyond our comprehension. Japan and the United States should never oppose each other, but cooperate. Recent words and actions of political leaders in the United States have been extremely provocative, and it would seem that their object is to build a defense sufficiently powerful to enable the United States to act as a police official for the whole world. Such a thing is indeed not only regrettable for the sake of peace in the Pacific, but also unbecoming of the United States. Instead of interfering often with the right to livelihood enjoyed by the other powers, the United States, I believe, should awaken to the responsibilities that are hers by right and that she has towards world peace, and in the spirit of mutual concession, should devote all her energy to the solution of the impending crisis and to the promotion of the well-being of humanity.
Relay to London.
Trans. 2-17-41
Page A-5
No. 6
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State.
(Paraphrase)
3
TOKYO, Jan 27, 1941—6 p.m.
(Received January 27—6:38 a.m.)
(125)
A member of the Embassy was told by my ----- colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of "trouble" between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use of all the Japanese military facilities. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic.
Grew
711.94/1935: Telegram
(S.D. II, P. 133)
No. 7
FROM: Honolulu (Okuda)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) [a]
February 15, 1941
# 027.
Chief of Office Routing.
To Chief of Fifth Branch, Section 3 of the General Staff and Captain Ogawa:
WOTUTO requested on the 14th that the information noted below be forwarded to you. I find it difficult to relay the information contained in paragraph 1, but I do so anyway.
1. Indications seem to be that the U.S. has decided to declare war on Japan within the next three weeks.
2. Definite advice will be available twenty-four hours in advance of such a declaration by the U.S.
3. The U.S. plans to cut Japanese trade lanes to South America.
[a] To foreign ministry.
Trans. 2-18-41
Page A-6
No. 8
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
February 19, 1941
# 095
At the time of my assuming my post the newspapers of this country manifested a spirit of welcoming me personally as one who has a large number of friends in this country and as being well acquainted with conditions here, but they are all agreed in saying that as far as the future of Japanese-American relations is concerned there is nothing to do but wait for future developments. The newspapers have also reported the President's press conference of the 11th (see my special intelligence report) and activities of the Japanese Navy in the French Indo China area; taking the attitude that Japanese-American relations still permit of no optimism.
To cite some of the more noteworthy newspapers articles, the New York Herald Tribune of the 12th pointed out the great significance of the statement by President Roosevelt on the day of Ambassador Nomura's assumption of his post, to the effect that there will be no change in the established policy of assistance to Britain, even though the U.S. should become involved in war in the Far East; and asserted that even though Ambassador Nomura will likely begin conversations with the U.S. government officials looking to Japanese-American negotiations, unless the Japanese are prepared to make greater concessions than they are generally anticipated now, there is very little hope of any success. It also set forth that the Ambassador personally is friendly to the U.S., that during his office as Foreign Minister he had worked for the renewal of the trade treaty, and that he will likely renew his efforts for the conclusion of a treaty.
The Evening Star on the 12th related how the German and Italian diplomatic representatives in Washington turned out to welcome the Ambassador at the station on his arrival, suggesting that Germany and Italy expect the new Ambassador to bring about some joint diplomatic moves with the German-Italian Axis in Washington. It was asserted that local diplomatic circles will be watching with interest to see what conciliatory moves will be made by Ambassador Nomura in trying to enlist American good-will for the improvement of Japanese-American relations. It was further stated that when it comes to the actual problems, expressions of intentions and personal relationships, mean nothing, but that friendship of the U.S. for Japan will depend upon Japan's actions in the Far East and South Pacific, and that the new Ambassador knows well what the conditions are for bringing about closer relations between Japan and America.
Trans. 2-26-41
No. 9
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
February 19, 1941
# 96.
Although it has been but a few days since I assumed my post, I wish to report my general observations.
(1) There are definite indications of American-British solidarity and identity of feelings Germany in the present war. Although no tangible proof can be given, the general sentiment in America against Germany appears to be as strong as, if not stronger, than it was during the world war.
Page A-7
(2) Since the Tripartite Treaty, there is a definite feeling among the people here that Japan is their real enemy, and also that, coinciding with the German spring offensive, Japan will embark on her southward advance and that Japan is using the Thailand-French Indo-China situation as an excuse to prepare herself for an attack on Singapore.
(3) There is much talk of America's backing England, Australia, New Zealand, and Dutch Indies against Japan's southward advance.
(4) In the event of American-British joint naval action, many capital ships will be needed in the Pacific and many smaller ships in the Atlantic. Therefore, if the situation demands it, British capital ships will take over the Pacific area and American destroyers will take over the Atlantic area. On the basis of this argument, there are some who believe that in exchange for the aid of latest type British capital ships, America will furnish destroyers to assist England. This is a very important question, deserving our utmost consideration.
(5) Some are bold enough to say that, in a year or two, the American fleet at Hawaii will make a westward advance, claiming that Japan's southward advance is part of her national plan and for that reason America cannot maintain a neutral attitude. Should Britain fall, the Americans will add whatever remains of the British fleet to her own fleet to attack Japan.
Please communicate the contents of this message to the War Minister and the Navy Minister.
Trans. 2-21-41
No. 10
February 20, 1941
Japan Must Expand Nomura Says
Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, new Japanese Ambassador, said yesterday that his country must expand southward, that he hopes the expansion can be by peaceful economic means but that he cannot promise Japan will not use force to carry out the program.
Describing Japan as a nation bent only on preserving the peace, the Ambassador declared that war can be avoided between the United States and Japan unless the initiative comes from the American side.
"Japan will expand to the south peacefully and economically," he said in Japanese to an interpreter at his first press conference since arriving in Washington February 11.
Doesn't Expect War With U.S.
Under the present economic bloc system Japan can no longer get goods from far places. Naturally she has to get them nearby.
"I cannot say with absolute definiteness whether Japan will have to resort to force to secure these necessities," he added.
He did not expect war with the United States, he said, unless this country makes the first move.
Six feet in height and a veteran of more than three decades in his country's navy, the Ambassador took great delight in his rejoinders to questions fired by a group of forty reporters.
Though he has a good command of the English language, Nomura spoke through an interpreter, yesterday, apparently to give himself more time to prepare careful answers to all questions.
Page A-8
The picture he painted of Japan's activities and of her "new order" for Asia was one of a peaceful nation intent on removing trade barriers.
Atmosphere Not so Good
Persistently reporters attempted to get him to express some of Japan's objections to recent American and British military movements in the Far East, to admit a danger of war with the United States, to voice Japan's objections to fortification of the far Pacific Island of Guam and to disclose the degree of cooperation existing between Japan and Germany.
None of these attempts was successful.
Whenever a barbed question was asked the Ambassador and his interpreter would laugh uproariously, slap thighs and prepare an answer.
The closest that Nomura came to saying that Japanese-American relations were something less than rosy was a statement at the start, that he found the "atmosphere in Washington not quite so good as I expected when I was in Japan. I thought it would not be so bad".
"Do you believe there is danger of war between the United States and Japan," Nomura was asked.
"Personally I believe that there should not be war, and there will not be war," he replied. "But of course that is my personal opinion."
"Can there be any commercial equality in Asia in view of Japan's program?" was the next question.
"I believe that eventually, when peace and normal conditions are restored in China, it will be quite possible to restore normal policies and guarantees to United States commerce," Nomura said.
"Of course at present there are military controls. Without these controls it would be impossible to carry out our operations. It is inevitable that there will be certain cases of impairing third-power interests. But this is merely temporary."
Queried on Guam
Asked if Japan objected to strengthening by the United States of Guam and Samoa, voted yesterday by the house, Nomura replied:
"Of course from the Japanese side we don't like to see an air or naval base so near our territory, especially a base of a great power like the United States."
"But we cannot interfere."
Asking if he had any objection to British reinforcements arriving at Singapore, the Japanese envoy replied similarly: "Singapore doesn't concern us. It is a British base."
Asked whether he had brought with him any concrete suggestions for improving relations, Nomura replied that "I can not answer that."
"Do you think Japan will have to expand her territory some more in order to establish this new order?" the Ambassador was asked.
"No," he replied—in English.
Regarding current activities in Indo-China and Thailand he said,
"Indo-China and Thailand have special reference to the China war. The main object of Japan there is the economic, or exchange of goods." He explained that his country is interested chiefly in making sure that no war supplies get into China from Indo-China or Thailand."
Nomura was asked, "Will Japan extend her relations with the Axis?"
"There is a treaty and Japan will stick to it," he said.
If the United States goes to war against Germany would Japan declare war on the United States?" was the next stickler.
Page A-9 http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG
"I don't think the United States will declare war against Germany, so the situation you refer to will not arise." Nomura answered.
"Does the treaty obligate Japan to go to war against the United States if the United States goes to war against Germany?" the envoy was asked.
"That is a question of treaty interpretation; I will refrain from going into it," he said cautiously.
Then he volunteered the following:
"When Japan entered upon the Axis treaty it was her intention to preserve the peace. Her motives were entirely peaceful. We wanted to avoid war with the United States."
Asked for a comment on a statement by Undersecretary of State Welles, Tuesday, that Japan should express her intention in deeds not words the Japanese Ambassador said:
"That remark by Mr. Welles may mean some criticism against Japanese or some other country. Japan sincerely tries to carry out her words."
The press conference broke up when a reporter asked whether he believed "the Roosevelt Administration is trying to get the United States into a war."
"I'll ask you," said Admiral Nomura, laughing heartily.
Nomura was characterized recently by President Roosevelt as an old friend.
(Washington Post)—(20 February 1941: Columns 1 & 2)
No. 11
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington
February 27, 1941
# 100.
On the 27th the German Ambassador called on me and said that according to a telegram from the German Ambassador in Washington, you said, in response to a question put to you at the press conference regarding Japan's stand in the event of German-American war, that "it involved the question of the application of the Tripartite Agreement."
As the German Ambassador wishes to verify the above phrase let me know the facts relative to it.
Trans. 3-3-41
No. 12
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
February 28, 1941
# 122. Re your # 100. [a]
At a press interview on February 19th, they cornered me with queries as to whether Japan would join the war in case the United States does. I explained, "That is a matter of the Tripartite Pact, and I do not wish to discuss it. Originally this Pact was concluded with peaceful intentions toward the United States."
Page A-10
For your information I am sending you the clipping (Washington Post) by separate wire (# 123). [b]
[a] The German Amb. in Tokyo desires verification of your statement in Washington re the question of application of the Tripartite Agreement being involved in the event of a U.S.-German war.)
[b] See No. 13.
Trans. 3-4-41
No. 13
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
March 2, 1941
# 123.
"If the United States goes to war against Germany, would Japan declare war on the United States," was the next stickler. "I don't think the United States will declare war against Germany, so the situation you refer to will not arise," NOMURA answered. "Does the treaty obligate Japan to go to war against the United States if the United States goes to war against Germany," the Envoy was asked. "That is a question—I will refrain from going into it," he said cautiously. Then he volunteered the following: "When Japan entered upon the Axis Treaty it was her intention to preserve the peace. Her motives were entirely peaceful. We wanted to avoid war with the United States."
Note: This is request message. It was referred to in No. 14 (Tokyo to Washington # 107) in which Matsuoka warns Nomura to be extremely careful in his replies to such questions and to keep pace with the Foreign Office.
Trans. 3-11-41
No. 14
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington
March 4, 1941
# 107.
Re your # 123 [a].
Though Your Excellency is sufficiently aware of the necessity of being extremely cautious in your replies to questions as to whether Japan will enter the conflict in the event the United States attacks Germany, I am gradually clarifying this in the affirmative at the Plenary Budget Sessions of the Lower House. As far as your manner of answering questions is concerned, henceforth, when questions are put to you on successive occasions, please keep pace with me. Please transmit your wire and this one to Germany.
[a] No. 13.
Trans. 3-8-41
Page A-11
No. 15
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
March 8, 1941
# 136.
(Part 1 of 2) Strictly Secret.
To be handled in Government Code.
Today, the 8th, at HULL's residence, we had a secret conversation all by ourselves lasting for more than two hours.
The Secretary explained to me his economic policy and said that the economics of extreme nationalism was bound to invite war and that he had at one time concluded a treaty especially with Canada even against preferentialism practiced within the British Empire. From this point on we entered into the main stream of our discussion. I said:
"The President had once pointed out that Japanese-American relations were in a state of deterioration. Suppose that the worse came to worst; this worst state of affairs would recur every ten or twenty years and nothing would be so unfortunate as that to both countries."
The Secretary agreed with me in this view, and so I proceeded, saying:
"We need, at this time, to maintain in a cool-headed manner our promises to each other and reduce to the minimum anything that is provocative." He again concurred in this.
I then warned him by emphatically pointing out how the embargo arouses antagonism. However, he did not make any satisfactory reply.
Then the Secretary stated:
"The great aspiration on the part of HITLER for military conquest is as insatiable as were those of NAPOLEON and ALEXANDER. It appears that Japan approves of such conquest and that what she professes as the New Order in the Far East is in fact merely the conquest of the Great Far East by force of arms."
Then our conversation shifted to the subject of China, French Indo-China and Thailand. I said, "What Japan is seeking in China are three things, namely; as may be clearly seen from Japan's treaty with that government, a good neighbor (of course if a third power attempts to establish military bases in China, Japan would object to it as a threat to her); economic cooperation (Japan places great importance on such products as iron and coal. She has no intention of interfering with any third power in the matter of ordinary commerce); and an anti-Communist agreement (the Communist Party is succeeding in the northwestern part of China), and Japan is trying to get these on the basis of equality. So long as the army is in China, it has for its object victory. War, as it is fought today, is an economic war as well; and so it is inevitable that the economic state in the occupied territories assumes the form of economic planning and control."
The Secretary did not very strongly object to this view, and merely stated "The question of the 250 protests could well be settled without touching upon this question."
Trans. 3-13-41
Page A-12
No. 16
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
March 8, 1941
# 136.
(Part 2 of 2)
Strictly secret. To be handled in Government code.
I said to him: "Heretofore French Indo-China has followed the policy of seclusion too closely. It is necessary for Japan to get her to open her doors in order that Japan may cope with the present tendency of dividing the world into economic spheres. As to Thailand, we would like to have her also become a good neighbor of ours. I suppose you already know that we have a treaty of friendship with her. I don't know personally whether naval forces were used or not in the recent mediation. They may have been used in demonstrating our power so as to hasten a successful conclusion of the mediation."
To this, he did not say a word in reply.
Then the Secretary said: "How about the advance towards Singapore and into the Dutch East Indies?", which he thought was the most important point of our conversation and, quoting the arguments presented by politicians, he seemed to express fear over the possibility of Japan's planning a more aggressive military conquest in the Greater Far East.
I explained, "There was no danger of Japan advancing towards Singapore and the Dutch East Indies by means of force unless circumstances make it unavoidable. What Japan wants from the Dutch East Indies is of an economic nature."
As regards 'unless circumstances make it unavoidable,' since it was previously stated that if the United States stiffens the embargo, those who advocate that we should acquire oil wells would get the upper hand regardless of the question of whether we must acquire oil from some other place, I asked him what he thought of this. The Secretary seemed to think that Japan would be forced rather by the Tripartite Alliance than by the embargo. (Regarding this point, the President also expressed a similar view at the time of our first meeting).
Furthermore, the Secretary appeared to be greatly concerned over the alleged visit which you are to make to the European countries.
At any rate, today's conversation was only a beginning. He said that he would discuss such questions only with an Ambassador and "off the record" whether the discussion is official or private; and added that although the President is in complete agreement with his views, he would be glad to arrange for my interview with the President. He went so far as to show me the back-door entrance to the White House so that I could avoid the newspaper men.
We agreed to consider today's conversation as having taken place with neither party taking the initiative. Since I expect to have similar conversations in the future, will you please be especially careful not to let this matter leak out to the officials on the outside.
Trans. 3-13-41
No. 17
FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo
March 9, 1941
# 134.
On the 5th, Wakasugi met and talked with Roy Howard. The outline of what Howard had to say is given below, for whatever interest it may have:
1. Howard said that his travel schedule had made it impossible for him to have accepted the kind invitation of the Foreign Minister. He also said that he felt the necessity of rushing
Page A-13
home to the U.S. to aid his friend Wilkie in his campaign for the Presidency which at that time seemed to be going against him.
However, Howard said, he is considering making another visit to the Far East as soon as the British Aid Bill, which is at present being discussed in Congress, is decided upon.
2. Howard, on his last trip, flew from Rangoon to Chungking and thence to Hongkong. While in Chungking he called on Chiang Kai-Shek and other key men. Chiang's spirits were so high that he appeared even younger than he did when Howard saw him on the previous trip. His, as well as the others', spirit to fight on against Japan is as ever on the increase.
Howard said that he asked Chiang Kai-Shek if he had any intention of accepting Japanese demands of setting up a patrol area between North China and the Soviet Union to guard against Communism; to suppress anti-Japanese sentiment in China; to cooperate in the economic development of China, and through these acts to settle Sino-Japanese differences.
Chiang's reply, Howard said, could not be quoted here but the gist of it was that now that Japan had set up the Nanking government and installed Wang Ching-wei therein, there was no hope of any amicable settlement.
3. With regard to the query as to the possibility of settling the Sino-Japanese incident through the mediation of the President of the United States, Howard said that if Japan guaranteed non-aggression against China, there was, in his opinion, a possibility. (The same opinion was expressed by President Stewart of Yenching University in Peking when Wakasugi saw him there recently.)
4. Howard said that he knew the Foreign Minister well. "Matsuoka", he said, "has a realistic view of politics. He knows that win or lose the battle, an American-Japanese war would end in nothing but losses for both countries and absolutely no gains. This conviction on the part of Matsuoka is one guarantee of peace between the two countries."
He added confidentially that he has described the man Matsuoka as a realist to the President.
5. Howard said that the most difficult problem in the relations between the U.S. and Japan is America's ignorance of the truth behind Japan's avowed goal of establishing a New Order in East Asia.
Americans, as a rule, are under the impression that-----(garbled). Through this, Japan, disregarding all foreign interests and intentions in the Far East, will attempt to do what she pleases to suit herself through force of arms.
Since the signing of the Tripartite Pact, this impression is growing stronger all the time, for Germany has used this very same system in Europe.
It is true that the U.S. has used force against her neighbors in the past, Howard said, giving as instances Nicaragua, Mexico, and Cuba. However, since then, the U.S. has been trying to right these wrongs and to offer cooperative assistance.
At present, the U.S. policy is to settle all differences with foreign countries by treaty terms and through international law. In this way, she is hoping to bring about order throughout the world.
In view of this, the U.S. cannot tolerate the setting up of a new order program fashioned to suit Japan and Japan only, for, if allowed, it would break down the U.S.'s policy from its very foundation.
The country is unified in the belief that two policies cannot exist in this world.
To ease this fundamental difference between the two countries, Howard suggests that the fact that Japan's real intentions are peaceful and involve only economic factors, be explained by someone like the Foreign Minister. He adds that in his opinion, it would be well to repeat at every opportunity that Japan does not have any political or militaristic ambitions; that Japan is not embarked upon any domination program.
Page A-14
6. Japan is not grasping the most important points to publicize in her propaganda work. It is useless for Japan to spend so much time trying to explain the China Incident.
Americans are very ignorant of foreign affairs, he said. This can be seen by the fact that they are under the impression that a totalitarian state like China is a Democracy. Americans with Communistic leanings even claimed the Soviet Union to be a democracy until the German-Soviet Union anti-aggression pact was signed.
Japan should publicize the fact that in actuality, Japan is similar to a democracy and that there is no reason for the U.S. to look upon her as an enemy.
Mailed to all consuls general in U.S. and Canada, (plus Honolulu).
Trans. 3-11-41
No. 18
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
March 8, 1941
# 135.
To be handled in Government Code.
(Secret outside the Department).
I had an opportunity to talk with many well-known persons and newspaper men in New York. Viewing the developments taking place in the two countries, giving aid to Britain has virtually become a national policy with nationwide support. The influence of the Isolationists is steadily declining and although no one advocates the sending of troops to Europe, pending the passage of the bill to aid Great Britain, preparations are progressing for shipment of arms and materials to Britain in increasing numbers. Eventually, many say, that American warships will be used to convoy these shipments. Although at present there is no likelihood of Congress declaring war, it is certain that the President as a Commander-in-Chief has the power to dispatch warships to any part of the world.
The United States believes that if Great Britain succeeds in withstanding the German spring offensive, the war would become a drawn out affair in view of the fact that submarine warfare is not intended to be decisive but one of gradual exhaustion, and, therefore, the prospect of a victory would increase. Although the United States realizes that in comparison with the position Germany held during the first World War, it is at present much stronger, the people do not discuss this subject. As to Japanese-American relations, they believe they have reached a stalemate and since the United States does not wish inwardly to face crises on two fronts simultaneously, the China question has somewhat receded from the focus of interest. Due to the fact that peaceful settlement has been reached recently in French Indo-China, the people of the United States did not make a great ado over this question; however, as regards the question of French Indo-China versus Thai, they regard this question as a policy on the part of Japan to acquire bases for further southward advance, and so, if troops are moved further in the direction of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, they will begin to consider the situation as very serious for both the United States and Great Britain. Consequently, in such an event the United States would launch a thorough-going embargo against Japan and then, although the United States would not move her principal naval forces westward, she might cut off our sea routes and thus institute what may be called a long distance blockade. They see that there is a chance of such a strategy developing into a long-drawn-out and extensive guerrilla war on the sea.
As to the Axis Powers, they regard Italy as having already fallen under German pressure and for this reason they do not consider her an important factor. In other words, Germany comes
Page A-15
first; Japan, second. For this reason, Japan should face the situation in a cool-headed manner and avoid, as far as possible, expressing views that may be provocative. Inasmuch as there is the possibility of the present war becoming a long-drawn-out affair, Japan should make ready for any unforeseen eventuality ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- I believe that there is little prospect of improvements being achieved by means of temporary makeshifts and that there is no other way but for Japan to adopt a bold counter-policy.
Please transmit this message to the Premier and to the Navy and War Ministers.
Trans. 3-11-41
No. 19
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
February 25, 1941
# 112.
The following are the impressions I got as the result of meeting with various foreign representatives. I forward it to you for whatever value it may be.
1. With Japanese-U. S. relations in a critical condition, it is natural that the newspapers are full of speculations as to the possibility of war between the two countries. Inquiries of me on this point are frequent, as may be imagined. I have replied to all questions concerning the "southward expansion" program along the lines contained in your instructions.
2. I met the British Ambassador on this the 25th. He spoke very softly and his general attitude was very calm and collected.
He said that even though Japan had decided to sit at the same table as Germany and Italy, England had no actual differences with Japan. He brought up the subject of our so-called "southward expansion", but when I explained the matter to him, indicated satisfaction and comprehension. He continued by saying that England's war spirit was high and that with the aid of the United States, victory was a certainty. Today, Italy as a threat to Egypt is a thing of the past.
He added that he hoped that Japan would not misjudge the general outlook.
I said that it seemed inevitable that a war which involved both naval and continental warfare would be a long drawn out affair. "Was England making preparations for a long drawn out War?" I asked.
He replied that it may be said today that the air force holds the key to victory or defeat. England is gradually strengthening her air power. Great Britain once said that the war would last for three years. It is just at the half way mark at present, he said.
3. The representative of the Soviet Union told me that the U.S.S.R. would probably remain neutral for an indefinite period.
4. The Italian representative said that Germany and Italy would not welcome a long term war. The United States, on the other hand, has the ability to withstand a war lasting several years, if they are determined to do so. Moreover, the U.S. is gradually moving in the direction of entering the war, he said.
Trans. 2-26-41
Page A-16
http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG
No. 20
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
14 March 1941
# 145.
As it had been reported that the President would soon be taking a vacation trip, I had arrangements made by the Secretary of State and had a secret interview with him for an hour and a half this afternoon. (The Secretary of State was present taking notes.) The conversation ranged over a number of topics, and I told him that if further positive assistance is given China, and the "embargo" against Japan is made more rigid, this would cause uneasiness among our people, and that there ought to be some way of doing something to improve relations between the two countries. To this the President replied that the most serious obstacle is the Tripartite Alliance, that this had been a surprise to the American people; who feel that likely there will be greater developments than are to be seen in the wording of the published text of the same, and that in view of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's visit to Europe it is feared that there might be a further drive southward in concerted action with Germany's offensive. I replied that this would not necessarily follow, that our foreign policy is determined not by the Foreign Minister alone, but by all the Cabinet members. Being a person who is reluctant to give assent ----- I did not expect that he would say anything ----- .
The Secretary was pleased over the day's interview and urged that Japan take the "initiative" in bringing about a better situation. (Just before this the President did say that there would likely be some way out.). Inasmuch as they had again inquired regarding the matter of a southward push, I replied that I thought there was no danger of this. The President also added that one great problem after the war will be the regulation armaments. He said that personally he is very fond of the Navy, (his private room is decorated with nothing but pictures of battleships), but that as we well know there are many difficulties involved in carrying on a war with the Pacific Ocean intervening, and that it would not be a wise thing to burden the people with the heavy costs of an armament race between Japan and the U.S.; also that the appearance of motion pictures of Matsuoka and Hitler would have a disquieting effect upon the people. I agreed that this is quite possible ----- (last 3 lines garbled).
(On request of Tokyo's # 122, the last three lines were retransmitted in # 149 (See I, 21) from Washington.)
Trans. 3-19-41
No. 21
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
17 March 1941
# 149.
Regarding your # 122 [a], the portion of the message requested retransmission is as follows: "I agreed that the was quite possible and we finished our talk in good spirits. Details will be sent later. Please keep this matter secret for future occasion."
[a] "Send last part of your # 145," (Nomura's talk with Roosevelt, 14 March.)
Trans. 8-11-41
Page A-17
No. 22
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
15 March 1941
# 146.
(In 4 parts, complete).
The particulars of my interview with the President on the 14th were as follows:
I began by saying that I would address him with the frankness of a seaman, and that he would please pardon if I appeared impolite. He remarked laughingly that my English would do. Further prefacing my remarks with the statement that while Japan does not wish to fight America, if the present attitudes of the two countries are persisted in, a crisis in the Pacific must be reached, I came to the question of the difficulties involved in carrying on a frontal war with America, and told him that in the event of a Japan-American war, a war in the Pacific would not be an easy thing for the United States either, that even if the U.S. should win, the result of such a war would be the loss of peace and order in the Far East, that Soviet influence would become prevalent in the Far East, bringing about a recurrence of the difficulties of the monarchial days. Manchukuo would likely come under this influence, with the danger of China and even the entire Far East becoming Sovietized. The U.S. would have nothing to gain thereby. On the other hand in meeting Great Britain's continental blockade in the Atlantic, Germany's use of submarines and airplanes to attack Great Britain's shipping in a counter-blockade would become increasingly violent, with bombings even of non-military establishments, and also greater activity in the way of British counter-attacks. This war cannot be terminated by (such means) but will become a long drawn out war of exhaustion. The former great war affords proof that a long drawn out war brings serious reactions socially to both the victors and the vanquished alike, if not indeed social revolution. (The President gave assent to this point.) At such a time as this both the governments of Japan and the U.S. bear a grave responsibility for cooperating in maintaining the peace of the Pacific, and for preventing the spread of hostilities.
Coming next to the question of Japan's policy on the continent, I stated that it was Japan's policy to reach a local settlement of the dispute between Japan and China and to prevent its spread, but that one reason for its having become as extensive and long drawn out as it has, is the absolute anti-Japanese attitude of the Nationalist Government. Inasmuch as I had explained to the Secretary of State, the other day, what it is that Japan asks of China, I would omit a repetition of this, only to say that the treaty made with the Wang government gives evidence of the spirit of good neighborliness, friendship, and equality with which we are cooperating in economic matters and in an effort to resist Communism.
(Part 2)
There seem to be various misunderstandings in regard to the new order in East Asia, and I myself do not know of any clear definition as to what it is, however, it does mean that Japan is to be able to secure the commodities essential to her existence while preserving friendly relations with the adjacent neighbor nations, and the "bloc" economics and the economic pressure of the powers have given impetus to this program. To go more into detail, we desire to have the economic and trade doors open to our nearby neighboring nations, and we are planning for cooperative prosperity, but we are making no demands for territory. It is the same thing as the Pan Americanism or good neighbor policy of your country, but due to the fact that we are not as clever as your country in carrying it out we frequently invite misunderstandings.
The President and the Secretary looked at each other and laughed; I told them that I believed that even these matters were not such as could not be settled without recourse to
Page A-18
war, but that if at this time further positive assistance is given China and if the "embargo" is made more rigid, the relations between the two nations would be still further aggravated, however I still believed that some way can be found for an amicable solution.
To this the President replied as follows:
(1) My grandfather traveled and traded in all parts of China ----- entered a certain harbor of Haiti (?) on a Japanese merchant ship ----- sold a lot of goods at 10¢ and 15¢ apiece to the Negroes, also entered Santiago, Cuba, and sold all the stock that had accumulated. ----- saw that Japan was well able to compete with other countries on a basis of equality.
(Part 3)
----- in regard to Mexico, for example, we would be able to overcome her by force, but this would result in more harm than good. Some senators have advocated the acquisition of the islands in the Caribbean, (this, he said, is no national secret), but he said that Great Britain paid out $20,000,000 for two million Negroes, and that there is no need of taking these over. He said that he could not believe that Japan could continue long to govern China with her civilization of several millenniums, even though she might do so for a time.
Hitler's success -—--- (the Secretary ----- agreed ----- repeating "world conquest -----. Iraq ----- make Africa a colonial territory -----. After Germany's victory in the war, and the new order in East Asia, the U.S. will stand ----- and there she can never consent to this. Furthermore when Mussolini with Hitler's ----- Germany victory, a friend of which Japan must beware.
(2) China has an old civilization and by means of the radio her language is becoming unified, and she is about to emerge from the period of ruling military cliques into national unity. Until rather recently Russia was made up of nomadic peoples, a large part of them illiterate. Her civilization is behind the times and she is ruled by one man, Stalin, and is not in a position to profit -----. According to the report of an attaché who was with the 8th Route Army, the program of the 8th Route Army is not Communistic but "educational", but he may be somewhat mistaken.
I then told him something of the way the Communist influence has permeated the northwestern areas of China, and that the Japan-China emergency must not be allowed to continue on indefinitely. -----.
(Part 4)
(3) The Tripartite Alliance stirred up the American people tremendously. As long as such a treaty exists there is danger that ----- developments ----- result in southern advance in concert with Germany.
I therefore explained to him that this treaty has been forced upon us by the oppressive acts of the U.S. and that its object was "preventative" and not "offensive" and that it is therefore to be called a peaceful treaty, but he said it remains to be seen what the results of the Foreign Minister's visit to Europe will be. However, there may still be some way of bringing about a change for better in the situation.
(4) The policy of the government is to break Germany and to help Britain to win, and therefore exports even to the Soviet, of cotton, and machine tools, for instance, if they enter Germany from Russia will increase Germany's power to continue the war. This has given rise to embarrassing problems between us and Russia. Further explanation was then made regarding the "embargo" against Japan.
(5) Now and then persons calling themselves representatives of the Japanese government come over, but the U.S. government cannot deal with them. However, if it is necessary, it is always ready to talk freely with the Ambassador, as we have today, through the President, or the Secretary of State.
Page A-19
At any rate the conversation was pleasant throughout and they were concerned over the situation in the Far East. The Secretary finally thanked me, and made the statement reported in the latter part of my previous message.
Please be careful that this, as well as the former (previous) message [a] by no means be allowed to leak out.
[a] (See I, 20 & 21).
Trans. 3-18-41
No. 23
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
20 March 1941
# 157.
My observations concerning the present activities of the United States are as follows:
On the 19th the Lower House approved the $7,000,000,000 "Aid for Britain" Budget by a vote of 337 to 55 and without amendments. In addition to this they had previously approved a $3,500,000,000 Defense Budget. The President recently made a stirring address. Now the belligerent spirit of the people is being stirred up so that they are beginning more and more to support the dictatorial powers of the President. Well, when it comes to actually assisting Great Britain, ships are what is most needed and at present Great Britain's month losses, through sinking, amount to 500,000 tons. The argument has been put forward that in the United States' ship building program, it is better to construct more small craft than warships. In any case it is very difficult to speedily increase ship building capacity. Nevertheless, it is being said that by next year twice as many craft will be produced as this year. When it comes to delivering ships to Great Britain, there is a growing feeling here that, if necessary, they should be convoyed by American warships. By and large, it appears that the officials are making a great many military preparations. I do not think that the Congress will ever declare war, but for that matter the United States is actually already in the war. Influential American officials say that Germany may have a temporary success, and even though she succeeds in landing troops in Great Britain, long term occupation of those islands will be impossible. They hold that even though Great Britain is invaded, the war will not end but rather that, in that case, it will be a long, long struggle, ending no one knows when.
Relayed to London and Berlin.
Trans. 3-22-41
No. 24
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
20 March 1941
# 160.
The activities of the United States in connection with the convoy system exercised by the American Navy are as follows:
1. Now that the "Aid to Britain" Law has passed, America finds that she cannot immediately transfer the craft which constitute the most urgent need. The United States knows that she cannot exercise her aid to Britain unless the threat on the high seas is eliminated. Therefore, some sort of convoy system carried on by the Navy is deemed essential. It has been reported recently that German submarines are in the waters near this country and consequently popular opinion is gradually coming to recognize this necessity. The Committee to Defend
Page A-20
America by Aiding the Allies, which seems to reflect the opinions of the Government and which was formed last year before destroyers were transferred to Britain, recently passed a resolution to the effect that if convoys are needed, they shall be afforded. The Navy, too, recognized this necessity, and the President, himself, is said to have ordered the Navy to draw up a definite plan.
2. Since it is feared that through convoying ships the United States may precipitate its entry into the war, substitute proposals have been advanced; namely—
a. That American warships to transferred to England and that they do the convoying.
b. That the cruising limits under the Neutrality law be extended and that the convoy limits of British craft be curtailed.
3. Concerning convoys, there is a prohibition stipulation in the "Aid to Britain" Law. However, constitutionally speaking, this has no effect in limiting the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief. From a constitutional point of view, therefore, it is very doubtful if this clause has any meaning. Furthermore, the President is said to be considering abolishing from the Neutrality Law the provision (the cash and carry principle) prohibiting American merchantmen from stopping in belligerent zones.
Relayed to London, Berlin, and New York.
Trans. 3-22-41
No. 25
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
21 March 1941
# 162.
Relayed to London and Berlin.
It is estimated that not only the Democratic Representatives but also two thirds of the Republicans will vote approval of the policy of the administration, when the vote is taken in the House on the 7 billion dollar budget for carrying out the so-called Aid-to-Britain bill.
Some of the leaders of the Republican party who formerly were opposed to aiding Britain are now among those who will vote for the appropriation. Public opinion in the U.S. is rallying to the support of the President's aid for Britain.
Trans. 3-25-41
No. 26
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Berlin
24 March 1941
# 5.
Strictly Secret.
To be handled in Government code.
Please transmit the following message concerning the present state of affairs in the United States to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA:
By virtue of the expansion of her own national defense and her assistance to Great Britain, the United States had de facto already entered the war. It will take a considerable length of time before the United States' full power is behind her program of assistance to Britain and the big question of the moment is sea shipping. The number of ships recently sunk has mounted to a high figure and it is impossible to fully make up for them. Consequently, the officials of the United States are most anxious about this situation. The Congress is not likely,
Page A-21
at least at this stage, to declare war, but I would say that there is a possibility that American warships may presently begin to convoy. I am, however, following every detail of this situation because I know that convoying materials to England is going to have a tremendous effect upon the American people. The trend now is to concentrate the main strength of the American Navy in the Atlantic and, in coordination with Great Britain, to protect British territory in the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, the minds of the officials of the United States appear also to be made up to protect the Netherlands Indies. The United States is in addition following the policy of assisting China as much as possible so long as she restrains Japan and of preventing Japan's advance to the south. Notwithstanding all this, at least while the Atlantic is the primary focus of interest, the United States certainly desires at least a temporary peace in the Pacific. There can be no mistake on this point. For all the cheering and crying that American assistance will bring victory to England, those responsible are beyond any question trembling within themselves. Apparently there are also officials, who might be said to have the power of life and death, who on the surface loudly proclaim that a land invasion of Great Britain is next to impossible, and that the chances of its success are remote, and that Great Britain is sure to win, but who underneath the surface are pessimistic. Now, things have come to the point where people who speak of peace are anathematized by the title of defeatist and they are dwindling in numbers. It will take two years for assistance to England to reach its peak; that is to say, in June, year after next, and thereafter the plans are to have it continue at that rate for three years.
Trans. 3-27-41
No. 27
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Berlin and London
25 March 1941
# 047.
(Circular).
Action Tokyo as # 171.
Re my # 170 [a] and # 168 [a].
Even though this appropriation is passed, it is recognized that it will take time for it to get into operation so that the U.S. will be able to do anything toward replenishing the shipping lost by Great Britain. Of the merchant ships (5,000,000 tons) to be built with the shipbuilding funds provided in this appropriation ($629,000,000) together with those to be completed that are now under construction (3,500,000 tons), at the most only about 1,000,000 tons could be completed during the current year, and this would not be easy for the U.S. -----. It is thought that this is the reason why it is not advisable for the U.S. Navy to engage in convoy duty.
[a] See I, 27A.
Trans. 3-27-41
Page A-22
No. 27A
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
March 22, 1941
# 168.
1. Because of the shortage of bottoms, the President, the Secretary of the Navy and Naval Affairs Committee of Congress have on successive occasions stated that American commercial ships will be transferred to England. I have news which seems to indicate that the Naval Affairs Committee of Congress on the 21st made a statement supporting the transfer of some ships (five is said to be the number). This matter is being held over until the arrival of the British Envoy SALTE and until the people see how critical the situation is. This is to forewarn you.
2. On the occasion of a discussion for an additional naval budget in Congress on the 21st, a proposal prohibiting the use of already existing funds in the conveying of goods sent in the Aid to British Program was overwhelmingly voted down. The above is for your information.
Relayed to London and Berlin. Have relayed information to New York.
Trans. 3-26-41
No. 28
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
22 March 1941
# 167.
At the present time there are two bills before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House which call for strong economic restrictions against Japan. These two plans are as I give them below. This is but another example of the sort of bills they have been passing against us all along. Though I do not believe that they are of immediate concern, I give them for your information.
1. One bill (already presented in the House in Washington) calls for an embargo against the export of military goods to Japan, against transportation of such equipment on American ships, restrictions against American products being shipped on Japanese ships, and the prevention of activities by American people of companies that would aid Japan.
2. I am sending the details, by mail, of a resolution requesting the President to institute strong economic restrictions against Japan because of the occupation of Chinese territory by Japanese forces.
Have relayed information to New York.
Trans. 3-26-41
No. 29
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: London, Berlin and Rome
2 April 1941
# 66.
(Circular). Message to Tokyo # 207.
I. To the protests of Berlin and Rome over the confiscation of their ships, the American government will take a bristlingly hostile attitude, and returning them is the last thing that the United States would consider. I cannot consider otherwise than that. Washington's relations with those two governments will follow an ever-narrowing route.
II. The German and Italian ships will be handled in a manner more or less different from those of Denmark. (The charge of sabotage is a mere fabrication.) To the extent that general
Page A-23
principles and United States law will permit, these vessels will in all probability be somehow used to assist Great Britain, nor is there likely to be any objection.
III. It appears that the authorities of this country are conferring with the several American states on the question of the confiscation of vessels.
Relayed to London, Berlin and Rome. Have relayed information to New York.
Trans. 4-4-41
No. 30
FROM: Washington (Jap. Amb.)
TO: London, Berlin and Rome
2 April 1941
# 65.
(Circular). Message to Tokyo as # 206. Secret.
Aroused more and more by the course of the military situation, the Government of the United States is taking advantage of the National Defense legislation (and of course the Aid-to-Britain law) in order to strengthen her attitude of suppressing the Axis powers. An example of this can be found in the confiscation of ships, and in all probability Washington is going to take successive vigorous measures along the line of convoying, etc. But when it comes to the question of economics, although I regard it as inevitable that they will take the same course and extend the export quota system, nevertheless that is a matter they are considering very deeply. Gradually by degrees they are whipping up the spirit of the people upon whose approval they wish to base their actions. I do not think they can easily be deterred, and their talk of "short of war" is gradually turning to "economic warfare". We must be ever on the alert because of this trend.
Relayed to England, Germany, and Italy.
Trans. 4-4-41
No. 31
FROM: Rome
TO: Washington
10 April 1941
No number.
Message to Tokyo # 205.
In connection with the question of American seizures of Italian ships, Director PRUNAS [a] told ANDO [b] confidentially: "At the present time the Italian Government is protesting this act as being contrary to International Law but it seems that the American Government is again disregarding International Law and scheming to confiscate them. We are making a very profound study of retaliatory steps to be taken in such an event. Rest assured that should we put these into operation they will be blanket retaliatory measures. Furthermore, in the case that they do confiscate them, it will take at least six months of repair to put them in usable shape because the interiors of these Italian ships were severely damaged by their crews.
"Though Mexico, Venezuela and Costa Rica in Central and South America have already taken steps similar to the United States; Brazil, Argentina and Chile will not take such measures.
Page A-24
On this last point he is understood to have been very optimistic.
Relayed to Washington, London and Berlin. Relay to London.
[a] Director General of the Transoceania Bureau of the Italian Foreign Office.
[b] Secretary in the Japanese Embassy in Rome.
Trans. 4-12-41
No. 32
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Rome
4 April 1941
# 2.
(Message to Tokyo as # 218, April 4th).
Re my # 207 [a].
On the 4th the Italian Commercial Attaché told IGUCHI [b] confidentially that in all probability the Italian Government would demand the recall of the American Naval Attaché in Rome because of the American demand for the recall of the Italian Naval Attaché in Washington. Furthermore, if the American authorities decide to confiscate Italian ships in the United States, (at the present time the American flag has been taken down and again they are flying the Italian flag), in revenge the Italian Government is considering the confiscation of a part of American owned property in Italy (this is said to be something more than $150,000,000).
Relayed to Rome. Have relayed information to New York.
[a] See I, 29 in which Washington reports on the confiscation of German and Italian ships.
[b] Japanese Embassy Counselor in Washington.
Trans. Not dated
No. 33
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
11 April 1941
# 225.
(Abstract)
The passage of the lend-lease bill has made America optimistic about the war in Europe and Africa. However, the situation in the Balkans and the English failure in Africa, threatening as it does Alexandria and the Suez and Dakaar, have stirred up feeling in America. The sinking in one day of 400,000 tons of shipping as was done on March 23rd, has alarmed public opinion, for England and America together cannot turn out more than 2,000,000 tons a year.
Trans. 4-18-41
No. 34
FROM: New York (Morishima)
TO: Tokyo
12 April 1941
# 147.
President ROOSEVELT has been issuing orders one after another with special bearing on the sanctioning of the navigation of American ships on the high seas arranging preparations for the defense of Greenland; and generally everyone throughout the country has welcomed this
Page A-25
as an approved measure of assistance toward England, even such persons as Colonel Lindbergh himself. They are endorsing the leasing of Greenland as an appropriate step in America's National Defense program. On the other hand, in view of Germany's preeminent success in the Balkans, and the ever present threat to British maritime communications, further effective measures are being demanded, particularly in both the Christian Science Monitor and the Tribune editorials of the 12th.
1. Greenland will become a base for naval convoys.
2. It is a fact that munitions will be transported to the Suez in American ships.
3. The United States is considering going so far as to transfer to England the recently stolen German and Italian ships.
4. Colonel Donovan at a Foreign Policy discussion meeting held in Chicago on the 11th, in supporting the convoy question, proposed the occupation of Dakar [a], or the acquisition of usable harbors in Ireland as a result of British-American pressure and he went on to say that if necessary the United States should unhesitatingly enter the war. These comments are creating quite a stir.
This is for your information. Please transmit this to all competent ambassadors in Europe.
[a] French West Africa.
Trans. 4-18-41
No. 35
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
4 April 1941
# 214.
Re my # 212 [a] and # 213 [a].
In connection with the export quota system, as you know, in response to our numerous strong protests, for a year now the United States has taken the unwarranted attitude that it is unreasonable for foreign countries to keep prating about things which are necessary to the United States' defense program. (See my # 1679 [b] of last year.) Well, the United States does not attempt to conceal the fact that her objective is to bring pressure to bear and to restrain Japan. This is specifically why they are carrying out the measures which trouble us. So long as they take this attitude, it is futile for me to negotiate with the State Department on the question of obtaining the present licenses. No matter how much I negotiate on both of these matters, I will get nowhere. An official in charge at the Export Control Office very cynically remarked to Lawyer SIEBOLD; "Why, for us to use our good offices to get licenses for Japan would, after all, be giving a big boost to a technical enemy, wouldn't it?" From that, I think you can see how just about every one of the American officials feels.
[a] Available in code under study.
[b] MORISHIMA reports on the reasons for the limitations placed on exports.
Trans. 4-8-41
Page A-26
No. 36
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
15 April 1941
# 228.
(In 2 parts, complete).
Received from New York as # 048 to me.
Relayed to Tokyo as New York # 148 of 15 April.
New York—Tokyo # 065 [a]
Re my Washington—Tokyo # 164 [b]
I. The president of the YU Company [c] is confined to his home by sickness. According to my telegram # 65 [a] Yamaoka and the lawyer for "YU" have been holding conversations. Inasmuch as he has not yet applied for a permit, in order to expedite matters, I went with Yamaoka, on the 12th to call on the vice president. (The chief engineer and the lawyer were also present at this interview.)
The "YU" Company's opinions relative to the four points presented to them by Yamaoka are as follows:
(a) Concerning the "non-selective polymerization process, including catalytic hydrogen and tri-potassium phosphate process," the "tri-potassium phosphate process" cannot yet be manufactured by them, since it does not belong to them. It is a patent of the Shell Development Corporation and therefore the "YU" Company cannot apply for a permit.
(b) As to the "catalytic cracking process, including hydrogen transfer as a part thereof", there is no objection to applying for a permit for it, however, the "hydrogen transfer" ----- there is danger that the State Department may consider that it comes within the export embargo on aviation gasoline.
(c) As to the "catalytic desulpharization process":
(1) The "YU" Company is still studying it in the laboratory and it is not yet a "commercial process" and hence the problem of an export permit belongs to the future and need not be considered at this time.
(2) Inasmuch as the scope is rather broad and there is danger that it might be dealt with as aviation gasoline and thus come under the embargo, it would be better to deal with "crude, or other charging stock". (The original draft was presented as it was. After the attitude of the State Department has been ascertained it is to be considered again).
(3) The transfer of the "Phillips Desulpharization Process" to a third party is also forbidden.
(d) Materials such as a catalyst, etc., as requested in the 1938 and 1928 contracts, including the foregoing process". Even if a request for a comprehensive permit for the "materials" mentioned in the above were made by the "YU" Company it would be impossible to have it granted. Therefore there is no objection to requesting a permit for the "catalysts" only mentioned above ----- in case of ----- it will become an actual problem.
II. The "YU" Company's opinion is as (1) and is a reasonable one I think. Now, then there is a possibility of obtaining an export permit, we should immediately put in a request for a permit for only those things for which there is a reasonable expectation of having a request granted. And therefore in harmony with their opinion we have made application for a permit -----. Please convey the "YU" Company's views to Saneyoshi [d] and if he has any opinions, the talk may continue ----- having informed Saneyoshi please have another conference.
III. Further in regard to "materials" the Ambassador's telegram # 214 (?) [e] to Your Excellency ----- is necessary to get in touch with the State Department ----- other than "catalysts" ----- to delay needlessly the negotiations regarding materials ----- there is no other way than to request negotiations through the Embassy..
Page A-27
IV. For any further negotiations with the "YU" Company it will be necessary to have Saneyoshi (of the Japan Gasoline Company) come to America.
[a] See I.
[b] See I, 199.
[c] Universal Oil Products Co. of Chicago (?).
[d] Masao Saneyoshi, an official of the Japanese Gasoline Co.
[e] See I, 35. Ambassador Nomura reports that it is useless for him to continue negotiations with the U.S. in matters pertaining to licenses and protests over the export quota system, as the U.S. is not attempting to conceal the fact that her objective is to bring pressure to bear and restrain Japan.
Trans. 4-22-41
No. 37
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Nanking
16 April 1941
# 111.
(Part 1 of 2).
Message to Tokyo as # 617.
Re my # 616 [a].
On the 15th I sent a member of my staff to the American Consulate General and he said to Chief Consul STANTON: "Our Army, through its espionage agencies, has procured an unimpeachable report that the gasoline in question was purchased by the Chungking Commercial Section. After loading, the responsibility for the shipment rests on Chungking. Furthermore, we know that Chungking has not even got any war insurance. For over a year now we have suspected such shipments as being destined for the enemy and have been on the lookout. Naturally we feel strongly impelled to seize them." STANTON retorted: "Well, I will not even pretend to deny that this gasoline was about to be shipped to Chungking. I will not quibble. The customs have produced the necessary documents and this is a bona fide export. Any interference on the part of you Japanese is illegal." My staff member pointed out: "The Military does not raise the point as to whether or not this is to be included in the embargo which has recently been brought into force. The whole thing is this: the gasoline is for the use of our enemy, the Chungking Government, and we are going to confiscate it." STANTON retorted: "As to whether or not this is enemy produce, the burden of proof is on the Japanese. Furthermore, suppose it is destined for Chungking. Until it is turned over to them, it belongs to Texas. You say it is 'tekisan' (enemy produce): I say it is 'Texan' (evidently having heard the Japanese use the word 'tekisan', STANTON makes a pun using the word 'tekisan' for 'Texan'.) Now, say that you Japanese set aside the regulations of the customs and seize this gasoline on the mere charge that it is bound for the Central Army, the American concerns have not heard of any regulations permitting such deeds being publicly announced. If you start to seize American goods on the basis of unannounced regulations, it will be just too bad for you. By what logic could you possibly call such an act proper and reasonable?" My staff member answered: "Well, we got it straight from our espionage agencies and they will furnish definite proof. Pretty soon you'll understand why this proof cannot be denied."
[a] See I, 39.
Trans. 4-18-41
No. 38
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Nanking
16 April 1941
# 111.
Message to Tokyo as # 617.
Part 2 of 2.
"Don't think that just by calling our plans to seize this gasoline improper and unreasonable you can move us in our determination to confiscate it." STANTON replied "Well, Texas, through this incident, is going to incur a great loss. I will immediately protest to Japan by note and will demand reparations. What is more, I will wire the facts to both Washington and Tokyo." My man countered by saying "The diplomatic officials know that there is a good basis for our argument. They also know that Texas will incur no loss. A mere protest from the United States won't do any good. If you simply report the details of this to Tokyo, all that will ensue is a big argument and you will wind up where you are right now. I mean the United States will have no recourse in settling this matter but to withdraw its complaint immediately." My man started to walk out, but STANTON sat down and said "You may say if you will that Texas will incur no damage, but until this gasoline is bought up, Texas will suffer a sizeable loss." He was rather nasty, and in conclusion my man stated "Well I wasn't thinking about it being bought up. You know I am not authorized to go deeply into these things. However, I may safely say that Japanese officials are of the unanimous opinion that the American concerns shall not undergo any losses. Since this gasoline is for the enemy, we can't compromise. But, if it is true that Texas actually will suffer, it might be possible to get in touch with Hongkong and have them consider this point. In any case, I will communicate this to the Consul General in Shanghai."
Trans. 4-18-41
No. 39
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Nanking
16 April 1941
# 110.
Message to Tokyo as # 616.
Re your # 294 [a].
1. In connection with our schemes to procure petroleum mentioned in 2 of your telegram, I sought the advice of the purchasing agents and the Chief of the Constabulary. They replied that this gasoline must, at any cost, be prevented from reaching the hands of the Chungking officials, and that the thing to do is to seize it immediately.
2. As to whether or not this gasoline seems under the export embargo regulation of the customs, upon investigation I find that the export permit was obtained before this regulation went into effect on April 7th, and that the transaction is foolproof.
3. After finding out these things, on the 14th I called the military and naval officials to my residence and announced the contents of your telegram. As a result of our conversation, we agreed as follows:
If we follow the plan suggested in 3 of your message in handling this matter, from the very beginning it will smell of corruption, and if we merely say that we suspect that it is for the aid of CHIANG KAI-SHEK, we would make ourselves vulnerable to a come-back on the part of the United States. No.! We must have an air-tight case. Therefore, as we all agreed, the besthttp://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG
Page A-29
thing to do is to negotiate by insinuations, claiming that we have a witness (some imaginary person) whom we will not name.
Relayed to Nanking.
[a] Tokyo wires Nanking and Shanghai concerning a report that the U.S. is about to exercise a comprehensive Petroleum embargo against Japan.
Trans. (Not dated)
No. 40
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking
12 April 1941
# 118.
Message to Shanghai as # 294.
Re your # 575 [a].
1. We have received a report that the United States is about to exercise a comprehensive petroleum embargo against Japan in the near future. Soon we are going to have Ambassador NOMURA inform the American Government that if they carry out this measure, our Empire cannot but act with determination. We are going to have Ambassador NOMURA advise them not to embargo petroleum. Therefore, although we do not like to hold up the gasoline in question, if you get any definite proof that the Chungking Commerce Section has purchased it, go ahead and seize it.
2. So far I have received no report from you on the schemes mentioned in my # 153 [b] for purchasing petroleum. (Please report on this immediately.) These negotiations are going on and if it is seen that success is imminent and that this seizure will damage the negotiations, you may release the gasoline. I will leave this up to your judgment, which should be guided by developments in your city.
3. If you cannot find the actual proof mentioned in the preceding paragraph 1, take suitable steps to prevent the exports mentioned in your # 539a. If we cannot get the results we desire, we will come forth with an out and out charge that the goods are suspected of being sent to assist CHIANG KAI-SHEK and summarily seize them.
[a] Not available.
[b] Available; Not translated.
Tans. 4-14-41
No. 41
Proposal Presented to the Department of State Through the Medium of Private American and Japanese Individuals on April 9, 1941. [a]
The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.
Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.
Page A-30
It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of an entente cordiale, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.
For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. We, therefore, suggest that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both governments in honor and in act.
It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a Conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective Governments.
We presume to anticipate that our Governments could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:
1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.
3. The relations of both nations toward the China affair.
4. Naval, aerial and mercantile marine relations in the Pacific.
5. Commerce between both nations and their financial cooperation.
6. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
7. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.
Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual understanding subject, of course, to modifications by the United States Government and subject to the official and final decision of the Government of Japan.
I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
The Governments of the United States and of Japan might jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.
Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.
Both Governments might declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others.
Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.
II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.
The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of its Axis Alliance was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the extension of military grouping among nations not directly affected by the European War.
The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined by no aggressive alliance aimed to assist any one nation against another. The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.
Page A-31
III. China affairs.
The President of the United States, if the following terms are approved by His Excellency and guaranteed by the Government of Japan, might request the Chiang-Kai-Shek regime to negotiate peace with Japan.
a. Independence of China
b. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory, in accordance with an agreement to be reached between Japan and China
c. No acquisition of Chinese territory
d. No imposition of indemnities
e. Resumption of the "Open Door"; the interpretation and application of which shall be agreed upon at some future, convenient time between the United States and Japan
f. Coalescence of the Governments of Chiang-Kai-Chek [sic] and of Wang-Ching-Wei
g. No large-scale or concentrated immigration of Japanese into Chinese territory
h. Recognition of Manchukuo
With the acceptance by the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime of the aforementioned Presidential request, the Japanese Government shall commence direct peace negotiations with the newly coalesced Chinese Government, or constituent elements thereof.
The Government of Japan shall submit to the Chinese concrete terms of peace, within the limits of aforesaid general terms and along the line of neighborly friendship, joint defense against communistic activities and economic cooperation.
[Should the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime reject the request of President Roosevelt, the United States Government shall discontinue assistance to the Chinese] [b]
IV. Naval, aerial and mercantile marine relations in the Pacific.
a. As both the Americans and the Japanese are desirous of maintaining the peace in the Pacific, they shall not resort to such disposition of their naval forces and aerial forces as to menace each other. Detailed, concrete agreement thereof shall be left for determination at the Proposed joint Conference.
b. At the conclusion of the projected Conference, each nation might dispatch a courtesy naval squadron to visit the country of the other and signalize the new era of Peace in the Pacific.
c. With the first ray of hope for the settlement of China affairs, the Japanese Government will agree, if desired, to use their good offices to release for contract by Americans certain percentage of their total tonnage of merchant vessels, chiefly for the Pacific service, so soon as they can be released from their present commitments. The amount of such tonnage shall be determined at the Conference.
V. Commerce between both nations and their financial cooperation.
When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such commodities are as respectively available or required by either of them. Both governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it could be elaborated at the proposed conference and concluded in accordance with usual procedure.
For the advancement of economic cooperation between both nations, it is suggested that the United States extend to Japan a gold credit in amounts sufficient to [foster trade and industrial] [c] development directed to the betterment of Far Eastern economic conditions and to the sustained economic cooperation of the Governments of the United States and of Japan.
Page A-32
VI. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
On the pledged basis of guarantee that Japanese activities in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means, without resorting to arms, American cooperation and support shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.
VII. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.
a. The Governments of the United States and of Japan will not acquiesce in the future transfer of territories or the relegation of existing States within the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific area to any European Power.
b. The governments of the United States and of Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands and will consider means to come to their assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression by any third Power.
c. [The Government of Japan requests the friendly and diplomatic assistance of the Government of the United States for the removal of Hongkong and Singapore as doorways to further political encroachment by the British in the Far East.] [d]
d. Japanese Immigration to the United States and to the Southwestern Pacific area shall receive amicable consideration—on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.
Conference.
a. It is suggested that a Conference between Delegates of the United States and of Japan be held at Honolulu and that this Conference be opened for the United States by President Roosevelt and for Japan by Prince Konoye. The delegates could number less than five each, exclusive of experts, clerks, etc.
b. There shall be no foreign observers at the Conference.
c. This Conference could be held soon as possible (May 1941) after the present understanding has been reached.
d. The agenda of the Conference would not include a reconsideration of the present understanding but would direct its efforts to the specification of the prearranged agenda and drafting of instruments to effectuate the understanding. The precise agenda could be determined upon by mutual agreement between both governments.
Addendum.
The present understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.
The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments.
[a] The English text with a few omissions was sent to Tokyo by Admiral Nomura on April 30, 1941, though the Japanese text of this same proposal had already been sent on April 17, 1941 (See I, 47). Clauses of the original text which were omitted in the dispatch of April 30th to Tokyo. (I, 41) have been marked by brackets.
[b] Omitted in dispatch to Tokyo.
[c] Omitted in dispatch to Tokyo.
[d] Omitted in dispatch to Tokyo.
Trans. 5-1-41/5-3-41
Page A-33
No. 42
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
14 April 1941
(Urgent)
# 227.
Strictly secret. To be handled in Government code.
This morning of the 14th I had an interview with Secretary of State Hull at his private residence. I said that not only should the Governments of our two nations agree to maintain peace in the Pacific Ocean, but the time has now come when both should take a larger view and without delay. The Secretary expressed accord, and I continued, "We being presumably viewed as an enemy, the American fleet is cruising in the Southern Pacific and naval instructors are being sent here and there, and in Manila a conference is being held between England, the United States and the Netherlands. Viewed from the standpoint of military experts, this is a most unfortunate trend and is certainly a step in the direction of war. The responsible military officials of Japan cannot overlook such things as this. The war fever of both countries is rising. In the United States the thirst for blood is gradually increasing. In the Atlantic convoying is about to be exercised. This, I tell you, is an inflammatory situation. It looks to me as though a declaration of war is imminent. Japan cannot but feel the gravest concern. Now, Sir, don't you think there might be a little change?" To my first statement he offered no particular comment. However, with the second he expressed accord. Next, Secretary HULL questioned me about the military policy of Japan and I explained that, "For example, a year or so ago Prince KONOYE made a statement to the effect that Japan is ready to make peace with China on the basis of equality with no indemnity and no annexation. There were some opponents at the time but the people agreed and they are still of this mind. The Japanese are united in one firm mind under the Emperor." Then I went on to explain to him something of our form of Government and international ideals. He seemed pleased and to understand, and said, "We are much alike." We went on to converse more or less about mutual economic problems, the stabilization of the Pacific, etc., and he promised me that at his very first opportunity he and I were going to have a conference. I think that before long he is going to inform me as to the date.
By the way, I explained the new treaty between Tokyo and Moscow and concluded by stating that the pacification of the Pacific would be the first step in the eventual winding up of hostilities in Europe, with which Secretary HULL expressed agreement.
Trans. 4-15-41
No. 43
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
14 April 1941
(Very urgent)
# 229.
Secret. To be handled in Government Code.
The effect upon our country of the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality agreement is something for which sufficient gratitude cannot be expressed to you and I know full well the extent to which our Government and people appreciate your efforts. Japanese-American relations being extremely delicate at this time, it would be well to carefully heed the handling this pact is accorded in newspaper articles and editorials. As I told you in my # 227 [a], I made my explanations to Secretary HULL early in the morning of the 14th. As a direct result of these
Page A-34
conversations, Secretary HULL's opinions and phraseology on the occasion of the newspaper correspondents' interview of that day were not only extremely moderate, (please refer to my special report) but it seemed to me that he was probably doing his utmost to calm public opinion all over the country. And in this connection we, too, must see to it that our own papers do not play up this agreement as though it were directed against the United States. I believe that it would be wise not to arouse American public opinion. Therefore, on this point please send me your comments. That is all for the present.
http://Louis2J2Sheehan2Esquire.US
[a] See I. 42.
Trans. 4-15-41 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
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