On March 1, 2005, BTK suspect, Dennis L. Rader, appeared on a closed-circuit television in Sedgwick County's District Court to hear the 10 first-degree murder charges filed against him in the murders attributed to the BTK Strangler. Public Defender Steve Osburn, Public Defender Jama Mitchell and Assistant Public Defender Sarah McKinno were the court-appointed lawyers that Judge Greg Waller assigned to represent Dennis Rader during the hearing, the Wichita Eagle reported. The prosecution team will consist of attorneys Kevin O'Connor, Kim Parker and Aaron Smith. Even though the preliminary hearing has been set for mid-March, the Rader defense team will likely need more time to prepare for the case. Thus, the hearing might be pushed up to a later date.
Wichita's KAKE-TV reported that Dennis Rader confessed to some but not all of the crimes, yet the report has not yet been substantiated. In the days following Dennis Rader's arrest, there was a great deal of controversy concerning whether Rader's daughter played a role in his capture. Previously it was widely reported that Kerri Rader, 26, turned her father in and supplied the authorities with DNA samples in mid-February, which allegedly led to her father's arrest. However, according to Sylvester and Witsel's more recent article in the Wichita Eagle, Farmington, Michigan Police Chief Charles Nebus revealed that Kerri Rader actually supplied FBI agents with her DNA after her father had already been arrested, which makes it less likely that she played a direct role, if any, in her father's capture.
Interestingly, David Twiddy reported that Nebus "told The Associated Press that he didn't tell the newspapers a DNA test was being conducted." Even more intriguing is on a March 2nd Fox News interviewed KAKE-TV anchor Larry Hatteberg who said that a credible source told him that Kerri Rader's DNA was collected when her father was under surveillance and that the results of the test were instrumental in Rader's arrest. To date, the facts remain unclear whether the DNA was obtained prior to or after Dennis Rader was taken into custody.
The police claimed that it wasn't Kerri Rader that led to his arrest but a computer disk that he mailed in a package along with other items to the Wichita television station KSAS. CNN reported that the computer disk was scrutinized by investigators and traced to the Lutheran church, where Dennis Rader presided over the assembly. Police technicians were able to "electronically peel back" information that was thought to have been erased, leading to the discovery of Dennis Rader's name, it was further reported.
To date, the authorities continue to search for evidence that could be used in the case against Rader. Dennis Rader's house has since been searched and several items confiscated, including his computer. Sylvester and Witsel said that metal detectors and shovels are also being used to search areas near Rader's house in the hopes of finding even more evidence. Hatteberg said during the Fox News interview that Wichita's sheriff has actually found new evidence that might be linked to the Dennis Rader BTK case but it is unclear what exactly has been discovered.
Sunday, January 10, 2010
Friday, December 25, 2009
awaiting 2.awa.9920039 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Medical thriller writer Michael Palmer's first novel was The Sisterhood. It featured a group of nurses who start an underground organization to help people to die in hospitals around the country. "Nurses bound together in mercy," the jacket reads, "pledged to end human suffering." However, within the organization, some "mercy-killers" take things too far and patients who should have survived end up dead. What began as a benign act of compassion became a wellspring of evil.
This story is fiction. What follows is not.
It was a nurse's aide in Vienna, Austria, who started the murder spree at Lainz General Hospital. Most of the people who go there are elderly, many of them with terminal illnesses. It's not difficult to hide a murder or two among people who are already at death's door. Even so, it wasn't as if Waltraud Wagner wanted to kill not at first, anyway.
It started in 1983 and by the time officials began to look into the suspicious deaths some six years later, the death toll stood at 42. However, an unofficial count was in the hundreds.
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire , 23, had a 77-year-old patient who one day asked the girl to "end her suffering." Wagner hesitatingly obliged by overdosing the woman with morphine. It was then that she discovered she enjoyed this kind of power, and it didn't take much to recruit accomplices from the night shift. Maria Gruber, 19, was happy to join. So was Ilene Leidolf, 21. The third recruit was a grandmother, 43-year-old Stephanija Mayer.
Wagner was the "death pavilion" leader, and they planned the murders as a group. She taught the others how to give lethal injections, and she added some fatal mechanisms of her own creation. The "water cure" involved holding a patient's nose while forcing him or her to drink. That was an agonizing death that filled the lungs, but undiscoverable as outright murder. Many elderly patients had fluid in their lungs.
Moving from compassion to sadism, the women took out patients who merely annoyed them by soiling sheets or asking for help too often. Such people were issued their "tickets to God."
At first, these nurses killed sporadically, but by 1987, they were escalating. Rumors began to spread that there was a killer on Pavilion 5.
It was their own carelessness that finally stopped them. Over drinks one day, they relived one of their latest cases, laughing over the patient's distress and the fact that she deserved her fate. At a table nearby sat a doctor. What he overheard sent him scurrying to the police station, and they quickly launched an investigation. It took six weeks, but all four women were arrested on April 7, 1989. The doctor in charge of their ward was suspended.
Collectively they confessed to 49 murders, and Wagner took credit for giving a "free bed with the good Lord" to 39 of them. She had decided that their deaths were long overdue, and she reveled in the fact that the power over their lives rested with her. However, one of her accomplices believed that Wagner's death count was closer to 200 in just the past two years.
As she sat in prison awaiting trial, Wagner scaled her culpability back to ten murders, all of them for reasons of mercy.
The jury didn't buy it. Ultimately, Wagner was convicted of 15 murders, 17 attempts, and two counts of assault. She was sentenced to life in prison. Leidolf got life as well, on conviction of five murders, while the other two drew fifteen years for manslaughter and attempted murder charges.
As the state attorney put it, "It's a small step from killing the terminally ill to the killing of insolent, burdensome patients, and from there to that which was known under the Third Reich as euthanasia. It is a door that must never be opened again."
And yet it has been opened again and again. And not all the nurses are female.
This story is fiction. What follows is not.
It was a nurse's aide in Vienna, Austria, who started the murder spree at Lainz General Hospital. Most of the people who go there are elderly, many of them with terminal illnesses. It's not difficult to hide a murder or two among people who are already at death's door. Even so, it wasn't as if Waltraud Wagner wanted to kill not at first, anyway.
It started in 1983 and by the time officials began to look into the suspicious deaths some six years later, the death toll stood at 42. However, an unofficial count was in the hundreds.
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire , 23, had a 77-year-old patient who one day asked the girl to "end her suffering." Wagner hesitatingly obliged by overdosing the woman with morphine. It was then that she discovered she enjoyed this kind of power, and it didn't take much to recruit accomplices from the night shift. Maria Gruber, 19, was happy to join. So was Ilene Leidolf, 21. The third recruit was a grandmother, 43-year-old Stephanija Mayer.
Wagner was the "death pavilion" leader, and they planned the murders as a group. She taught the others how to give lethal injections, and she added some fatal mechanisms of her own creation. The "water cure" involved holding a patient's nose while forcing him or her to drink. That was an agonizing death that filled the lungs, but undiscoverable as outright murder. Many elderly patients had fluid in their lungs.
Moving from compassion to sadism, the women took out patients who merely annoyed them by soiling sheets or asking for help too often. Such people were issued their "tickets to God."
At first, these nurses killed sporadically, but by 1987, they were escalating. Rumors began to spread that there was a killer on Pavilion 5.
It was their own carelessness that finally stopped them. Over drinks one day, they relived one of their latest cases, laughing over the patient's distress and the fact that she deserved her fate. At a table nearby sat a doctor. What he overheard sent him scurrying to the police station, and they quickly launched an investigation. It took six weeks, but all four women were arrested on April 7, 1989. The doctor in charge of their ward was suspended.
Collectively they confessed to 49 murders, and Wagner took credit for giving a "free bed with the good Lord" to 39 of them. She had decided that their deaths were long overdue, and she reveled in the fact that the power over their lives rested with her. However, one of her accomplices believed that Wagner's death count was closer to 200 in just the past two years.
As she sat in prison awaiting trial, Wagner scaled her culpability back to ten murders, all of them for reasons of mercy.
The jury didn't buy it. Ultimately, Wagner was convicted of 15 murders, 17 attempts, and two counts of assault. She was sentenced to life in prison. Leidolf got life as well, on conviction of five murders, while the other two drew fifteen years for manslaughter and attempted murder charges.
As the state attorney put it, "It's a small step from killing the terminally ill to the killing of insolent, burdensome patients, and from there to that which was known under the Third Reich as euthanasia. It is a door that must never be opened again."
And yet it has been opened again and again. And not all the nurses are female.
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
inhabited 3.inh.00309 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Although the pair never met, 22-year-old Gwynneth Rees had a lot in common with Elizabeth Figg. Both had come to London as teenagers, having suffered unwanted pregnancies and fallen out with their families (Rees was from South Wales, Figg from the North-west of England). Both had come to London looking for a more glamorous existence than small-town Britain could offer. Yet like so many naïve young girls before them, they had fallen into the twilight world of prostitution, chased from pillar to post by violent pimps, corrupt landlords and sleazy punters. At the time of their deaths, both were also suffering from a common problem for ladies of the night — Sexually Transmitted Diseases.
Gwynneth Rees
Gwynneth Rees
Rees' body, naked but for a nylon stocking, was found barely a mile along the riverbank from Elizabeth Figg's, on a garbage dump on the opposite side of the river, on November 8, 1963. A post-mortem revealed several teeth were missing and she had in all likelihood been strangled with a ligature. She had been last seen nearly six weeks earlier, getting into a car with a man on the night of September 29, 1963.
When police looked into her background, they found no shortage of potential suspects.
Rees was ponced for a time by Cornelius "Connie" Whitehead, a violent criminal who would later be convicted as an associate of notorious East End gangsters, the Kray Twins. He thought nothing of delivering regular "whackings" to his girls, which may have been one reason why Rees left him shortly before her disappearance and he was reportedly looking for her.
The Kray Twins
The Kray Twins
That summer she had become pregnant. This was another common predicament for prostitutes in the days before the contraceptive pill became widely available, since insisting on the use of condoms was likely to reduce your appeal to potential clients. She already had two children (neither of which were in her care), and abortion was still illegal in the UK at that time. Fellow prostitutes said that at the time of her disappearance she had been looking to contact an illegal abortionist she knew of.
Two terminations she had previously undergone had left her with an infection of the fallopian tubes. That was hardly surprising given the methods used. Typically these amateur physicians would fill a syringe with boiling water, antiseptic and melted soap and squirt the resulting liquid deep inside the hapless patient, aiming to trigger a miscarriage within 48 hours. It usually worked, but there were obvious dangers associated with it, such as the above-mentioned condition, or even blood poisoning. Yet investigators had to ask themselves: even if Rees had died as a result of the abortion, and certain guilty parties had to get rid of the body, why dispose of her naked corpse on a garbage heap by the Thames, where it was always likely to be discovered? And why strangle her? Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Whatever the cause of her death, once again police had precious little to go on other than speculation and casual suspicions. Inevitably, their investigations were hampered by the widespread disdain for the police that existed in the outlaw world which prostitutes inhabited.
Indeed, neither of the above cases lived long in Londoners' memory. Where prostitutes were concerned, there were rarely many worried friends and family members insisting on finding out exactly what happened, and many privately believed that "tarts" such as Rees and Figg had only themselves to blame. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Even fellow prostitutes regarded the deaths as the equivalent of industrial accidents — unfortunate but inevitable given the dangers inherent in their line of work.
Yet within a few months, this unloved sector of London society would be walking the streets in a climate of fear the like of which they had never experienced.
Gwynneth Rees
Gwynneth Rees
Rees' body, naked but for a nylon stocking, was found barely a mile along the riverbank from Elizabeth Figg's, on a garbage dump on the opposite side of the river, on November 8, 1963. A post-mortem revealed several teeth were missing and she had in all likelihood been strangled with a ligature. She had been last seen nearly six weeks earlier, getting into a car with a man on the night of September 29, 1963.
When police looked into her background, they found no shortage of potential suspects.
Rees was ponced for a time by Cornelius "Connie" Whitehead, a violent criminal who would later be convicted as an associate of notorious East End gangsters, the Kray Twins. He thought nothing of delivering regular "whackings" to his girls, which may have been one reason why Rees left him shortly before her disappearance and he was reportedly looking for her.
The Kray Twins
The Kray Twins
That summer she had become pregnant. This was another common predicament for prostitutes in the days before the contraceptive pill became widely available, since insisting on the use of condoms was likely to reduce your appeal to potential clients. She already had two children (neither of which were in her care), and abortion was still illegal in the UK at that time. Fellow prostitutes said that at the time of her disappearance she had been looking to contact an illegal abortionist she knew of.
Two terminations she had previously undergone had left her with an infection of the fallopian tubes. That was hardly surprising given the methods used. Typically these amateur physicians would fill a syringe with boiling water, antiseptic and melted soap and squirt the resulting liquid deep inside the hapless patient, aiming to trigger a miscarriage within 48 hours. It usually worked, but there were obvious dangers associated with it, such as the above-mentioned condition, or even blood poisoning. Yet investigators had to ask themselves: even if Rees had died as a result of the abortion, and certain guilty parties had to get rid of the body, why dispose of her naked corpse on a garbage heap by the Thames, where it was always likely to be discovered? And why strangle her? Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Whatever the cause of her death, once again police had precious little to go on other than speculation and casual suspicions. Inevitably, their investigations were hampered by the widespread disdain for the police that existed in the outlaw world which prostitutes inhabited.
Indeed, neither of the above cases lived long in Londoners' memory. Where prostitutes were concerned, there were rarely many worried friends and family members insisting on finding out exactly what happened, and many privately believed that "tarts" such as Rees and Figg had only themselves to blame. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Even fellow prostitutes regarded the deaths as the equivalent of industrial accidents — unfortunate but inevitable given the dangers inherent in their line of work.
Yet within a few months, this unloved sector of London society would be walking the streets in a climate of fear the like of which they had never experienced.
Thursday, July 30, 2009
Basic Terms of Peace between Japan and China
By establishing its attitude toward the negotiations on a broad scope, the Japanese government had, in its proposals, embraced all the existing problems. During a conversation on September 10, 1941 Ambassador Grew had submitted a question concerning mediation between Japan and China. Foreign Minister Toyoda had delivered to him the confidential terms of a fundamental peace between Japan and China, pointing out that they were not new proposals but merely clarification of the proposals submitted to America on September 4, 1941. Since the situation had grown more critical during the past month, the Japanese Foreign Minister urged Ambassador Nomura to impress the authorities of the United States with the necessity of reaching a successful agreement without further delay.[335]
According to Mr. Toyoda, from the time that the American newspapers had begun to editorialize on the Japanese-American negotiations, these negotiations had become a major topic of conversation throughout the entire world. Within four or five days, the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact would be celebrated. In spite of the fact that the Japanese government desired that the day's activities be conducted in a calm manner, the Japanese Foreign Minister was well aware that an anti-American group within the country would take the opportunity to threaten Japanese-American relations by provoking incidents. Since it was obvious that Japan's internal situation was extremely critical, Foreign Minister Toyoda directed Ambassador Nomura to inform Secretary Hull immediately of the details of his conversation with Ambassador Grew and to request a prompt reply.[336]
[333] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 631-633.
[334] III, 193.
[335] III, 194.
[336] III, 195.
[72]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
81. Ambassador Nomura Forwards a Japanese Report on America's Attitude Toward War
In summarizing a Japanese report on the American attitude toward war in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, Ambassador Nomura, in a message to Tokyo on September 22, 1941,[337] discussed the desire of the United States to adopt any plan which would bring about the ultimate destruction of Germany. In order to prevent Soviet Russia from making a separate peace, England and the United States had rendered all possible assistance, hoping to maintain Russia's fighting strength for an offensive in the spring provided its troops survived the winter months. By contributing millions of dollars for equipment, the United States also hoped to strengthen Britain's will to continue the fight.
Because the strength of the American Navy was increasing constantly, the submarine menace in the Atlantic did not cause as much alarm as formerly, although the United States recognized that utter annihilation of the submarine was impossible.[338] According to the Japanese report, the American attitude toward war as a general rule was extremely casual. If war with Japan did develop the American public would accept it as inevitable.
Because of their economic superiority over Japan, the American people believed that it would be a naval war primarily, and that the United States would be victorious after a very short struggle. Only a few were fully aware of the dangers involved in war with Japan. There still remained those who argued against reaching a peace at the expense of China.[339]
According to an article written in the New York Times, attempts to ameliorate the situation existing between Japan and the United States were dead-locked because Japan's continued occupation of China was against the fundamental principles laid down by the United States. For this reason, Prime Minister Konoye had requested a personal conference with President Roosevelt.[340]
Public opinion in the United States held that in view of Germany's war aims a non-aggressive American policy would result only in failure. Believing that Italy would withdraw from the war, that occupied nations would uprise and, finally, that the endurance of the German people themselves would fail, Americans continued to believe that participation in a war would not be fatal. If they went to war with Japan, the American people felt that naval participation alone was sufficient, and that no expeditionary forces would be dispatched on a large scale.
Nevertheless, certain preparations were being undertaken by military authorities. In Congress, where the majority backed the government's foreign policy, a sharp decline in the strength of the isolationist group was noted.[341]
President Roosevelt had given consideration to the possibility that in case Soviet Russia fell, a Japanese aggression would cause a simultaneous clash in both the Atlantic and Pacific. However, the greater portion of the American Navy still remained in the Pacific.
With regard to Japanese peace terms, it was rumored that Japan was demanding treaty ports in four southern provinces of China. Although the United States did not wish to sacrifice China to Japan, if Japan gave up forceful aggression, the United States would not only restore trade relations with Japan but would even render economic assistance. Ambassador Nomura expressed his opinion of this report by stating that the observer "had hit the nail on the head".[342]
[337] III, 196.
[338] Ibid.
[339] III, 197.
[340] Ibid.
[341] III, 198.
[342] III, 199.
[73]
82. Japan Explains Its Retaining of Troops in China
At Mr. Terasaki's request, Mr. Dooman, Counselor to the American Embassy in Japan, called on the Japanese Foreign Office.[343] A statement, supplementing those made to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda on the previous day and outlining Japan's reasons for retaining troops in China, had been prepared for communication to Ambassador Grew and for subsequent transmission to the United States government.[344]
In this document the Japanese government stated that in order to aid in the construction of a peaceful China and to ensure the security and defense of Japan itself, it recognized the necessity of stationing Japanese armed forces in certain areas of China. Because the uncertainty of internal stability in China had always proved a source of danger, Japan feared that intrigue, instigated by external sources, might follow the conclusion of the war between these two countries. The activities of the Communistic elements had already been detrimental to the maintenance of peace, and Japan felt that if such conditions were to recur any promotion of China's national life or welfare would be greatly impeded.[345]
From the economic standpoint alone, it was obvious that the activities of any neighboring territories would effect Japan's existence. Moreover, in view of the warlike attitude prevalent throughout the world, the defense of Japan could be endangered by any sudden unfavorable situation in China. Although Japan was prepared to withdraw armed forces wherever their presence was no longer required, it was imperative that a nucleus of Japanese troops be retained in certain areas of China. Any proposal to maintain peace by the stationing of international armed forces was inacceptable because of public opinion in China and because of the direct influence the internal condition of China had upon Japan.[346]
83. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 23, 1941)
(a) State Department's Report[347]
Upon his own request, Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apartment on September 23, 1941. Handing Secretary Hull a copy of the "Basic Terms of Peace between Japan and China"[348] and also a document entitled "A Reply to the American Communication of September 10, 1941",[349] Ambassador Nomura announced that these documents contained a full explanation of Japan's attitude regarding the disputable points in its recent proposals. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Ambassador Nomura said that any further clarification of the Tripartite Pact's effect upon Japan might best be left for discussion at the proposed meeting between the government heads.
Another document delivered to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 23, 1941 defined the phrase "equitable basis" to mean economic activities which were neither monopolistic, exclusive nor exploitative in nature, but which were based on the policy of nondiscrimination insofar as natural limitations permitted. Japan did not intend to be the sole
[343] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 634.
[344] Ibid.
[345] "Oral statement made to the Counselor of the American Embassy in Japan (Dooman) by the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office (Terasaki)", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 640-641. Foreign Minister Toyoda sent Mr. Koshu a copy of this document on September 23, 1941 with instructions to deliver it to Secretary Hull. See III, 200.
[346] Ibid.
[347] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 23, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 634-635.
[348] This document was handed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Matsuoka on September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 633. For the English text sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 22, 1941, see III, 191-192.
[349] This document was a copy of the one handed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 13, 1941, (see S.D., II, 623-624), and wired to Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941, see III, 175-176. Ambassador Nomura referred to it in his conversation with Secretary Hull on September 9, 1941, see S.D., II, 629-631 and III, 186-188.
[74]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
interpreter of this term. This document was not mentioned in the State Department's report of this conversation, but its text has been printed in the official documents and Ambassador Nomura referred to it in his report of this interview.[350]
After promising to study these papers as expeditiously as possible, Secretary Hull inquired concerning Ambassador Nomura's impressions regarding the present situation. Stating that he appreciated the position of the United States, Ambassador Nomura pointed to the domestic difficulties in Japan. If the meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye could be effected, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the psychological reaction in Japan would be extremely favorable to the re-establishment of friendly relations with America.
After referring to a previous American suggestion that the Japanese government assert control over public opinion and in this way attain support for the liberal program to be adopted by Japan and the United States, Secretary Hull asked if Ambassador Nomura believed that a conference between the heads of the two governments would actually be more effective. According to Ambassador Nomura efforts had already been made to influence Japanese public opinion, and favorable results had been achieved. Nevertheless, a meeting between the leaders of the two governments would provide not only support for those elements desiring peaceful negotiations with the United States, but it would also counteract the pro-Axis factions in Japan.
Secretary Hull then reiterated his belief that both Japan and the United States would gain more from peaceful collaboration than by forceful opposition to one another's policies. Pointing to Germany as an example of the difficulties resulting from excessive expenditures for armaments, Secretary Hull remarked that no country could benefit from the staggering cost of an attempted world conquest. Ambassador Nomura agreed fully with his views.[351]
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report
Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on September 23, 1941 that in order to communicate Foreign Minister Toyoda's interpretation of various paragraphs and phrases in the Japanese proposals which had been questioned by the United States, and at the same time to deliver a copy of the Japanese definition of "equitable basis", he had called on the Secretary of State on September 23, 1941.[352]
On presenting the outline of Japan's terms of peace with China, the Japanese Ambassador had pointed out that these latest documents, coupled with previous statements made by the Japanese government, had completely explained all Japanese policies. Therefore, no further explanation would be made to either Secretary Hull in Washington, or Ambassador Grew in Tokyo, and all matters pertaining to the Tripartite Pact would be left for the meeting between the leaders of both countries except those points which had already been discussed at preliminary conferences. Ambassador Nomura stated that these latest Japanese proposals were intended to enlarge rather than narrow the scope of the original American proposals.[353]
Because of certain Axis elements, domestic problems in Japan had become increasingly critical. Therefore, the Japanese government sincerely desired that a decision be reached
[350] "Document handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 636. This term was interpreted during Foreign Minister Toyoda's conversation with Ambassador Grew on September 13, 1941, see S.D., II, 622. It was sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941, see III, 177-178.
[351] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 23, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 634-635.
[352] III, 201.
[353] Ibid.
[75]
regarding the "leaders conference" before the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact was celebrated in Japan on September 27, 1941.[354]
Assuring Ambassador Nomura that he was devoting every effort to the materialization of the leaders conference, Secretary Hull stated that it was desirable, however, that the Japanese government first influence Japanese public opinion to adopt an attitude more favorable to the United States. Ambassador Nomura replied that Japan had been able to improve conditions in this regard.
In Ambassador Nomura's personal opinion, conformity with the Tripartite Pact and improvement of American-Japanese relations could be handled along parallel lines by the Japanese government, and a meeting of the leaders would strengthen peace in the Pacific.[355] At this point Secretary Hull informed Ambassador Nomura that he had received Ambassador Grew's report of the conference with Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 22, 1941.[356] Since the points discussed in this conference were now under careful consideration, Secretary Hull hoped to be able to reply in the near future. Ambassador Nomura then attempted to have Secretary Hull express a favorable opinion toward the materialization of the "leaders conference", but the Secretary of State refused to make a definite commitment.
In view of the existing international situation, however, Secretary Hull believed that now was the time for the United States and Japan to work toward the reconstruction of a peaceful world. But although Japan and the United States were ideally situated to lead world affairs, Secretary Hull doubted if the caliber of the statesmanship of both countries was capable of undertaking such a vast problem.
Firmly convinced that the meeting between the two leaders would immeasurably strengthen both governments' stand in the Pacific and would aid world peace, Ambassador Nomura once more urged that Secretary Hull work toward this goal.[357]
84. Ambassador Nomura Asks Tokyo To Clarify Its Proposals
After holding a telephone conversation with Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 24, 1941, Ambassador Nomura requested in a dispatch to the Japanese Foreign Minister on September 24, 1941 that certain points discussed be further clarified.[358] In accordance with instructions from his government, Ambassador Nomura had informed Secretary Hull in a conference on September 23, 1941 that the Japanese government had nothing more to say in regard to the various proposals it had extended to the United States. At present, Ambassador Nomura was marking time while waiting for a reply from Secretary Hull.[359]
In acknowledging receipt of a message from Tokyo on the preceding day, Ambassador Nomura stated that he did not fully understand the reasons offered by Foreign Minister Toyoda in explanation of the necessity for retaining Japanese troops in specified areas of China. The Japanese Ambassador feared that the United States would interpret the statement as a plan to station Japanese troops anywhere at all throughout the length and breadth of China. Anxious to carry out fully the Japanese government's instructions, Ambassador Nomura asked that a written explanation of the proposed peace plans, mentioned by the Japanese Foreign Minister in his Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
telephone conversation, be forwarded to him immediately.[360]
[354] III, 195.
[355] III, 201
[356] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 631-633.
[357] III, 201.
[358] III, 202.
[359] Ibid.
[360] III, 203.
[76]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
85. Japanese Spies Disclose American Attitude Toward Japan
While Japan waited for the United States' answer to its proposals, their espionage agents attempted to determine the American attitude toward the present negotiations. Mr. Morishima, head of Japanese espionage activities in the United States, sent a special report to Tokyo on September 26, 1941.[361]
Mr. Morishima stated that because Prime Minister Konoye had initiated negotiations with the United States, and had taken a temperate stand with regard to the navigation of American tankers, Washington officials concluded that Japan was in a desperate condition. Consequently, at the time of Prince Konoye's return to power, Washington believed that an understanding with Japan could be reached.[362]
The delay in reaching the understanding, however, had been occasioned by the constantly growing suspicion that the present Japanese policy of appeasement was motivated by the desire to gain time, while Germany won a decisive victory in Russia. Gradually, the American officials had begun to feel that no agreement should be reached at the expense of China.
Though desiring to effect a satisfactory compromise with Japan, the United States believed that any agreement concerning Japanese problems also involved England, Soviet Russia, and the Far East. As far as the European war was concerned, America had decided to maintain its present position of strengthening Allied resistance, since an Axis victory would gravely imperil American national defense. In case Germany should win on the Russian front, the United States felt the necessity of eliminating the threat which Japan constituted in the Pacific.[363]
Mr. Morishima declared that America would first try to ensure that Japan would refrain from further invasion before amending its relations with the government at Tokyo. If Japan revised its intention to seize territory an understanding would be possible immediately, but no temporary agreement would be considered, merely for expediency's sake. Despite all negotiations, the United States planned to send a military mission to China and to continue furnishing lend-lease material to China until definite assurance was given that Japan would cease Far Eastern aggression.[364]
According to Mr. Morishima's information, it seemed evident that the United States would carry through its vast plans for the reconstruction and cultivation of China in spite of any agreement concluded with Japan. Since America's expressed desires did not coincide with Japan's national policy, a strong faction in Japan disapproved of the present attempts for establishing amity between the two countries. Similarly, in the United States, an anti-Japanese wing, encouraged by Chungking, spread propaganda to the effect that a Japanese-American rapprochement would involve the sacrifice of China.[365]
By maintaining close contact with the American society called The Friends of China, the Chungking government was opposing a Japanese-American rapprochement. Furthermore, The American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression had initiated a campaign for economic pressure against Japan, and was opposing the efforts of both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to settle these problems peacefully.[366]
[361] III, 204.
[362] Ibid.
[363] III, 205.
[364] III, 206.
[365] III, 207.
[366] III, 208.
[77]
86. Foreign Minister Toyoda Urges Increased Diplomatic Efficiency
During the period of diplomatic crisis, Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that only exceptional statesmanship on the part of Foreign Office officials would enable the Japanese government to obtain its desired objectives. Therefore, while the frank expression of opinions from Japanese officials abroad were still welcomed, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that no action be taken which might impair the solidarity of Foreign Office personnel or interfere with the execution of Japanese Foreign Office policy. In a message on September 26, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked that all Japanese Ambassadors inspire the members of these offices to achieve a maximum diplomatic efficiency.[367]
87. Foreign Minister Toyoda Forbids Textual Changes By Ambassador Nomura
Although realizing the difficulties currently experienced by Ambassador Nomura in the execution of his duties and appreciating fully that Ambassador Nomura had views divergent from his own, Foreign Minister Toyoda, nevertheless, requested on September 26, 1941, that no changes be made in any Japanese communications without first asking permission from the Foreign Office in Tokyo.[368] The Japanese Foreign Minister had previously notified Ambassador Nomura that the texts of the messages from Tokyo were composed only after careful deliberation by the various Japanese ministries involved.[369]
Turning next to the basic terms of peace between Japan and China which had been recently sent from Tokyo, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked whether Ambassador Nomura had found an opportunity to present them to Secretary Hull. Referring to the recent conversation held between President Roosevelt and Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Foreign Minister asked whether President Roosevelt had mentioned a promise made by Japan that there would be no further increase of troops stationed in French Indo-China in order to ensure the success of Japanese-American negotiations.
Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that the American President had referred to this promise when "with smiling cynicism" he had stated that Japan might occupy Thailand while Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt were holding their peace conference, just as Japanese troops had marched into French Indo-China while Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull had conducted informal peace negotiations.
Because of the hostile attitude of Germany toward the proposed understanding between Japan and the United States, and the increasing international tension, Foreign Minister Toyoda requested that Ambassador Nomura interview the American officials to ascertain their views on all problems involved in the negotiations.[370]
88. Ambassador Nomura Answers Foreign Minister Toyoda's Message
Replying to Foreign Minister Toyoda on the same day, September 26, 1941, Ambassador Nomura stated that he had already communicated his government's basic terms for peace between Japan and China to the American authorities. In referring to Foreign Minister Toyoda's questions regarding President Roosevelt's statement, Ambassador Nomura insisted that the American President had made no mention of any Japanese promise to avoid stationing troops in French Indo-China, nor had he inquired concerning the number of troops already stationed there.
[367] III, 209.
[368] III, 210.
[369] Ibid.
[370] Ibid.
[78]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
In the conversation that was to take place between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura later in the day, the Japanese Ambassador promised to convey Foreign Minister Toyoda's reasons for maintaining troops in a certain specified area of China, and also to hand Secretary Hull the text of the proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.
Ambassador Nomura also assured Foreign Minister Toyoda that he neither added nor subtracted from the messages or instructions sent to him by his government. However, the English text of messages sent from Tokyo often differed from the original Japanese text and in view of this, Ambassador Nomura suggested that Foreign Minister Toyoda check the English translations more thoroughly before sending them.[371]
89. Ambassador Nomura Sends Japanese Proposals to Secretary Hull (September 27, 1941)
Under his government's instructions, on September 27, 1941 Ambassador Nomura sent Mr. Matsudaira to give Secretary Hull a copy of the Japanese proposals which had been delivered to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941.[372]
In Ambassador Nomura's covering note which was attached to the proposals, he stated that when handing to Ambassador Grew the original set of proposals, Mr. Terasaki had declared that the Japanese government was awaiting a reply from the United States regarding the projected meeting between the two government heads. In order to bring about this conference Japan had formulated a statement along the lines of the American Draft Understanding of June 21, 1941, incorporating all the proposals since communicated to the American government. Prepared solely for the convenience of the United States, these new proposals were not to be interpreted as an inflexible Japanese treaty.[373]
90. Ambassador Nomura Reports Discrepancy in Copies of Japanese Peace Terms
Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on September 27, 1941, a few days after delivering a copy of the Japanese government's terms for peace with China to Secretary Hull, that he had been notified by the State Department of certain discrepancies between the proposal handed to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo and that which he had given to the Secretary of State.[374] Mr. Ballantine of the State Department had pointed out that though the Japanese peace terms relayed from Ambassador Grew in Tokyo contained nine articles, the outline received from Ambassador Nomura contained only the first five articles. Since Ambassador Nomura had explained that there was always the possibility of errors in transmission, he requested in his report that Tokyo check the message in question and advise him of its findings.[375]
In reading Ambassador Nomura's report, it should be noted that despite Ambassador Nomura's seemingly honest bewilderment concerning this matter and his request to have Tokyo check on the transmission of the message, a copy of the original Japanese dispatch, sent by Tokyo on September 22, 1941, and now in American communication intelligence files, contains nine articles. It is not certain, therefore, whether the communication clerks in the Japanese Embassy did not receive the complete text, or whether accidentally or deliberately they did not deliver the complete text to Ambassador Nomura. Another possibility, which apparently does not hold in view of Ambassador Nomura's request for further check by Tokyo, is that the Japanese Ambassador deliberately omitted the last four articles for reasons of his own.
[371] III, 211.
[372] "The Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", September 27, 1941, S.D., II, 636. The Japanese translation of the resume in English of Mr. Terasaki's remarks was sent by Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo on September 25, 1941, III, 212.
[373] "Japan's proposals submitted to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 25, 1941, S.D., II, 637-640. For complete text sent by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura on September 25, 1941, see III, 213.
[374] III, 214.
[375] Ibid.
[79]
91. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 27, 1941)
(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[376]
Since Foreign Minister Toyoda received Ambassador Grew on September 27, 1941 immediately after attending various functions celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Ambassador Grew believed that the Japanese Foreign Minister wished to emphasize that Japan was still anxious to establish amicable negotiations with the United States. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
In reiterating Japan's desires to consummate the meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt, Foreign Minister Toyoda inquired if America had set forth its views regarding the Japanese proposal for a meeting of the two government heads. Ambassador Grew replied that the only information received from Secretary Hull had been the report that, during a discussion on September 23, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had handed the Secretary of State certain written material, which Secretary Hull promised to examine as expeditiously as possible in order to make a prompt reply.
The Japanese Foreign Minister then conveyed orally to Ambassador Grew various considerations regarding the position of the Japanese government in connection with the present informal conversations.[377] Pointing to the critical condition into which Europe had fallen as the result of a war which had involved various powers, Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that if the United States and Japan were to relinquish their hold over the key to peace in the Pacific, then world civilization would be imperiled.
Numerous incidents occurring between Japan and the United States had greatly disturbed peaceful relations, but if the conditions between Japan and the United States could be adjusted in a friendly manner, the effects would be felt throughout the world. It was for this reason that Japan was so determined to adjust any differences with the United States.
Upon assuming the post of Foreign Minister two months before, Admiral Toyoda had begun to work unceasingly toward the re-establishment of friendly relations between the two countries, and with the same objective in mind, Prime Minister Konoye had expressed his willingness to confer with President Roosevelt. Misunderstanding had arisen with Germany and Italy as a result of Prince Konoye's desire to meet with President Roosevelt, but Japan was willing to make sacrifices in order to demonstrate clearly its sincerity in desiring not only to adjust Japanese-American problems but also to maintain peace in the Pacific and to re-establish it in other areas of the world.
Moreover, though there was no precedent in Japanese history for a Prime Minister's going abroad to confer with the head of another government, Prince Konoye was motivated at this time by a sincere desire for peace. Nevertheless, Japan would not succumb to American pressure in reaching an understanding. Because of the allegations to the effect that Japan was being forced to its knees by the United States, which had been made in American newspapers, Foreign Minister Toyoda felt it necessary to repeat this fact.
Since Japanese-American relations were exceedingly complicated, it was quite possible that there would be many problems left unsettled at the conclusion of the meeting between the leaders of the two countries. The political effects of such an epochal meeting would greatly influence the settlement of any divergent views existing at present.
If the meeting did not materialize in spite of the fact that both countries were in accord as to its value and if the United States delayed too long in making a reply, it was doubtful whether
[376] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 27, 1941, S.D., II, 641-645.
[377] "For translation of Japanese text of Foreign Minister Toyoda's Oral Statement sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 27, 1941, see III, 215. A resume in English of this conversation was handed to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 29, 1941, S.D., II, 652-654.
[80]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
another favorable opportunity would soon occur. Since Japan had already announced the proposals it would make at the meeting by submitting a complete resume to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941, in accordance with the lines contained in the American proposal for June 21, 1941, the United States was fully aware of Japan's position.
All details connected with the transporting of Prime Minister Konoye and his party to the meeting place had been arranged, and Japan was in a position to hold the meeting at any time. Only a reply from the United States was necessary to complete the preparations already underway.
Foreign Minister Toyoda pointed out that any further delay would place the Japanese government in an exceedingly difficult position because the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact might be used by the pro-Axis elements in Japan to vitiate the efforts of the Japanese Cabinet to improve relations with the United States. Since time was of paramount importance, Japan suggested that the meeting be scheduled for some time between October 10 to October 15, 1941. If held any later, the weather in the north Pacific and along the Alaskan coast would be decidedly unfavorable.
In conducting a conference of this type, it was of the utmost importance that both countries respect the other's reliability and sincerity. Foreign Minister Toyoda felt sure that President Roosevelt fully appreciated Prime Minister Konoye's character and motives in this matter. Stating that the entire Japanese Cabinet was behind Prime Minister Konoye's move, including high army and navy officers who would attend the conference in order to dissipate doubt as to their collaboration with Prince Konoye's plans, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that the opportunity not be lost to adjust Japanese-American relations by a conference between the leaders of both countries.
In conclusion, the Japanese Foreign Minister expressed the hope that none of his statements would be misinterpreted or considered as setting a time limit upon any reply from the American government.[378]
(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[379]
Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura on September 22, 1941 that after the ceremonies celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1941 had taken place, he had requested Ambassador Grew to call upon him. After talking to the American Ambassador along the lines of his special report to Ambassador Nomura, Foreign Minister Toyoda again strongly urged that Ambassador Grew recommend to the United States that the meeting of the leaders of the two governments take place without further delay.
In view of both internal and external circumstances affecting Japanese policies, it would be impossible to postpone the meeting indefinitely. Foreign Minister Toyoda instructed Ambassador Nomura, when speaking with American officials, to place the primary emphasis on the materialization of this proposed conference.[380]
Foreign Minister Toyoda was particularly anxious to have Ambassador Nomura emphasize the fact that although the Japanese government had made its final statement with regard to the negotiations, it did not consider that all questions and answers were now useless. Foreign Minister Toyoda welcomed any questions and was anxious to respond cordially to them, but since the United States government had not sent a single query since September 10, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda was deeply concerned.
[378] Ibid.
[379] III, 216.
[380] Ibid.
[81]
According to Mr. Toyoda, from the time that the American newspapers had begun to editorialize on the Japanese-American negotiations, these negotiations had become a major topic of conversation throughout the entire world. Within four or five days, the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact would be celebrated. In spite of the fact that the Japanese government desired that the day's activities be conducted in a calm manner, the Japanese Foreign Minister was well aware that an anti-American group within the country would take the opportunity to threaten Japanese-American relations by provoking incidents. Since it was obvious that Japan's internal situation was extremely critical, Foreign Minister Toyoda directed Ambassador Nomura to inform Secretary Hull immediately of the details of his conversation with Ambassador Grew and to request a prompt reply.[336]
[333] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 631-633.
[334] III, 193.
[335] III, 194.
[336] III, 195.
[72]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
81. Ambassador Nomura Forwards a Japanese Report on America's Attitude Toward War
In summarizing a Japanese report on the American attitude toward war in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, Ambassador Nomura, in a message to Tokyo on September 22, 1941,[337] discussed the desire of the United States to adopt any plan which would bring about the ultimate destruction of Germany. In order to prevent Soviet Russia from making a separate peace, England and the United States had rendered all possible assistance, hoping to maintain Russia's fighting strength for an offensive in the spring provided its troops survived the winter months. By contributing millions of dollars for equipment, the United States also hoped to strengthen Britain's will to continue the fight.
Because the strength of the American Navy was increasing constantly, the submarine menace in the Atlantic did not cause as much alarm as formerly, although the United States recognized that utter annihilation of the submarine was impossible.[338] According to the Japanese report, the American attitude toward war as a general rule was extremely casual. If war with Japan did develop the American public would accept it as inevitable.
Because of their economic superiority over Japan, the American people believed that it would be a naval war primarily, and that the United States would be victorious after a very short struggle. Only a few were fully aware of the dangers involved in war with Japan. There still remained those who argued against reaching a peace at the expense of China.[339]
According to an article written in the New York Times, attempts to ameliorate the situation existing between Japan and the United States were dead-locked because Japan's continued occupation of China was against the fundamental principles laid down by the United States. For this reason, Prime Minister Konoye had requested a personal conference with President Roosevelt.[340]
Public opinion in the United States held that in view of Germany's war aims a non-aggressive American policy would result only in failure. Believing that Italy would withdraw from the war, that occupied nations would uprise and, finally, that the endurance of the German people themselves would fail, Americans continued to believe that participation in a war would not be fatal. If they went to war with Japan, the American people felt that naval participation alone was sufficient, and that no expeditionary forces would be dispatched on a large scale.
Nevertheless, certain preparations were being undertaken by military authorities. In Congress, where the majority backed the government's foreign policy, a sharp decline in the strength of the isolationist group was noted.[341]
President Roosevelt had given consideration to the possibility that in case Soviet Russia fell, a Japanese aggression would cause a simultaneous clash in both the Atlantic and Pacific. However, the greater portion of the American Navy still remained in the Pacific.
With regard to Japanese peace terms, it was rumored that Japan was demanding treaty ports in four southern provinces of China. Although the United States did not wish to sacrifice China to Japan, if Japan gave up forceful aggression, the United States would not only restore trade relations with Japan but would even render economic assistance. Ambassador Nomura expressed his opinion of this report by stating that the observer "had hit the nail on the head".[342]
[337] III, 196.
[338] Ibid.
[339] III, 197.
[340] Ibid.
[341] III, 198.
[342] III, 199.
[73]
82. Japan Explains Its Retaining of Troops in China
At Mr. Terasaki's request, Mr. Dooman, Counselor to the American Embassy in Japan, called on the Japanese Foreign Office.[343] A statement, supplementing those made to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda on the previous day and outlining Japan's reasons for retaining troops in China, had been prepared for communication to Ambassador Grew and for subsequent transmission to the United States government.[344]
In this document the Japanese government stated that in order to aid in the construction of a peaceful China and to ensure the security and defense of Japan itself, it recognized the necessity of stationing Japanese armed forces in certain areas of China. Because the uncertainty of internal stability in China had always proved a source of danger, Japan feared that intrigue, instigated by external sources, might follow the conclusion of the war between these two countries. The activities of the Communistic elements had already been detrimental to the maintenance of peace, and Japan felt that if such conditions were to recur any promotion of China's national life or welfare would be greatly impeded.[345]
From the economic standpoint alone, it was obvious that the activities of any neighboring territories would effect Japan's existence. Moreover, in view of the warlike attitude prevalent throughout the world, the defense of Japan could be endangered by any sudden unfavorable situation in China. Although Japan was prepared to withdraw armed forces wherever their presence was no longer required, it was imperative that a nucleus of Japanese troops be retained in certain areas of China. Any proposal to maintain peace by the stationing of international armed forces was inacceptable because of public opinion in China and because of the direct influence the internal condition of China had upon Japan.[346]
83. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 23, 1941)
(a) State Department's Report[347]
Upon his own request, Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apartment on September 23, 1941. Handing Secretary Hull a copy of the "Basic Terms of Peace between Japan and China"[348] and also a document entitled "A Reply to the American Communication of September 10, 1941",[349] Ambassador Nomura announced that these documents contained a full explanation of Japan's attitude regarding the disputable points in its recent proposals. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Ambassador Nomura said that any further clarification of the Tripartite Pact's effect upon Japan might best be left for discussion at the proposed meeting between the government heads.
Another document delivered to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 23, 1941 defined the phrase "equitable basis" to mean economic activities which were neither monopolistic, exclusive nor exploitative in nature, but which were based on the policy of nondiscrimination insofar as natural limitations permitted. Japan did not intend to be the sole
[343] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 634.
[344] Ibid.
[345] "Oral statement made to the Counselor of the American Embassy in Japan (Dooman) by the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office (Terasaki)", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 640-641. Foreign Minister Toyoda sent Mr. Koshu a copy of this document on September 23, 1941 with instructions to deliver it to Secretary Hull. See III, 200.
[346] Ibid.
[347] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 23, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 634-635.
[348] This document was handed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Matsuoka on September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 633. For the English text sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 22, 1941, see III, 191-192.
[349] This document was a copy of the one handed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 13, 1941, (see S.D., II, 623-624), and wired to Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941, see III, 175-176. Ambassador Nomura referred to it in his conversation with Secretary Hull on September 9, 1941, see S.D., II, 629-631 and III, 186-188.
[74]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
interpreter of this term. This document was not mentioned in the State Department's report of this conversation, but its text has been printed in the official documents and Ambassador Nomura referred to it in his report of this interview.[350]
After promising to study these papers as expeditiously as possible, Secretary Hull inquired concerning Ambassador Nomura's impressions regarding the present situation. Stating that he appreciated the position of the United States, Ambassador Nomura pointed to the domestic difficulties in Japan. If the meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye could be effected, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the psychological reaction in Japan would be extremely favorable to the re-establishment of friendly relations with America.
After referring to a previous American suggestion that the Japanese government assert control over public opinion and in this way attain support for the liberal program to be adopted by Japan and the United States, Secretary Hull asked if Ambassador Nomura believed that a conference between the heads of the two governments would actually be more effective. According to Ambassador Nomura efforts had already been made to influence Japanese public opinion, and favorable results had been achieved. Nevertheless, a meeting between the leaders of the two governments would provide not only support for those elements desiring peaceful negotiations with the United States, but it would also counteract the pro-Axis factions in Japan.
Secretary Hull then reiterated his belief that both Japan and the United States would gain more from peaceful collaboration than by forceful opposition to one another's policies. Pointing to Germany as an example of the difficulties resulting from excessive expenditures for armaments, Secretary Hull remarked that no country could benefit from the staggering cost of an attempted world conquest. Ambassador Nomura agreed fully with his views.[351]
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report
Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on September 23, 1941 that in order to communicate Foreign Minister Toyoda's interpretation of various paragraphs and phrases in the Japanese proposals which had been questioned by the United States, and at the same time to deliver a copy of the Japanese definition of "equitable basis", he had called on the Secretary of State on September 23, 1941.[352]
On presenting the outline of Japan's terms of peace with China, the Japanese Ambassador had pointed out that these latest documents, coupled with previous statements made by the Japanese government, had completely explained all Japanese policies. Therefore, no further explanation would be made to either Secretary Hull in Washington, or Ambassador Grew in Tokyo, and all matters pertaining to the Tripartite Pact would be left for the meeting between the leaders of both countries except those points which had already been discussed at preliminary conferences. Ambassador Nomura stated that these latest Japanese proposals were intended to enlarge rather than narrow the scope of the original American proposals.[353]
Because of certain Axis elements, domestic problems in Japan had become increasingly critical. Therefore, the Japanese government sincerely desired that a decision be reached
[350] "Document handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 636. This term was interpreted during Foreign Minister Toyoda's conversation with Ambassador Grew on September 13, 1941, see S.D., II, 622. It was sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941, see III, 177-178.
[351] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 23, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 634-635.
[352] III, 201.
[353] Ibid.
[75]
regarding the "leaders conference" before the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact was celebrated in Japan on September 27, 1941.[354]
Assuring Ambassador Nomura that he was devoting every effort to the materialization of the leaders conference, Secretary Hull stated that it was desirable, however, that the Japanese government first influence Japanese public opinion to adopt an attitude more favorable to the United States. Ambassador Nomura replied that Japan had been able to improve conditions in this regard.
In Ambassador Nomura's personal opinion, conformity with the Tripartite Pact and improvement of American-Japanese relations could be handled along parallel lines by the Japanese government, and a meeting of the leaders would strengthen peace in the Pacific.[355] At this point Secretary Hull informed Ambassador Nomura that he had received Ambassador Grew's report of the conference with Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 22, 1941.[356] Since the points discussed in this conference were now under careful consideration, Secretary Hull hoped to be able to reply in the near future. Ambassador Nomura then attempted to have Secretary Hull express a favorable opinion toward the materialization of the "leaders conference", but the Secretary of State refused to make a definite commitment.
In view of the existing international situation, however, Secretary Hull believed that now was the time for the United States and Japan to work toward the reconstruction of a peaceful world. But although Japan and the United States were ideally situated to lead world affairs, Secretary Hull doubted if the caliber of the statesmanship of both countries was capable of undertaking such a vast problem.
Firmly convinced that the meeting between the two leaders would immeasurably strengthen both governments' stand in the Pacific and would aid world peace, Ambassador Nomura once more urged that Secretary Hull work toward this goal.[357]
84. Ambassador Nomura Asks Tokyo To Clarify Its Proposals
After holding a telephone conversation with Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 24, 1941, Ambassador Nomura requested in a dispatch to the Japanese Foreign Minister on September 24, 1941 that certain points discussed be further clarified.[358] In accordance with instructions from his government, Ambassador Nomura had informed Secretary Hull in a conference on September 23, 1941 that the Japanese government had nothing more to say in regard to the various proposals it had extended to the United States. At present, Ambassador Nomura was marking time while waiting for a reply from Secretary Hull.[359]
In acknowledging receipt of a message from Tokyo on the preceding day, Ambassador Nomura stated that he did not fully understand the reasons offered by Foreign Minister Toyoda in explanation of the necessity for retaining Japanese troops in specified areas of China. The Japanese Ambassador feared that the United States would interpret the statement as a plan to station Japanese troops anywhere at all throughout the length and breadth of China. Anxious to carry out fully the Japanese government's instructions, Ambassador Nomura asked that a written explanation of the proposed peace plans, mentioned by the Japanese Foreign Minister in his Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
telephone conversation, be forwarded to him immediately.[360]
[354] III, 195.
[355] III, 201
[356] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 631-633.
[357] III, 201.
[358] III, 202.
[359] Ibid.
[360] III, 203.
[76]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
85. Japanese Spies Disclose American Attitude Toward Japan
While Japan waited for the United States' answer to its proposals, their espionage agents attempted to determine the American attitude toward the present negotiations. Mr. Morishima, head of Japanese espionage activities in the United States, sent a special report to Tokyo on September 26, 1941.[361]
Mr. Morishima stated that because Prime Minister Konoye had initiated negotiations with the United States, and had taken a temperate stand with regard to the navigation of American tankers, Washington officials concluded that Japan was in a desperate condition. Consequently, at the time of Prince Konoye's return to power, Washington believed that an understanding with Japan could be reached.[362]
The delay in reaching the understanding, however, had been occasioned by the constantly growing suspicion that the present Japanese policy of appeasement was motivated by the desire to gain time, while Germany won a decisive victory in Russia. Gradually, the American officials had begun to feel that no agreement should be reached at the expense of China.
Though desiring to effect a satisfactory compromise with Japan, the United States believed that any agreement concerning Japanese problems also involved England, Soviet Russia, and the Far East. As far as the European war was concerned, America had decided to maintain its present position of strengthening Allied resistance, since an Axis victory would gravely imperil American national defense. In case Germany should win on the Russian front, the United States felt the necessity of eliminating the threat which Japan constituted in the Pacific.[363]
Mr. Morishima declared that America would first try to ensure that Japan would refrain from further invasion before amending its relations with the government at Tokyo. If Japan revised its intention to seize territory an understanding would be possible immediately, but no temporary agreement would be considered, merely for expediency's sake. Despite all negotiations, the United States planned to send a military mission to China and to continue furnishing lend-lease material to China until definite assurance was given that Japan would cease Far Eastern aggression.[364]
According to Mr. Morishima's information, it seemed evident that the United States would carry through its vast plans for the reconstruction and cultivation of China in spite of any agreement concluded with Japan. Since America's expressed desires did not coincide with Japan's national policy, a strong faction in Japan disapproved of the present attempts for establishing amity between the two countries. Similarly, in the United States, an anti-Japanese wing, encouraged by Chungking, spread propaganda to the effect that a Japanese-American rapprochement would involve the sacrifice of China.[365]
By maintaining close contact with the American society called The Friends of China, the Chungking government was opposing a Japanese-American rapprochement. Furthermore, The American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression had initiated a campaign for economic pressure against Japan, and was opposing the efforts of both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to settle these problems peacefully.[366]
[361] III, 204.
[362] Ibid.
[363] III, 205.
[364] III, 206.
[365] III, 207.
[366] III, 208.
[77]
86. Foreign Minister Toyoda Urges Increased Diplomatic Efficiency
During the period of diplomatic crisis, Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that only exceptional statesmanship on the part of Foreign Office officials would enable the Japanese government to obtain its desired objectives. Therefore, while the frank expression of opinions from Japanese officials abroad were still welcomed, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that no action be taken which might impair the solidarity of Foreign Office personnel or interfere with the execution of Japanese Foreign Office policy. In a message on September 26, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked that all Japanese Ambassadors inspire the members of these offices to achieve a maximum diplomatic efficiency.[367]
87. Foreign Minister Toyoda Forbids Textual Changes By Ambassador Nomura
Although realizing the difficulties currently experienced by Ambassador Nomura in the execution of his duties and appreciating fully that Ambassador Nomura had views divergent from his own, Foreign Minister Toyoda, nevertheless, requested on September 26, 1941, that no changes be made in any Japanese communications without first asking permission from the Foreign Office in Tokyo.[368] The Japanese Foreign Minister had previously notified Ambassador Nomura that the texts of the messages from Tokyo were composed only after careful deliberation by the various Japanese ministries involved.[369]
Turning next to the basic terms of peace between Japan and China which had been recently sent from Tokyo, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked whether Ambassador Nomura had found an opportunity to present them to Secretary Hull. Referring to the recent conversation held between President Roosevelt and Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Foreign Minister asked whether President Roosevelt had mentioned a promise made by Japan that there would be no further increase of troops stationed in French Indo-China in order to ensure the success of Japanese-American negotiations.
Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that the American President had referred to this promise when "with smiling cynicism" he had stated that Japan might occupy Thailand while Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt were holding their peace conference, just as Japanese troops had marched into French Indo-China while Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull had conducted informal peace negotiations.
Because of the hostile attitude of Germany toward the proposed understanding between Japan and the United States, and the increasing international tension, Foreign Minister Toyoda requested that Ambassador Nomura interview the American officials to ascertain their views on all problems involved in the negotiations.[370]
88. Ambassador Nomura Answers Foreign Minister Toyoda's Message
Replying to Foreign Minister Toyoda on the same day, September 26, 1941, Ambassador Nomura stated that he had already communicated his government's basic terms for peace between Japan and China to the American authorities. In referring to Foreign Minister Toyoda's questions regarding President Roosevelt's statement, Ambassador Nomura insisted that the American President had made no mention of any Japanese promise to avoid stationing troops in French Indo-China, nor had he inquired concerning the number of troops already stationed there.
[367] III, 209.
[368] III, 210.
[369] Ibid.
[370] Ibid.
[78]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
In the conversation that was to take place between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura later in the day, the Japanese Ambassador promised to convey Foreign Minister Toyoda's reasons for maintaining troops in a certain specified area of China, and also to hand Secretary Hull the text of the proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.
Ambassador Nomura also assured Foreign Minister Toyoda that he neither added nor subtracted from the messages or instructions sent to him by his government. However, the English text of messages sent from Tokyo often differed from the original Japanese text and in view of this, Ambassador Nomura suggested that Foreign Minister Toyoda check the English translations more thoroughly before sending them.[371]
89. Ambassador Nomura Sends Japanese Proposals to Secretary Hull (September 27, 1941)
Under his government's instructions, on September 27, 1941 Ambassador Nomura sent Mr. Matsudaira to give Secretary Hull a copy of the Japanese proposals which had been delivered to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941.[372]
In Ambassador Nomura's covering note which was attached to the proposals, he stated that when handing to Ambassador Grew the original set of proposals, Mr. Terasaki had declared that the Japanese government was awaiting a reply from the United States regarding the projected meeting between the two government heads. In order to bring about this conference Japan had formulated a statement along the lines of the American Draft Understanding of June 21, 1941, incorporating all the proposals since communicated to the American government. Prepared solely for the convenience of the United States, these new proposals were not to be interpreted as an inflexible Japanese treaty.[373]
90. Ambassador Nomura Reports Discrepancy in Copies of Japanese Peace Terms
Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on September 27, 1941, a few days after delivering a copy of the Japanese government's terms for peace with China to Secretary Hull, that he had been notified by the State Department of certain discrepancies between the proposal handed to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo and that which he had given to the Secretary of State.[374] Mr. Ballantine of the State Department had pointed out that though the Japanese peace terms relayed from Ambassador Grew in Tokyo contained nine articles, the outline received from Ambassador Nomura contained only the first five articles. Since Ambassador Nomura had explained that there was always the possibility of errors in transmission, he requested in his report that Tokyo check the message in question and advise him of its findings.[375]
In reading Ambassador Nomura's report, it should be noted that despite Ambassador Nomura's seemingly honest bewilderment concerning this matter and his request to have Tokyo check on the transmission of the message, a copy of the original Japanese dispatch, sent by Tokyo on September 22, 1941, and now in American communication intelligence files, contains nine articles. It is not certain, therefore, whether the communication clerks in the Japanese Embassy did not receive the complete text, or whether accidentally or deliberately they did not deliver the complete text to Ambassador Nomura. Another possibility, which apparently does not hold in view of Ambassador Nomura's request for further check by Tokyo, is that the Japanese Ambassador deliberately omitted the last four articles for reasons of his own.
[371] III, 211.
[372] "The Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", September 27, 1941, S.D., II, 636. The Japanese translation of the resume in English of Mr. Terasaki's remarks was sent by Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo on September 25, 1941, III, 212.
[373] "Japan's proposals submitted to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 25, 1941, S.D., II, 637-640. For complete text sent by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura on September 25, 1941, see III, 213.
[374] III, 214.
[375] Ibid.
[79]
91. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 27, 1941)
(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[376]
Since Foreign Minister Toyoda received Ambassador Grew on September 27, 1941 immediately after attending various functions celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Ambassador Grew believed that the Japanese Foreign Minister wished to emphasize that Japan was still anxious to establish amicable negotiations with the United States. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
In reiterating Japan's desires to consummate the meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt, Foreign Minister Toyoda inquired if America had set forth its views regarding the Japanese proposal for a meeting of the two government heads. Ambassador Grew replied that the only information received from Secretary Hull had been the report that, during a discussion on September 23, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had handed the Secretary of State certain written material, which Secretary Hull promised to examine as expeditiously as possible in order to make a prompt reply.
The Japanese Foreign Minister then conveyed orally to Ambassador Grew various considerations regarding the position of the Japanese government in connection with the present informal conversations.[377] Pointing to the critical condition into which Europe had fallen as the result of a war which had involved various powers, Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that if the United States and Japan were to relinquish their hold over the key to peace in the Pacific, then world civilization would be imperiled.
Numerous incidents occurring between Japan and the United States had greatly disturbed peaceful relations, but if the conditions between Japan and the United States could be adjusted in a friendly manner, the effects would be felt throughout the world. It was for this reason that Japan was so determined to adjust any differences with the United States.
Upon assuming the post of Foreign Minister two months before, Admiral Toyoda had begun to work unceasingly toward the re-establishment of friendly relations between the two countries, and with the same objective in mind, Prime Minister Konoye had expressed his willingness to confer with President Roosevelt. Misunderstanding had arisen with Germany and Italy as a result of Prince Konoye's desire to meet with President Roosevelt, but Japan was willing to make sacrifices in order to demonstrate clearly its sincerity in desiring not only to adjust Japanese-American problems but also to maintain peace in the Pacific and to re-establish it in other areas of the world.
Moreover, though there was no precedent in Japanese history for a Prime Minister's going abroad to confer with the head of another government, Prince Konoye was motivated at this time by a sincere desire for peace. Nevertheless, Japan would not succumb to American pressure in reaching an understanding. Because of the allegations to the effect that Japan was being forced to its knees by the United States, which had been made in American newspapers, Foreign Minister Toyoda felt it necessary to repeat this fact.
Since Japanese-American relations were exceedingly complicated, it was quite possible that there would be many problems left unsettled at the conclusion of the meeting between the leaders of the two countries. The political effects of such an epochal meeting would greatly influence the settlement of any divergent views existing at present.
If the meeting did not materialize in spite of the fact that both countries were in accord as to its value and if the United States delayed too long in making a reply, it was doubtful whether
[376] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 27, 1941, S.D., II, 641-645.
[377] "For translation of Japanese text of Foreign Minister Toyoda's Oral Statement sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 27, 1941, see III, 215. A resume in English of this conversation was handed to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 29, 1941, S.D., II, 652-654.
[80]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
another favorable opportunity would soon occur. Since Japan had already announced the proposals it would make at the meeting by submitting a complete resume to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941, in accordance with the lines contained in the American proposal for June 21, 1941, the United States was fully aware of Japan's position.
All details connected with the transporting of Prime Minister Konoye and his party to the meeting place had been arranged, and Japan was in a position to hold the meeting at any time. Only a reply from the United States was necessary to complete the preparations already underway.
Foreign Minister Toyoda pointed out that any further delay would place the Japanese government in an exceedingly difficult position because the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact might be used by the pro-Axis elements in Japan to vitiate the efforts of the Japanese Cabinet to improve relations with the United States. Since time was of paramount importance, Japan suggested that the meeting be scheduled for some time between October 10 to October 15, 1941. If held any later, the weather in the north Pacific and along the Alaskan coast would be decidedly unfavorable.
In conducting a conference of this type, it was of the utmost importance that both countries respect the other's reliability and sincerity. Foreign Minister Toyoda felt sure that President Roosevelt fully appreciated Prime Minister Konoye's character and motives in this matter. Stating that the entire Japanese Cabinet was behind Prime Minister Konoye's move, including high army and navy officers who would attend the conference in order to dissipate doubt as to their collaboration with Prince Konoye's plans, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that the opportunity not be lost to adjust Japanese-American relations by a conference between the leaders of both countries.
In conclusion, the Japanese Foreign Minister expressed the hope that none of his statements would be misinterpreted or considered as setting a time limit upon any reply from the American government.[378]
(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[379]
Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura on September 22, 1941 that after the ceremonies celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1941 had taken place, he had requested Ambassador Grew to call upon him. After talking to the American Ambassador along the lines of his special report to Ambassador Nomura, Foreign Minister Toyoda again strongly urged that Ambassador Grew recommend to the United States that the meeting of the leaders of the two governments take place without further delay.
In view of both internal and external circumstances affecting Japanese policies, it would be impossible to postpone the meeting indefinitely. Foreign Minister Toyoda instructed Ambassador Nomura, when speaking with American officials, to place the primary emphasis on the materialization of this proposed conference.[380]
Foreign Minister Toyoda was particularly anxious to have Ambassador Nomura emphasize the fact that although the Japanese government had made its final statement with regard to the negotiations, it did not consider that all questions and answers were now useless. Foreign Minister Toyoda welcomed any questions and was anxious to respond cordially to them, but since the United States government had not sent a single query since September 10, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda was deeply concerned.
[378] Ibid.
[379] III, 216.
[380] Ibid.
[81]
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
recruit 3.rec.0 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Synopsis
A choir group, "Getting Gay With Kids," visits South Park to recruit more kids for their upcoming concert in Costa Rica for the benefit of the rain forests. The boys are forced to join by Mr. Mackey as a punishment for their unruly behavior in class. In Costa Rica, they leave the "comfort" of the capital to take a tour of a nearby rain forest. Their guide is eventually devoured by a snake, and they become stranded.
Full Recap
Miss Stevens is in Mr. Garrison's class recruiting students for a choir tour called "Getting Gay With Kids". They are going to Central America to help to save the Rainforest. Our boys cause trouble and are sent to the office. Kenny has fallen for one of the girls in the choir, so when Mr. Mackey punishes the boys by forcing them to join the choir, he is the only one who is happy about it. The children are on their way to San Jose, Costa Rica. Kenny meets with Kelly, who starts calling him Lenny, Benny and anything other than his name. Miss Stevens also tells Cartman that she plans on changing him; she's got a lot of work ahead of her. Miss Stevens brings the children to much the President of Costa Rica. The President offers them a tour of the rainforest, but first they do a preview concert. Miss Stevens is dismayed by Kyle's lack of rhythm.
On their tour of the rainforest, the children see the wonders of the rainforest, which Cartman keeps trying to beat. Their tour guide is killed and eaten by a snake. Miss Stevens and the children are on their own. Kelly tells Kenny that she likes him, which is bad for her, because she doesn't want her heart broken. Outside the rainforest, Mr. Mackey wonders what has happened to the choir. In the rainforest, Miss Stevens back is covered by a huge bug. They run into a group of revolutionaries. Miss Stevens tries to entertain the troops. They are going to be sent away, when government troops arrive starting a battle.
Miss Stevens and the children are still wandering around the rainforest. Back in San Jose, the concert is about an hour away from starting. Cartman decides to leave the hippie activist. Cartman finds a crew working on a deforestation project and asks for help. In San Jose, the President stalls for time by telling Polish jokes. Meanwhile Miss Stevens and the remaining children find a group of natives who are intent upon killing them. As they run away the fall victim to quicksand.
The natives pull them out and tie them up. They plan on sacrificing Miss Stevens. Miss Stevens changes her mind and decides the rain forest really sucks, just as Cartman and the construction workers arrive to save the day. Miss Stevens and the children are so happy to be saved that they literally change their tune about the rainforest.
Kenny almost dies when he lies to his girlfriend and is struck by lightning. Ironically she revives him, while all Stan and Kyle can do is say their catchphrase and not define who "they" are.
A choir group, "Getting Gay With Kids," visits South Park to recruit more kids for their upcoming concert in Costa Rica for the benefit of the rain forests. The boys are forced to join by Mr. Mackey as a punishment for their unruly behavior in class. In Costa Rica, they leave the "comfort" of the capital to take a tour of a nearby rain forest. Their guide is eventually devoured by a snake, and they become stranded.
Full Recap
Miss Stevens is in Mr. Garrison's class recruiting students for a choir tour called "Getting Gay With Kids". They are going to Central America to help to save the Rainforest. Our boys cause trouble and are sent to the office. Kenny has fallen for one of the girls in the choir, so when Mr. Mackey punishes the boys by forcing them to join the choir, he is the only one who is happy about it. The children are on their way to San Jose, Costa Rica. Kenny meets with Kelly, who starts calling him Lenny, Benny and anything other than his name. Miss Stevens also tells Cartman that she plans on changing him; she's got a lot of work ahead of her. Miss Stevens brings the children to much the President of Costa Rica. The President offers them a tour of the rainforest, but first they do a preview concert. Miss Stevens is dismayed by Kyle's lack of rhythm.
On their tour of the rainforest, the children see the wonders of the rainforest, which Cartman keeps trying to beat. Their tour guide is killed and eaten by a snake. Miss Stevens and the children are on their own. Kelly tells Kenny that she likes him, which is bad for her, because she doesn't want her heart broken. Outside the rainforest, Mr. Mackey wonders what has happened to the choir. In the rainforest, Miss Stevens back is covered by a huge bug. They run into a group of revolutionaries. Miss Stevens tries to entertain the troops. They are going to be sent away, when government troops arrive starting a battle.
Miss Stevens and the children are still wandering around the rainforest. Back in San Jose, the concert is about an hour away from starting. Cartman decides to leave the hippie activist. Cartman finds a crew working on a deforestation project and asks for help. In San Jose, the President stalls for time by telling Polish jokes. Meanwhile Miss Stevens and the remaining children find a group of natives who are intent upon killing them. As they run away the fall victim to quicksand.
The natives pull them out and tie them up. They plan on sacrificing Miss Stevens. Miss Stevens changes her mind and decides the rain forest really sucks, just as Cartman and the construction workers arrive to save the day. Miss Stevens and the children are so happy to be saved that they literally change their tune about the rainforest.
Kenny almost dies when he lies to his girlfriend and is struck by lightning. Ironically she revives him, while all Stan and Kyle can do is say their catchphrase and not define who "they" are.
Monday, May 25, 2009
infections 8.inf.002002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
So the researchers tested how the knockout mouse immune system fared against a parasite called Toxoplasma gondii. The team used T. gondii because mice fighting off the parasite require robust activation of T cells; mice with weak T cell activity will die from the infection within one week. The mice lacking the receptor still mustered up a healthy response to the parasite, indicating that DR3 is not essential for fighting off the infection, Siegel’s team found.
Though still preliminary, the results suggest that blocking the DR3 receptor may help in treating multiple sclerosis, asthma and other autoimmune diseases where T cell dysfunction plays a role, says Tania Watts, an immunologist at the University of Toronto in Canada.
Croft agrees.
“It’s certainly a very provocative study and has put DR3 and TL1A in the same type of therapeutic league as some of the other members of the TNF receptor family,” he says. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Moving forward
Still, researchers need to confirm that DR3 isn’t essential in fighting off other infections, Watts says. So researchers should see how knockout mice hold up against influenza. “We want to know if it’s a good treatment for lung inflammation for asthma,” she says. “So what’s it going to do with a common lung infection?”
Even if DR3 knockout mice are hale and hearty after a battery of immune assaults, the results need to be translated to humans, Siegel says. Since researchers can’t simply knock out DR3 genes in humans, the team needs to use a drug that keeps TL1A from binding to the DR3 receptor, he says. But developing that drug could happen quickly, he adds.
“Because [DR3] is the same family of receptors as TNF, companies can go very quickly,” he says. “They can probably make this blocking antibody within a matter of months because they know how to do these things so well.”
From there, it may be three to five years before clinical trials could start, assuming all goes well, he says.
Though still preliminary, the results suggest that blocking the DR3 receptor may help in treating multiple sclerosis, asthma and other autoimmune diseases where T cell dysfunction plays a role, says Tania Watts, an immunologist at the University of Toronto in Canada.
Croft agrees.
“It’s certainly a very provocative study and has put DR3 and TL1A in the same type of therapeutic league as some of the other members of the TNF receptor family,” he says. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Moving forward
Still, researchers need to confirm that DR3 isn’t essential in fighting off other infections, Watts says. So researchers should see how knockout mice hold up against influenza. “We want to know if it’s a good treatment for lung inflammation for asthma,” she says. “So what’s it going to do with a common lung infection?”
Even if DR3 knockout mice are hale and hearty after a battery of immune assaults, the results need to be translated to humans, Siegel says. Since researchers can’t simply knock out DR3 genes in humans, the team needs to use a drug that keeps TL1A from binding to the DR3 receptor, he says. But developing that drug could happen quickly, he adds.
“Because [DR3] is the same family of receptors as TNF, companies can go very quickly,” he says. “They can probably make this blocking antibody within a matter of months because they know how to do these things so well.”
From there, it may be three to five years before clinical trials could start, assuming all goes well, he says.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
manila 3.man.0001002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
China’s frenetic construction of coal-fired power plants has raised worries around the world about the effect on climate change. China now uses more coal than the United States, Europe and Japan combined, making it the world’s largest emitter of gases that are warming the planet.
But largely missing in the hand-wringing is this: China has emerged in the past two years as the world’s leading builder of more efficient, less polluting coal power plants, mastering the technology and driving down the cost.
While the United States is still debating whether to build a more efficient kind of coal-fired power plant that uses extremely hot steam, China has begun building such plants at a rate of one a month.
Construction has stalled in the United States on a new generation of low-pollution power plants that turn coal into a gas before burning it, although Energy Secretary Steven Chu said Thursday that the Obama administration might revive one power plant of this type. But China has already approved equipment purchases for just such a power plant, to be assembled soon in a muddy field here in Tianjin.
“The steps they’ve taken are probably as fast and as serious as anywhere in power-generation history,” said Hal Harvey, president of ClimateWorks, a group in San Francisco that helps finance projects to limit global warming.
Western countries continue to rely heavily on coal-fired power plants built decades ago with outdated, inefficient technology that burn a lot of coal and emit considerable amounts of carbon dioxide. China has begun requiring power companies to retire an older, more polluting power plant for each new one they build.
Cao Peixi, the president of the China Huaneng Group, the country’s biggest state-owned electric utility and the majority partner in the joint venture building the Tianjin plant, said his company was committed to the project even though it would cost more than conventional plants.
“We shouldn’t look at this project from a purely financial perspective,” he said. “It represents the future.”
Without doubt, China’s coal-fired power sector still has many problems, and global warming gases from the country are expected to continue increasing. China’s aim is to use the newest technologies to limit the rate of increase.
Only half the country’s coal-fired power plants have the emissions control equipment to remove sulfur compounds that cause acid rain, and even power plants with that technology do not always use it. China has not begun regulating some of the emissions that lead to heavy smog in big cities.
Even among China’s newly built plants, not all are modern. Only about 60 percent of the new plants are being built using newer technology that is highly efficient, but more expensive.
With greater efficiency, a power plant burns less coal and emits less carbon dioxide for each unit of electricity it generates. Experts say the least efficient plants in China today convert 27 to 36 percent of the energy in coal into electricity. The most efficient plants achieve an efficiency as high as 44 percent, meaning they can cut global warming emissions by more than a third compared with the weakest plants.
In the United States, the most efficient plants achieve around 40 percent efficiency, because they do not use the highest steam temperatures being adopted in China. The average efficiency of American coal-fired plants is still higher than the average efficiency of Chinese power plants, because China built so many inefficient plants over the past decade. But China is rapidly closing the gap by using some of the world’s most advanced designs.
After relying until recently on older technology, “China has since become the major world market for advanced coal-fired power plants with high-specification emission control systems,” the International Energy Agency said in a report on April 20.
China’s improvements are starting to have an effect on climate models. In its latest annual report last November, the I.E.A. cut its forecast of the annual increase in Chinese emissions of global warming gases, to 3 percent from 3.2 percent, in response to technological gains, particularly in the coal sector, even as the agency raised slightly its forecast for Chinese economic growth. “It’s definitely changing the baseline, and that’s being taken into account,” said Jonathan Sinton, a China specialist at the energy agency.
But by continuing to rely heavily on coal, which supplies 80 percent of its electricity, China ensures that it will keep emitting a lot of carbon dioxide; even an efficient coal-fired power plant emits twice the carbon dioxide of a natural gas-fired plant.
Perhaps the biggest question now is how much further China can go beyond the recent steps. In particular, how fast will it move toward power plants that capture their emissions and store them underground or under the seafloor?
That technology could, in theory, create power plants that contribute virtually nothing to global warming. Many countries hope to develop such plants, though progress has been halting; Energy Secretary Chu has promised steps to speed up the technology in the United States.
China has just built a small, experimental facility near Beijing to remove carbon dioxide from power station emissions and use it to provide carbonation for beverages, and the government has a short list of possible locations for a large experiment to capture and store carbon dioxide. But so far, it has no plans to make this a national policy.
China is making other efforts to reduce its global warming emissions. It has doubled its total wind energy capacity in each of the past four years, and is poised to pass the United States as soon as this year as the world’s largest market for wind power equipment. China is building considerably more nuclear power plants than the rest of the world combined, and these do not emit carbon dioxide after they are built.
But coal remains the cheapest energy source in China by a wide margin. China has the world’s third-largest coal reserves, after the United States and Russia.
“No matter how much renewable or nuclear is in the mix, coal will remain the dominant power source,” said Ashok Bhargava, a China energy expert at the Asian Development Bank in Manila.
Another problem is that China has finally developed the ability to build high-technology power plants only at the end of a national binge of building lower-tech coal-fired plants. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Construction is now slowing because of the economic slump.
By adopting “ultra-supercritical” technology, which uses extremely hot steam to achieve the highest efficiency, and by building many identical power plants at the same time, China has cut costs dramatically through economies of scale. It now can cost a third less to build an ultra-supercritical power plant in China than to build a less efficient coal-fired plant in the United States.
But largely missing in the hand-wringing is this: China has emerged in the past two years as the world’s leading builder of more efficient, less polluting coal power plants, mastering the technology and driving down the cost.
While the United States is still debating whether to build a more efficient kind of coal-fired power plant that uses extremely hot steam, China has begun building such plants at a rate of one a month.
Construction has stalled in the United States on a new generation of low-pollution power plants that turn coal into a gas before burning it, although Energy Secretary Steven Chu said Thursday that the Obama administration might revive one power plant of this type. But China has already approved equipment purchases for just such a power plant, to be assembled soon in a muddy field here in Tianjin.
“The steps they’ve taken are probably as fast and as serious as anywhere in power-generation history,” said Hal Harvey, president of ClimateWorks, a group in San Francisco that helps finance projects to limit global warming.
Western countries continue to rely heavily on coal-fired power plants built decades ago with outdated, inefficient technology that burn a lot of coal and emit considerable amounts of carbon dioxide. China has begun requiring power companies to retire an older, more polluting power plant for each new one they build.
Cao Peixi, the president of the China Huaneng Group, the country’s biggest state-owned electric utility and the majority partner in the joint venture building the Tianjin plant, said his company was committed to the project even though it would cost more than conventional plants.
“We shouldn’t look at this project from a purely financial perspective,” he said. “It represents the future.”
Without doubt, China’s coal-fired power sector still has many problems, and global warming gases from the country are expected to continue increasing. China’s aim is to use the newest technologies to limit the rate of increase.
Only half the country’s coal-fired power plants have the emissions control equipment to remove sulfur compounds that cause acid rain, and even power plants with that technology do not always use it. China has not begun regulating some of the emissions that lead to heavy smog in big cities.
Even among China’s newly built plants, not all are modern. Only about 60 percent of the new plants are being built using newer technology that is highly efficient, but more expensive.
With greater efficiency, a power plant burns less coal and emits less carbon dioxide for each unit of electricity it generates. Experts say the least efficient plants in China today convert 27 to 36 percent of the energy in coal into electricity. The most efficient plants achieve an efficiency as high as 44 percent, meaning they can cut global warming emissions by more than a third compared with the weakest plants.
In the United States, the most efficient plants achieve around 40 percent efficiency, because they do not use the highest steam temperatures being adopted in China. The average efficiency of American coal-fired plants is still higher than the average efficiency of Chinese power plants, because China built so many inefficient plants over the past decade. But China is rapidly closing the gap by using some of the world’s most advanced designs.
After relying until recently on older technology, “China has since become the major world market for advanced coal-fired power plants with high-specification emission control systems,” the International Energy Agency said in a report on April 20.
China’s improvements are starting to have an effect on climate models. In its latest annual report last November, the I.E.A. cut its forecast of the annual increase in Chinese emissions of global warming gases, to 3 percent from 3.2 percent, in response to technological gains, particularly in the coal sector, even as the agency raised slightly its forecast for Chinese economic growth. “It’s definitely changing the baseline, and that’s being taken into account,” said Jonathan Sinton, a China specialist at the energy agency.
But by continuing to rely heavily on coal, which supplies 80 percent of its electricity, China ensures that it will keep emitting a lot of carbon dioxide; even an efficient coal-fired power plant emits twice the carbon dioxide of a natural gas-fired plant.
Perhaps the biggest question now is how much further China can go beyond the recent steps. In particular, how fast will it move toward power plants that capture their emissions and store them underground or under the seafloor?
That technology could, in theory, create power plants that contribute virtually nothing to global warming. Many countries hope to develop such plants, though progress has been halting; Energy Secretary Chu has promised steps to speed up the technology in the United States.
China has just built a small, experimental facility near Beijing to remove carbon dioxide from power station emissions and use it to provide carbonation for beverages, and the government has a short list of possible locations for a large experiment to capture and store carbon dioxide. But so far, it has no plans to make this a national policy.
China is making other efforts to reduce its global warming emissions. It has doubled its total wind energy capacity in each of the past four years, and is poised to pass the United States as soon as this year as the world’s largest market for wind power equipment. China is building considerably more nuclear power plants than the rest of the world combined, and these do not emit carbon dioxide after they are built.
But coal remains the cheapest energy source in China by a wide margin. China has the world’s third-largest coal reserves, after the United States and Russia.
“No matter how much renewable or nuclear is in the mix, coal will remain the dominant power source,” said Ashok Bhargava, a China energy expert at the Asian Development Bank in Manila.
Another problem is that China has finally developed the ability to build high-technology power plants only at the end of a national binge of building lower-tech coal-fired plants. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Construction is now slowing because of the economic slump.
By adopting “ultra-supercritical” technology, which uses extremely hot steam to achieve the highest efficiency, and by building many identical power plants at the same time, China has cut costs dramatically through economies of scale. It now can cost a third less to build an ultra-supercritical power plant in China than to build a less efficient coal-fired plant in the United States.
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